I don't think people should obsess so much over the dying bit; who cares if you die? You're alive at the end of it, after all.
Re: Transports in New Trek (novelization)
- Thread starter Creedence
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Re: Transports in New Trek
OK-read through the whole thread to see if this is addressed. On the contrary, I think that there is evidence that in the ST fictional universe, it is an unavoidable truth that the soul exists.
Spock's body exists in ST III, but his "Katra", his soul is stuck in McCoy. During this time he had no mental function, just that of instinct, all that made him Spock was elsewhere.
Not to mention the numerous examples we see of life forms which have transcended the need for physical form, and only have the "life force" left.
If anything, I think ST makes the case that our soul, the thing which makes us who we are, is a real and transcendent force within our physical being.
the evidence seems to be rather absolute that in the Star Trek fictional universe(s), there is no such thing as a "soul"
Or did Riker's "soul" get split in half?
OK-read through the whole thread to see if this is addressed. On the contrary, I think that there is evidence that in the ST fictional universe, it is an unavoidable truth that the soul exists.
Spock's body exists in ST III, but his "Katra", his soul is stuck in McCoy. During this time he had no mental function, just that of instinct, all that made him Spock was elsewhere.
Not to mention the numerous examples we see of life forms which have transcended the need for physical form, and only have the "life force" left.
If anything, I think ST makes the case that our soul, the thing which makes us who we are, is a real and transcendent force within our physical being.
If the technology existed today, I wouldn't hesitate. Unless the fatality rate is high, of course. Who cares if you're clinically dead? You could be clinically dead on the operating table, and if they didn't tell you, you'd be none the wiser. I don't care if I die, I don't care if they turn me into a lemon pie and I don't care if they duplicate me and integrate the duplicates -- so long as, when transport is finished, I'm at my destination and, as far as I can tell, see, think and feel the same as before.
Now if I'd grow an extra manhood, or if I turn purple, or if my length would vary with every transport -- that'd be an issue for me.
God, I've replied to this enough. At this point, I'm going to "replicate" what others have said in a related discussion on Megan McArdle's blog:
Link to comment by "Brian" quoted above
[Quote tags added for clarity and non-functioning link corrected. - M']
Amen. Having said all that, if a real life transporter is ever developed, I would be open to true believers, like those in this thread, extinguishing themselves in order to be first in line.
Link to article
Link to comment by "Brian" quoted above
[Quote tags added for clarity and non-functioning link corrected. - M']
Amen. Having said all that, if a real life transporter is ever developed, I would be open to true believers, like those in this thread, extinguishing themselves in order to be first in line.
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The duplicate example proves the point - if the original is killed, then who cares how many duplicates are created? None of them are the original, so they can go piss off. The only way duplicates are a problem is if the original isn't killed, if the person who comes out at the end is the same as the person who went in, only then is two people coming out a problem.
Which one is the original? The only reasonable answer is, they both are. Doesn't do much good in terms of real-world application, though.
Yes, and these days that's how we measure life vs. death. That wasn't always the case - just as many in this thread are arguing that a brief cessation of brain activity during transport equals death, at one time it was felt that stopping the heart equals death, that starting the heart again after stopping it was akin to creating a zombie, and that putting a person on a bypass machine was a hideous perversion of science. Eventually, the real-life benefits of these procedures outstripped these concerns, and opinions changed.
You keep only considering each half of the process individually. Yes, when your brain is disassembled you will lose consciousness. But once it's reassembled at your destination your consciousness will resume.
Most surgeries also look quite bleak if you only consider the first half - You are wheeled into an operating room, at which point doctors pump you full of narcotic drugs and you lose all consciousness. Then they start cutting your body open. The end. Sounds pretty grim, doesn't it?
I think that last bit is backwards - the only way to argue that transport=death would be to assume something non-physical like a soul, because anything physical is transported. If sentience is physical, then it will be in the new body. Also, what is the stream of consciousness from that first paragraph if not something incorporeal which you are saying is the true seat of sentience?
Can you tell me the difference between the mind that is dematerialized at one transporter and the one rematerialized at the other end? If the person who walks out the other end has all of the memories, the thoughts, the persionality, etc. of the original, believes themselves to be the original, remembers the transporter room fading away and the destination fading in around them, tell me in what way is the person at the end not the person from the beginning?
Exactly! That's why I think the word "death" is being used incorrectly here - a brief cessation of consciousness followed by its immediate resumption is not death, no more than a brief cessation of heart beats or a brief cessation of respiration.
It matters because the original person's consciousness ends when their body is destroyed. A new body is created elsewhere - a body that happens to be identical or nearly so - but the original individual will be unable to enjoy it.
Is it that hard to recognize that if your body is destroyed, that no matter what new body is assembled, that your sense of life continuity is at an end? That it comes to a permanent end as soon as your brain is dissolved into a molecular soup?
Yes, from the standpoint of society, of friends, and family, this a distinction without a difference. But, remember, from the perspective of the public at large, Kirk's or Riker's transporter twin is as good as the original as well.
Edit: I should add - whatever the changing opinions on the life-death transition hitherto, it seems fair now to conclude that brain death is the vital distinction. Transport necessitates brain death, period. It necessitates the destruction and elimination of the entire human body.
It goes beyond, even, the temporary extinguishing of brain activity to be followed by it's revival, which by the way, most likely has never occurred. It extends, rather, to the disappearance of the brain, and the appearance of an identical brain in another place and time.
All other forms of "death" (like surgery, cardiac arrest, severe hypothermia, whatever) do not involve total brain death. In all cases of individuals being revived, brain activity continued at some level.
Is it that hard to recognize that if your body is destroyed, that no matter what new body is assembled, that your sense of life continuity is at an end? That it comes to a permanent end as soon as your brain is dissolved into a molecular soup?
Yes, from the standpoint of society, of friends, and family, this a distinction without a difference. But, remember, from the perspective of the public at large, Kirk's or Riker's transporter twin is as good as the original as well.
Edit: I should add - whatever the changing opinions on the life-death transition hitherto, it seems fair now to conclude that brain death is the vital distinction. Transport necessitates brain death, period. It necessitates the destruction and elimination of the entire human body.
It goes beyond, even, the temporary extinguishing of brain activity to be followed by it's revival, which by the way, most likely has never occurred. It extends, rather, to the disappearance of the brain, and the appearance of an identical brain in another place and time.
All other forms of "death" (like surgery, cardiac arrest, severe hypothermia, whatever) do not involve total brain death. In all cases of individuals being revived, brain activity continued at some level.
That's the thing - your sense of life continuity doesn't end, any more than it does under anesthesia, or when you go to sleep at night - in fact much less than either of those, because rather than hours of unconsciousness, transporting only involves seconds, at most. One of the points that I've been trying to make is that this interruption of conciousness is not permanent, but only momentary.
But if brain activity only pauses, and resumes a moment later, can that really be called death? When the person is standing in front of you, whole and intact and kind of hungry, are you going to tell them, Sorry, your EEG flatlined for 1.2 seconds, you're dead, so stop asking for a sandwich?
Well, this is science fiction.
There is no original individual, he's been destroyed. All that's left is you, and your hopes, fears, beliefs and everything is exactly the same as the other you had. In essense, you are still you. Thus, there is no original and there is no copy; you are you and are still you, even though you've died and then got better again.
If instead, during the transport, two duplicates were created instead of one, would that have any bearing whatsoever on your opinion? Or why stop at two, let's say a million duplicates are reproduced.
I still can't fathom why it isn't obvious that *you*, as in the stream of awareness of existence that is you, ceases to exist when your body is vaporized.
The replicated being is a reproduction - the Scottie we saw in "Relics" was based upon a template in the computer's memory.
Here's the crucial point: once we're dealing with data in a computer, there's no barrier to producing an infinite number of copies. Are all these copies you and only you? If a million versions of President Obama go walking around after he's beamed out of Airforce One - is he really immortal?
I still can't fathom why it isn't obvious that *you*, as in the stream of awareness of existence that is you, ceases to exist when your body is vaporized.
The replicated being is a reproduction - the Scottie we saw in "Relics" was based upon a template in the computer's memory.
Here's the crucial point: once we're dealing with data in a computer, there's no barrier to producing an infinite number of copies. Are all these copies you and only you? If a million versions of President Obama go walking around after he's beamed out of Airforce One - is he really immortal?
It isn't obvious to me, and I've never -- through all of the series and all of the movies -- ever been given the impression that anyone dies when the matter and energy of which they are ordinarily composed is converted (not vaporized - where does that come from, anyway?) into a transmittable state. It seems to me better explained as being akin to a state change:
matter(you) -> energy(you) -> matter(you)
with, perhaps, the "stream of awareness of existence" you mention merely paused for an eye-blink or a hiccup, barely noticed or given any thought. You (the hypothetical "you") haven't ceased to exist; you've continued to exist while undergoing a state change.
I don't understand the claim that death is a necessary part of the transportation process, yet it's been stated as fact in this thread more than a few times. What is the on-screen source of this assertion and why is it so important to anyone that death occur at all?
As long as there is only one of me at the end of the transport, I don't care how many duplicates get made. The problem only stars when these duplicates are allowed to exist outside of the transport -- you'd suddenly have clones without preparing for them. I don't mind clones of me, I'm handsome after all
, but they can't sleep with my girlfriend! 
No seriously, it doesn't matter if you're still the you with all your original atoms or if you're a reproduction from the original you -- your body chemistry changes from one moment to the next, so in effect, each microsecond you are a reproduction. That doesn't bother you, does it? So why should a transport? It's not as if the reproduction is somehow inferior in quality to the original.
Now that would be a good point for me to refuse transport: if the person that steps out is physically inferior (perhaps in brain chemisty, or cell biology) then the previous one, and you'd be a vegetable after a transport or 10.
Any copy is you -- but as long as the copies don't exist outside of the transport systems, it doesn't matter since they don't really exist. If you put a cat in a box, make him unconscious, it doesn't matter if you turn it into a stone brick, jell-o or a popsicle, as long as, when you open the box, your cat is still there, and he still looks, feels, acts and thinks the same.
How come you believe otherwise? Do you think that any copy is inferior? Are you afraid they'll intrude into your life? I'd be -- but I assume that, if that would be the case, the transport would most certainly kill off those individuals before they become conscious. And since they didn't become conscious, it isn't (yet) murder, since they have no life experiences whatsoever of their own, not even a single microsecond -- they're just some data you can randomly copy or delete. When they do become conscious, it's another matter - then they're persons in their own right and you have a problem on your hands.
Thought experiment.
Suppose a scientist had developed a new type of nano technology. As an experiment, he applies it to a volunteer. You.
Over a period of one month, individual nanobots (TNG term, but it fits) gradually replace every cell in your body. They travel to the cells site, study it's structure and function, destroy it, then replace it. They replicate it's function and attributes in every way.
At the end of this experiment you are left with a body and brain that are indistinguishable from before. Yet they are comprised of entirely different materials.
Question: Are you still you? That is, are you the same individual that volunteered a month ago.
Discuss. Write on one side of the paper only.
Suppose a scientist had developed a new type of nano technology. As an experiment, he applies it to a volunteer. You.
Over a period of one month, individual nanobots (TNG term, but it fits) gradually replace every cell in your body. They travel to the cells site, study it's structure and function, destroy it, then replace it. They replicate it's function and attributes in every way.
At the end of this experiment you are left with a body and brain that are indistinguishable from before. Yet they are comprised of entirely different materials.
Question: Are you still you? That is, are you the same individual that volunteered a month ago.
Discuss. Write on one side of the paper only.
I think there's more to you then simply your body; as such, an argument can be made that you would still be you. Even if your body is different and you won't recognize the face staring back at you in the mirror, are your thoughts not the same as before? Your desires, hopes, dreams, fears? If you get down to it, I think it's not such a bold claim to define a person as nothing more but his/her personality and life experiences. As long as you keep those intact, I'd say the nanobot person is you -- not some copy or reproduction, but you. Just slightly different in physical makeup. But then, if you eat something different then the day before, your physical makeup is different as well.
Well, to be fair, we're all just (increasingly shoddy) copies of oursevles anyways, biologically speaking. Then one day the copy passes the threshold of viability and we 'die.'
Since this thread has become rather philosophical, the following eight pages from Douglas Hofstadter's I Am a Strange Loop may be of interest. These are less than 2% of the total work (keeping within fair use), and each image is less than 640 pixels max and 70 k (keeping within TrekBBS guidelines). I hope that you find them thought-provoking/useful.
The thing is Cartesian Ego is not a tangible thing. It sounds to be part memory, part consciousness. Both are all in the mind of a person. Since the mind is being reconstructed at the destination, down to quantum level, it is the exact same mind that is present at the end of the transport cycle that was present at the start of the cycle at the source (at least up until the quantum scan was completed. If you had any thought after that and before molecular incoherency, that may be lost, but the destination brain may "create" the same thought since the thought(s) before dissolving were the exact same.
I agree (and so does Hofstadter - sort of, but apparently not Parfit). Hofstadter and I both view human consciousness as a pattern - one that could "run" on a computer or another brain (assuming they physically support it, with no "extra element/soul" needed). In Trek terms, this would mean that Tom Riker was as much a person as Will Riker.
To be fair to Hofstadter, his view is actually more complex than this. As far as I can tell, he has an extremely subtle take on the human "I" experience, such that it isn't "really" real, but is rather a hallucination (in his terms, an "I" is a hallucination hallucinated by a hallucination - he views consciousness as an inevitable consequence of any sufficiently complex system rather than a separate entity). However, he isn't being irrational, just very subtle (a point that I can't bring out even if I were to scan a whole chapter: he takes most of his roughly 400-page book to make his point).
But on the subject of a transported subject, I'm comfortable in saying that any created duplicate would be "the same" as the original. I have no problem with "the same" being/consciousness existing in two places as the same time, using different atoms.
First off, it depends how you define "you". If you believe that you are made of your physical structure (your body and brain) then the transporter doesn't kill you. It simply converts you to energy and then builds you back up again. You technically die but you live again so that isn't the issue.
However if you believe that there is something else that constitutes "you", as in a soul that contains your indivual essence, then there may be anissue bacaues the transporter may not be able to copy this.
It's my opinion that souls don't exist and that our brain funtioning or consciousness is what people call our soul. if an exact copy of this comes out at the other end, it is still us, and therefore our identity is still intact.
I don't see a problem with it when I look at it that way. I think the issue so many people have with it is that being converted into energy and then back into matter sounds scary. It sounds scary to me. It's unknown and people have problems with what can't be understood. I wouldn't volunteer to be a testing subject for a transporter, but if it had been proved to work just fine I wouldn't mind using it.
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