Dollhouse: "Haunted" (1x10)

[Admiral Buzzkill]

I loved the Ballard/Mellie bits because, dude, with all those layers of "who abuses who" this is all kinds of frakked up.

Exactly. There's a subtext to this show that I'm not really willing to try too hard to tease out or define right now, partly because I'm not sure that the writers are so clear on what they're doing yet that it would stand up to analysis. One can get too far ahead of a story and then wind up unnecessarily disappointed when the folks telling it have something different in mind.

Topher is lonely, yeah. All of the employees of the Dollhouse are deeply lonely and isolated. The Actives, of course, are not.

I was glad that the writers refrained from putting any additional analysis of Topher into the mouths of any of the other characters. The birthday cake itself was almost too much, but as a silent bit it played okay.

 

[Ryan]

I liked the concept of achieving immortality through Dollhouse technology.

I'm surprised DeWitt didn't point out to Boyd it's not real immortality. It's just another doll running around with a copy of someone's memories/personality, just without the usual conditioning.

 

[Hyperspace05]

I liked the concept of achieving immortality through Dollhouse technology.

I'm surprised DeWitt didn't point out to Boyd it's not real immortality. It's just another doll running around with a copy of someone's memories/personality, just without the usual conditioning.

How is it not real immortality? If the full personality and memories is downloaded into the doll - well then that *is* the new you. You are the sum of your experiences and memories. Same body? no... But all the cells in your own body get replaced eventually as life progresses. And you are still you.

It's not perhaps true immortality in a narrow definition, but for all intents and purposes, it could be.

 

[Admiral Buzzkill]

It's immortality as far as the people around you are concerned. As far as you're concerned - well, you're not concerned. You have ceased to care about anything; you're dead.

 

[Dionysis]

Brilliant concept handled as well as can be expected for prime time TV.

I agree she went too easily at the end. Of course it would have been a horrendous cliche if she'd decided to run off or put up a fight for Echo's body (hm!). But a bit of "just five more minutes, ma?" would have been expected of a normal person. Or maybe it just shows how strong a person she was that she simply lay down and died on cue.

One of the best eps, IMHO.

They could have just programmed that in her memory, to not resist?

 

[Ryan]

How is it not real immortality? If the full personality and memories is downloaded into the doll - well then that *is* the new you. You are the sum of your experiences and memories.

That my consciousness could be duplicated doesn't change the fact that I'm still going to die and cease existing. If you take a Gutenberg Bible and throw it in a fire that book is gone forever even though we have digital copies of the text.

In the same way once my body physically dies my consciousness is gone. That there would be a clone of my personality out there presumably making all the same decisions I would is as immaterial to my mortality as if it were running around while I was still alive.

 

[Admiral Buzzkill]

How is it not real immortality? If the full personality and memories is downloaded into the doll - well then that *is* the new you. You are the sum of your experiences and memories.

That my consciousness could be duplicated doesn't change the fact that I'm still going to die and cease existing. If you take a Gutenberg Bible and throw it in a fire that book is gone forever even though we have digital copies of the text.

In the same way once my body physically dies my consciousness is gone. That there would be a clone of my personality out there presumably making all the same decisions I would is as immaterial to my mortality as if it were running around while I was still alive.

Absolutely Right(TM).

 

[Mr Light]

Unfortunately I found this episode as (not)interesting as the first five, except for the amusing Topher subplot. I wonder if he boffs them? And does he pick the same girl every year or does he rotate? Was that supposed to be a clone of his own personality? The mind boggles!

 

[Mr Light]

I didn't enjoy the Helo subplot either. He ignores her and treats her like crap... until she gives a speech to him about how she'll just be his sex doll to use as he pleases and then he boffs her? Yeesh. So much for our "hero" character

 

[PurpleBuddha]

I gotta disagree about Topher. He's been one of the more entertaining parts of the show for me. His scenes with Sierra in this one were really cute and raised the episode from average to above average.

I agree. I think Topher adds a lot to the show.

 

[Ayelbourne]

That my consciousness could be duplicated doesn't change the fact that I'm still going to die and cease existing. If you take a Gutenberg Bible and throw it in a fire that book is gone forever even though we have digital copies of the text.

In the same way once my body physically dies my consciousness is gone. That there would be a clone of my personality out there presumably making all the same decisions I would is as immaterial to my mortality as if it were running around while I was still alive.

Yeah, the question is: Can you copy a soul?
Funnily enough, that's the same topic that the Pilot for Caprica (and presumably the show) deals with.

But then there's also the question about what's up with the original soul of the doll, in this case Caroline? Were they erased, or are they still in there somewhere?
Based on Needs, I'd say the latter, which would mean that this was Margaret's personality pared with Caroline's soul.

Unfortunately I found this episode as (not)interesting as the first five, except for the amusing Topher subplot. I wonder if he boffs them?

It seemed more platonic to me.
Also, between this and his uncomfortability with the word "errection", I'm starting to believe that he doesn't even have a notable sex drive.

 

[Allyn Gibson]

I didn't enjoy the Helo subplot either. He ignores her and treats her like crap... until she gives a speech to him about how she'll just be his sex doll to use as he pleases and then he boffs her? Yeesh. So much for our "hero" character

My view was that Ballard saw that he was trapped, and he had no way out except to give Mellie what she was programmed to want. Knowing what she was, he pushed her away earlier in the episode. I supposed that she was programmed to behave in certain ways as an unconscious spy, and if certain programming parameters weren't met, she would then go to another level. For Ballard, if he didn't meet the programming's expectations, it could trigger more suspicion on him and bring the Dollhouse down on him. I think he realized that he had no choice -- he has to give the Mellie program what she wants, so that his investigation can continue without the Dollhouse growing suspicious of his motives.

 

[Admiral Buzzkill]

I don't think a Whedon series needs an unalloyed "hero" character for very long. Ballard is learning a lot about what the Dollhouse is all about.

 

[Temis the Vorta]

I liked the concept of achieving immortality through Dollhouse technology.

I'm surprised DeWitt didn't point out to Boyd it's not real immortality. It's just another doll running around with a copy of someone's memories/personality, just without the usual conditioning.

How is it not real immortality? If the full personality and memories is downloaded into the doll - well then that *is* the new you. You are the sum of your experiences and memories. Same body? no... But all the cells in your own body get replaced eventually as life progresses. And you are still you.

It's not perhaps true immortality in a narrow definition, but for all intents and purposes, it could be.

Some people would accept a copy as "immorality," or as much as they're ever going to get, the way people see their children or the work they accomplish in life (publish a book, design a building) as a form of immorality as long as it survives them.

 

[Bishbot]

I'm surprised DeWitt didn't point out to Boyd it's not real immortality. It's just another doll running around with a copy of someone's memories/personality, just without the usual conditioning.

How is it not real immortality? If the full personality and memories is downloaded into the doll - well then that *is* the new you. You are the sum of your experiences and memories. Same body? no... But all the cells in your own body get replaced eventually as life progresses. And you are still you.

It's not perhaps true immortality in a narrow definition, but for all intents and purposes, it could be.

Some people would accept a copy as "immorality," or as much as they're ever going to get, the way people see their children or the work they accomplish in life (publish a book, design a building) as a form of immorality as long as it survives them.

I don't really see why it isn't "real" immortality. Isn't this the same debate about whether the Star Trek Transporter kills the person that gets beamed?

 

[Admiral Buzzkill]

I don't really see why it isn't "real" immortality.?

Because the subject - I'll say "I" - I lose consciousness never to regain it. I'm dead. The fact that there's a perfect duplicate of me who is still alive means nothing to me as far as my own mortality is concerned. I will know nothing of that.

Temis is right, though - there is another way of thinking about survival or immortality which is meaningful to most people while alive, which is the belief that one has made some significant contribution to the world which will outlive one.

 

[Bishbot]

Because the subject - I'll say "I" - I lose consciousness never to regain it. I'm dead. The fact that there's a perfect duplicate of me who is still alive means nothing to me as far as my own mortality is concerned. I will know nothing of that.

Temis is right, though - there is another way of thinking about survival or immortality which is meaningful to most people while alive, which is the belief that one has made some significant contribution to the world which will outlive one.

I guess I just don't see why it matters. Literally the only thing you wouldn't remember is dying, and even then, maybe you'd remember some of that. If your consciousness was in an identical cloned body - where's the harm?

 

[Lindley]

From the point of view of your "second self", nothing. They would think they're you.

From the point of view of your "first self".....well, there's no such thing, since they're dead.

You die and someone else wakes up thinking they're you. That's basically the issue. There's no continuity of consciousness.

 

[Bishbot]

You die and someone else wakes up thinking they're you. That's basically the issue. There's no continuity of consciousness.

That's just semantics though. You lose say, five minutes of awareness, you could have been asleep... it's still everything that makes you you, alive and well, in an identical body. I don't really understand what makes the new person "someone else." but I suppose its a question of what you believe, so I won't ever understand.

 

[Lindley]

From an outside perspective, yes. From the point of view of the person who never woke up, no. I don't see why that's difficult to grasp.