All other things being equal (ie no mitigating circumstances that might dictate otherwise), the perspective of the person whose life is being decided is more valid than the perspective of people whose lives are not. Arbitrary perhaps, but just.
And you still haven't established that Tuvok and Neelix's lives were not at stake.
Nor can I, using your requirements for establishing "life at stake." We know, however, that Tuvix's life is at stake and he will die. We do not know if Tuvok or Neelix's lives are at stake. One is a certainty, the others are uncertain.
No. The criteria for "life" is notoriously difficult to define, as is the criteria for "consciousness," and that's not even begining to scratch the surface of the "value" we should and should not place on each.
My assumption that Tuvix knows the status of Tuvok's and Neelix's consciounesses extancy is just as likely as yours that he doesn't. Recall, after all, that as Tuvok is Vulcan there is cultural proof of a manipulable consciousness - and Tuvix would have that knowledge.
Assumption, not fact.
That may be what you're discussing, but it's not what I am. I'm well aware that Tuvok and Neelix could be "brought back" (though I contend they're returning from death or at least non-existence and may be considered copies rather than the original) - but I don't believe it's valid to take an innocent life to "bring back" others if the innocent is unwilling.
And Janeway obviously thought otherwise, using different criteria.
Our definition of "dead" has changed before and will change again. Rather than belaboring this point, why not just accept that in the Star Trek universe, death - actual nonexistence - can be beaten or at least altered by certain highly advanced civilizations (such as the Q).
I've already accepted such. Now, what I want to know is how that expanded definition of "death" fits into the moral question of what to do with Tuvix.
Obviously. But babies, young children, the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, and the comatose don't have their existence depending on the unwilling death of another being...
If a living being desired life, and such could be established by killing a baby, mentally retarded person, or a comatose person, is it okay to strangle a baby? How does one decide?
- and moreover, there is proof of their existence. Would you also condone killing a healthy person who had no desire to die if it meant that two comatose people would be awakened?
Depends.
Perhaps I did. It's neither justified, nor unjustified, as it wasn't a choice I made, but an accomplished fact that I resulted from the death of a previous "me." That doesn't give you the right to kill me in order to restore "him," nor if it were possible should that be allowed.
You still resulted from the destruction of your prior self. Your assuming that Tuvix's "choice" to remain alive trumps Tuvok and Neelix's "non-choice" to remain Tuvix.
Perhaps the person who existed prior to transport was "murdered" - but the "copy" considers him/herself the same person, as does the rest of society.
Much like Tuvok and Neelix did after being restored.
Moreover, it was a choice made by that person, and if not (emergency transport) then that "original" person is lost.
So what? The person retains the memories and personality of the "original" and is considered to be the "original" by society. And I'm still waiting for you define the nature of existence that we might establish whether the person after the transport can be considered the "same" or not.
The "salamander" might have objected, and you may have a point - good thing that episode never happened.
You still haven't addressed my point. Was the salamander "murdered?" Was the caveman "murdered" after Riker was restored?
I don't need to define "dead," "alive," and "murdered" because my argument doesn't actually hinge on Tuvok or Neelix being dead...
You claim that they "don't exist" anymore, or that they're "dead;" therefore, it's cool to not bring them back in order to perserve Tuvix. Or, at least, that's the way I've been reading it. Clarify as you see fit.
What, pray tell, makes Janeway's decision "right" from a military perspective as opposed to a farming community?
In the military, the needs of the many do, in fact, outweigh the needs of the few. In an organization that's often called upon to destry large amounts of life, the focus is on reducing the amount of harm as much as possible; therefore, two > one.
What other considerations or factors could be more important in the case of an innocent man (that is, not responsible for his existence or for the deaths/apparent deaths of Tuvok and Neelix) who has no desire or intent to harm others than his own right to life?
The fact that Tuvok and Neelix have prior established relationships and family? The fact that two able-bodied crewmembers are better than one? Saving two lives as opposed to one? Whether these factors "matter" to you is entirely subjective.
I'm sure there were Japanese citizens who "desired life" before an atomic bomb was dropped on them, but it was decided that ending WWII was more important than their "desires."
If VOY was being attacked by a ship whose crew was largely comprised of conscripts who "desired life" and had no "choice" but to be where they were, would Janeway be "justified" in destroying the attacking ship? My point is, depending on your point of view and your specific circumstances, an individual's "rights" and "desires" may or may not matter, especially in the military where "individuals" are often considered less important than the group.
What makes killing one innocent person to bring back two other innocent people in any way jusified?
Depends on your perspective.
Tuvix exists and has a right to life. This is known.
"Rights" are established by the society in which one lives. There is no inherent "right to life" as far as objective, inherent, universal "truths" go. In this particular context, it's debatable whether Tuvix had a "right to life" which was more important than Tuvok and Neelix.
The status of Tuvok and Neelix are unknown.
It is known is that they can be reconstituted. Whether the resulting individuals have a "right to life" that trumps Tuvix is up for interpretation.
In Vulcans at least, the "consciousness" appears to be a discrete physical entity of some sort (the katra) which can be transferred or perhaps copied and, when restored, is culturally considred a restored, reconstituted being. It would be fair to say Tuvok's katra combined with the Talaxian equivalent, Trill-symbiosis style. The difference between Tuvix and Spock's situation though is that Spock-McCoy wanted to dissolve the bond.
"Consciousness," which we STILL have not been able to define, exists in any number of ways on "Star Trek," as do physical bodies.
Well obviously it can't. You were the one that used the phrase "perspective of the universe" though, so I assumed you were doing what Guy was accusing me of doing.
In that there are no "moral truths" inherent in the universe, yes. It doesn't follow that that means the universe can "decide" things.
How very... Miltonic of you, better to reign in Hell eh?
Granted, like Guy correctly pointed out, the writers wanted a "hero," but Janeway, by the very nature of her circumstances and her character, was never going to be a "hero" for everybody. I'm content with Janeway as a flawed captain, and wished the muck-a-mucks would've run with that idea and portrayed her as a person who screwed up by stranding her crew in the DQ and then had to work for seven years to overcome her shortcommings and earn the respect of those she commanded. Instead, we got, "Janeway was always right!" I love Janeway and think she was entirely too complex for such a simplistic approach. They tried too hard to force her into the Picard mold of "perfect, heroic captain." And I can certainly see why you have your issues with her.
