There is no "more valid" or "less valid" perspective, unless you can provide a non-arbitrary reason why Tuvix's perspective is more "valid."
All other things being equal (ie no mitigating circumstances that might dictate otherwise), the perspective of the person whose life is being decided is more valid than the perspective of people whose lives are not. Arbitrary perhaps, but just.
And you still haven't established that Tuvok and Neelix's lives were not at stake.
Nor can I, using your requirements for establishing "life at stake." We know, however, that Tuvix's life is at stake and he will die. We do not know if Tuvok or Neelix's lives are at stake. One is a certainty, the others are uncertain.
That's an assumption, not a fact. Tuvix had no idea if Tuvok's and Neelix's "consciousness" were extant. So far, the concept of "consciousness" hasn't even been defined.
My assumption that Tuvix knows the status of Tuvok's and Neelix's consciounesses extancy is just as likely as yours that he doesn't. Recall, after all, that as Tuvok is Vulcan there is cultural proof of a manipulable consciousness - and Tuvix would have that knowledge.
This discussion is precisely about whether Tuvok and Neelix could be brought back. If they couldn't be brought back, this discussion wouldn't be taking place.
That may be what you're discussing, but it's not what I am. I'm well aware that Tuvok and Neelix could be "brought back" (though I contend they're returning from death or at least non-existence and may be considered copies rather than the original) - but I don't believe it's valid to take an innocent life to "bring back" others if the innocent is unwilling.
And? Then no one is ever really "dead" as we've come to understand the concept of "dead."
Our definition of "dead" has changed before and will change again. Rather than belaboring this point, why not just accept that in the Star Trek universe, death - actual nonexistence - can be beaten or at least altered by certain highly advanced civilizations (such as the Q).
Assumption, not fact. All that is known is that they didn't have a "voice" with which to articulate their wishes, which, as it turns out, babies, young children, the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, and the comatose don't have "voices" either, and, in many cases, have limited to no self-awareness or concept of "death." This does not mean they are afforded no rights, or that their potential wishes are not taken into consideration.
Obviously. But babies, young children, the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, and the comatose don't have their existence depending on the unwilling death of another being - and moreover, there is proof of their existence. Would you also condone killing a healthy person who had no desire to die if it meant that two comatose people would be awakened?
It "kills" the other person who existed prior to the memory loss, or falling asleep. The person you are now could very well depend on the non-existence of the person you were an hour ago. Did you "kill" them, and was it "justified?"
Perhaps I did. It's neither justified, nor unjustified, as it wasn't a choice I made, but an accomplished fact that I resulted from the death of a previous "me." That doesn't give you the right to kill me in order to restore "him," nor if it were possible should that be allowed.
A "new" person is created every time a person is transported from one point to another. Was the person who existed prior to being transported "murdered?" Was the salamander "murdered" when Tom Paris' DNA was restored? Was the caveman "murdered" when Will Riker was brough back from his de-evolved state? What are the definitions of "dead," alive," and "murdered," and how do I know your definitions are any better than Janeway's?
Perhaps the person who existed prior to transport was "murdered" - but the "copy" considers him/herself the same person, as does the rest of society. Moreover, it was a choice made by that person, and if not (emergency transport) then that "original" person is lost. The "salamander" might have objected, and you may have a point - good thing that episode never happened.
I don't need to define "dead," "alive," and "murdered" because my argument doesn't actually hinge on Tuvok or Neelix being dead,
There's any number of "justifications" for killling any person at any time. Whether you personally find them adequate is based on your perspective. From the military perspective, and Starfleet is a para-military organization, Janeway did the "right" thing. If she was a leader of a farming community, things might have been different.
What, pray tell, makes Janeway's decision "right" from a military perspective as opposed to a farming community?
At this point, all you've done is assume that if a sentient being expresses a desire for life, then it trumps all other considerations. There are plenty of examples of a "desire for life" not being the primary factor in a decision as to whether or not to eliminate another being. You may not agree with it, but you haven't demonstrated that your reasoning is any less arbitrary. That's the sticking point in any moral/philisophical discussion.
What other considerations or factors could be more important in the case of an innocent man (that is, not responsible for his existence or for the deaths/apparent deaths of Tuvok and Neelix) who has no desire or intent to harm others than his own right to life?
It might if his continued existence denied the existence of two other people. Depends on your definition of "same."
What makes killing one innocent person to bring back two other innocent people in any way jusified? Tuvix exists and has a right to life. This is known. The status of Tuvok and Neelix are unknown.
That's your perspective, not necessarily the perspective of either Tuvok or Neelix.
Being as he's a Starfleet officer and a Vulcan, I think I can safely say Tuvok would not want an innocent sentient killed on his behalf. Neelix strikes me as very similar, though you're right that we can't know.
And you still have not established a definition for "consciousness," nor whether Tuvok and Neelix were the "same" after being reconstituted, let alone whether they would "want" to be reconstituted.
In Vulcans at least, the "consciousness" appears to be a discrete physical entity of some sort (the
katra) which can be transferred or perhaps copied and, when restored, is culturally considred a restored, reconstituted being. It would be fair to say Tuvok's
katra combined with the Talaxian equivalent, Trill-symbiosis style. The difference between Tuvix and Spock's situation though is that Spock-McCoy
wanted to dissolve the bond.
The universe had made its arbitrary decision already.
How can the universe "decide" things?
Well obviously it can't. You were the one that used the phrase "perspective of the universe" though, so I assumed you were doing what
Guy was accusing me of doing.
When I wake up, I would not like to have myself "reset" to a time before I went to sleep, or any point prior to that, and forcing that on me would be criminal.
Kestrel, how do you know that you haven't been reset, or even reset more than once. If you are reset you can't know, and there could be multiple resets going on even as we post.
<shrug> I don't know, I can't know, and I don't care. That doesn't give you the right to force a change on me by medical procedure which I refuse.
Depending on the point of view "Tuvix" was a reset too, and if the universe chose then there wouldn't have been the ability to restore Tuvok and Neelix in the first place.
Brit
"If man were meant to fly, he'd have been born with wings!"
"If God wanted that baby to be aborted, He wouldn't have let it grow in the first place."
Star Trek's all about going beyond our boundaries - the question isn't "can we" but "should we"; and in this case, "we" (Voyager's crew) should
not have.
It's extremely important, in fact critical, to establish whether Tuvix was speaking metaphorically or literally.
Sorry, that was tongue in cheek. The "justification" is the accomplished fact that two people have been killed.
