Why was it necesarry to prove Data's sentience?

[Use of Time]

Discussions like this, conducted with inquisitiveness and civility, make me very happy to be the TNG moderator. Well done, folks.

I'll take this time to say that I have only been a member a couple of weeks but I have been greatly impressed by the well mannered discourse that take place on these boards. I am generally skeptical of message boards in general but this place is a breath of fresh air. This thread in general has been a blast to me and I think it is really cool that the writers themselves are willing to mix it up with us and dive into these debates. I'm having a lot of fun here.

 

[Unicron]

We'll have to work harder at giving Mutai something to do. Wouldn't want him to get bored in here. Personally, I'd be more interested to learn about Picard's advocation of the rights of Data and other life forms. It was referenced more than once in the series, but never really expounded on in much detail.

 

[Destructor]

But that's not what happened (and I need to correct my own erroneous assumptions after reviewing the episode transcript).

I just read the whole script, and it made me teary! One of the first episodes of Star Trek I was truly moved by.

Still, I think Data was premature in concluding that Maddox couldn't do what he said he would do. Dismantling Data doesn't "kill" him, and dumping (copying) his memory to a computer (even non-positronic) doesn't mean his positronic brain wouldn't remain intact. Reassembling him should bring Data back to normal.

But Maddox wasn't just going to disassemble Data's body. He wasn't studying Data's body, he was studying the positronic brain. I refer you again to the transcript. His proposal called for invasive examination of the brain, so no, the brain definitely would not remain intact. That was the entire point. He wanted to take the brain apart and see how it worked.

An instructive story to relate at this point is the myth of Newton's Bridge. It's a bridge in Cambridge that (according to the myth) was constructed by Newton using no nuts or bolts to hold it together- it was perfectly counterbalanced so that the weight of the the bridge held itself together. A perplexed student do not understand how this worked, so took it apart in order to see how it worked- but couldn't put it back together again in such a way that the bridge's weight would continue to sustain the construction. The bridge still stands today- held together by nuts and bolts.

Tolkien was inspired by this myth to incorporate its lesson into The Fellowship of the Ring:

“For I am Saruman the Wise, Saruman Ring-maker, Saruman of Many Colours!'

I looked then and saw that his robes, which had seemed white, were not so, but were woven of all colours, and if he moved they shimmered and changed hue so that the eye was bewildered.

I liked white better,' I said.

White!' he sneered. 'It serves as a beginning. White cloth may be dyed. The white page can be overwritten; and the white light can be broken.'

In which case it is no longer white,' said I. 'And he that breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom.'

 

[Christopher]

I don't know if if I should make a new thread for this or not but lets talk about Lal. I find it hard to believe that after the incident in "Measure Of A Man" that Lal could be considered property of Starfleet. Is it fair for Starfleet to assume Lal is property. Does Admiral Haftel have that kind of unilateral authority or is that another decision made by many in Starfleet Command. Maybe she could be considered Starfleet property because Data used Starfleet resources (The Enterprise) to create her? Thoughts?

Nobody ever said Lal was property. Here's the transcript for "The Offspring" -- the word "property" is never spoken at any point. The issue was more that Haftel saw Lal more as Data's invention than his child -- a sentient being, yes, but an artificially created one and thus not equivalent to a daughter. So he didn't take it as a given that Data had a parent's rights in the matter. Starfleet Research, which Haftel represented, had decided that it was more qualified to oversee and care for this new entity than Data was.

Again, as with the fight for civil rights in the real world, it's an ongoing, incremental battle. One victory doesn't automatically enlighten everyone, and each tiny step forward must be fought for one by one. The ruling that Data has the right to resign from Starfleet does not, in and of itself, constitute a ruling that he has parental rights over an AI of his creation. That's a separate legal question, even if it is an overlapping ethical question.

 

[Mojochi]

I find it hard to believe that after the incident in "Measure Of A Man" that Lal could be considered property of Starfleet. Is it fair for Starfleet to assume Lal is property. Does Admiral Haftel have that kind of unilateral authority or is that another decision made by many in Starfleet Command. Maybe she could be considered Starfleet property because Data used Starfleet resources (The Enterprise) to create her? Thoughts?

I've heard this point before too, & I still don't buy it being an excuse to deny the liberties of what has been previously ruled a being of free will, by Federation law

Plus, it's a thin thread of a clause to be grasping. Data has sustained injury on a number of occasions, being impaled, for example, in Thine Own Self. When repairs were made, they undoubtedly used Starfleet technology & components to repair or replace damaged parts on Data. Does that nullify the court ruling, such that now he can once again be claimed as Starfleet property? I can't see it being so

It's a being of free will we're talking about. The origin of it's components is moot. I can donate the biological components necessary to create a new human. Do I own that human? Of course not

I just clump this Admiral Haftel in with all the other Starfleet admirals who are willing to attempt breaking rules & regulations, with the idea that they are powerful enough that no one will bother to stop them. Had Lal lived, I suspect that this new conflict would not have even made it to trial. Of course she is a free being just like Data, & of course Data can consider her his child, because he used positronic core dumps from himself to create her. She was made from him, as well as by him, to his own design specs

Just another dickhead admiral needing to be put in his place

 

[Timo]

Odds and ends:

The court ruled that "Data has the right to choose", in reference to his resignation, not the experiment.

The wording was extremely vague, so we don't know what right Data ultimately got, and over which choice.

But it all makes very good sense if the above interpretation is true. If Data is given the right to resign, then Maddox hopefully realizes how much had been at stake, and hopefully withdraws on his own. By giving room for hope, the judge defuses the situation and makes it less likely that Maddox would huff and puff and appeal to higher courts.

Sure the joining papers for Starfleet must note that the candidate is joining of their own free will or similar wording? If data is indeed, simply a machine, he doesn't have free will and therefore his enlistment into Starfleet was invalid as a machine can't legally sign the papers and therefore was never in Starfleet.

And this indeed seemed to be part of the Maddox strategy to get his hands on Data (although no doubt it was just "collateral", as Maddox' real interests were limited to his research): with the ruling of "Starfleet property", all these earlier evaluations of Data would be rendered erroneous and void, and his career would lay in ruins.

As for him for being property? Can they provide a valid receipt or even his warranty?

No doubt they can, or else Louvois would not have ruled the way she originally did.

Again, as with the fight for civil rights in the real world, it's an ongoing, incremental battle.

But unlike the case in the real world, the goal keeps shifting a lot. Here we only have the great diversity of human existence to deal with. Tomorrow, the goal will no doubt expand to include whales, beetles and weeds. But even that is nothing compared with the 24th century where all-new lifeforms either pop up from beyond the horizon of the known, thanks to all the exploration, or then simply suddenly begin to exist, thanks to all the experimentation.

Timo Saloniemi

 

[Mojochi]

The court ruled that "Data has the right to choose", in reference to his resignation, not the experiment.

The wording was extremely vague, so we don't know what right Data ultimately got, and over which choice.

But it all makes very good sense if the above interpretation is true. If Data is given the right to resign, then Maddox hopefully realizes how much had been at stake, and hopefully withdraws on his own. By giving room for hope, the judge defuses the situation and makes it less likely that Maddox would huff and puff and appeal to higher courts.

However, the trial itself was only brought, at such time as Data was denied resignation, based on the acts of cumberland. She can word it as poorly as she wants. It doesn't change the fact that they are all in the court to resolve the issue of him wanting to resign & being told he couldn't

When she recognizes his right to choose, it was apparently a victory in the trial, such that Maddox, even went so far as to withdraw his transfer order, essentially admitting legal defeat. Data was given the right to leave Starfleet, & Maddox knew he couldn't hold him there, so he stopped trying altogether

That she was vague doesn't change the issue that preoccupied the court, & since a ruling on it was achieved, the result is still clear

 

[Use of Time]

I find it hard to believe that after the incident in "Measure Of A Man" that Lal could be considered property of Starfleet. Is it fair for Starfleet to assume Lal is property. Does Admiral Haftel have that kind of unilateral authority or is that another decision made by many in Starfleet Command. Maybe she could be considered Starfleet property because Data used Starfleet resources (The Enterprise) to create her? Thoughts?

I've heard this point before too, & I still don't buy it being an excuse to deny the liberties of what has been previously ruled a being of free will, by Federation law

Plus, it's a thin thread of a clause to be grasping. Data has sustained injury on a number of occasions, being impaled, for example, in Thine Own Self. When repairs were made, they undoubtedly used Starfleet technology & components to repair or replace damaged parts on Data. Does that nullify the court ruling, such that now he can once again be claimed as Starfleet property? I can't see it being so

It's a being of free will we're talking about. The origin of it's components is moot. I can donate the biological components necessary to create a new human. Do I own that human? Of course not

I just clump this Admiral Haftel in with all the other Starfleet admirals who are willing to attempt breaking rules & regulations, with the idea that they are powerful enough that no one will bother to stop them. Had Lal lived, I suspect that this new conflict would not have even made it to trial. Of course she is a free being just like Data, & of course Data can consider her his child, because he used positronic core dumps from himself to create her. She was made from him, as well as by him, to his own design specs

Just another dickhead admiral needing to be put in his place

Yeah, this is my take as well. Picard goes so far as to say to Haftel that Lal and Data are sentient beings with rights and that he helped define them. If they couldn't get their hands on Data through the Starfleet property loophole then why would they think they could get their hands on Lal who actually has nothing to do with Starfleet?

 

[Christopher]

^Again: the question was not about whether Starfleet had the right to "own" Lal. The question was about whether or not Data had the right to be considered her parent and legal guardian. He and Picard argued that Lal was his daughter, while Starfleet Research and Haftel believed that the relationship between creator and AI did not constitute a parent-child relationship. And someone who isn't a child's parent doesn't automatically have the right to take care of them. If I found an orphaned child in the woods and saved her life, then I couldn't just claim to be her father; the state would insist on taking charge of the orphan for her own good and trying to find suitable guardians for her. That's what Haftel was doing here. He felt that just because Data built Lal, that didn't automatically mean he was entitled or qualified to be her sole guardian and teacher. He felt that Lal would be better off in a research institution where she could be observed and cared for full-time. And he probably thought that, given how rare and precious positronic androids were, it was safer to have them separate rather than together where a single accident or attack could destroy the entire "race."

Certainly Haftel's thinking about the matter was somewhat cold and calculating, and motivated by seeing Lal as a fascinating scientific breakthrough and Data as her inventor rather than perceiving them as daughter and father. But it wasn't about ownership. In his own detached, insensitive way, he believed he was trying to do what was best for Lal, though of course he did have ulterior motives.

 

[Use of Time]

^Again: the question was not about whether Starfleet had the right to "own" Lal. The question was about whether or not Data had the right to be considered her parent and legal guardian. He and Picard argued that Lal was his daughter, while Starfleet Research and Haftel believed that the relationship between creator and AI did not constitute a parent-child relationship. And someone who isn't a child's parent doesn't automatically have the right to take care of them. If I found an orphaned child in the woods and saved her life, then I couldn't just claim to be her father; the state would insist on taking charge of the orphan for her own good and trying to find suitable guardians for her. That's what Haftel was doing here. He felt that just because Data built Lal, that didn't automatically mean he was entitled or qualified to be her sole guardian and teacher. He felt that Lal would be better off in a research institution where she could be observed and cared for full-time. And he probably thought that, given how rare and precious positronic androids were, it was safer to have them separate rather than together where a single accident or attack could destroy the entire "race."

Certainly Haftel's thinking about the matter was somewhat cold and calculating, and motivated by seeing Lal as a fascinating scientific breakthrough and Data as her inventor rather than perceiving them as daughter and father. But it wasn't about ownership. In his own detached, insensitive way, he believed he was trying to do what was best for Lal, though of course he did have ulterior motives.

Fair enough, but if we are going under the assumption that Data and Lal are sentient which seems to be establised in this episode given Picard's statement; why wouldn't Data force a custody hearing with the Federation judicial system? He could argue that the Federation has no documentation or prior history that would sustain he is unfit to be a parent and that Lal is in fact his method of procreation. Since Data is a member of a 2 person species who would they be to argue with him? It all became a moot point when Lal began to malfunction in the middle of the dispute. I wonder how this would have all played out had Lal not malfunctioned.

 

[Christopher]

I wonder how this would have all played out had Lal not malfunctioned.

One version of that story has been told: The Embrace of Cold Architects by David R. George III in the trade paperback Star Trek: Myriad Universes: Shattered Light.

 

[Use of Time]

Christopher, I feel like I'm being assigned homework here. haha.

 

[Timo]

When she recognizes his right to choose, it was apparently a victory in the trial, such that Maddox, even went so far as to withdraw his transfer order, essentially admitting legal defeat.

The right to leave Starfleet would be only a partial defeat for Maddox, as he would know Data would not actually wish to resign. The right to refuse the procedure would be a total defeat. So this line of arguing cannot be used to prove that Louvois gave Data the right to resign, quite the opposite in fact.

That she was vague doesn't change the issue that preoccupied the court, & since a ruling on it was achieved, the result is still clear

Far from it, as it was never even established what the proceedings were about. If the wording given is the final verdict, then Maddox wouldn't even need a lawyer to help him for the obvious next step, which is to order Data to undergo the experiment again and cite Louvois' words as proof that the court doesn't protect Data from this in any way. Evidently, all the court gave Data was the right to choose his hair color, after all.

Timo Saloniemi

 

[BillJ]

I think "ownership" of Lal is a bit trickier that Data. Lal was built on a Starfleet vessel most likely using Starfleet materials.

 

[Mojochi]

... it was never even established what the proceedings were about.

But it is established in the episode. Data is resigning. He's packing his bags when they stop him

PHILLIPA: He can refuse to undergo the procedure, but we can't stop the transfer.
--------------------------------------------------------------
PHILLIPA: There is always an option. He can resign.

See, He can refuse the procedure, but only because of the fact that he can resign his commission

MADDOX: (To Phillipa) Data must not be permitted to resign.
------------------------------------------------------
PHILLIPA: That's an interesting point. But the Enterprise computer is property. Is Data?
MADDOX: Of course.

So, it is established that the trial is being brought to fight the claim that Data is property, & thereby cannot be allowed to resign from Starfleet, in order to refuse this procedure. That is the full scope of this trial. Firstly, Data is granted the status of not being property

PHILLIPA: Is Data a machine? Yes. Is he the property of Starfleet? No.

She may not have worded it such, but that is a ruling, because his status as property which has no freedom to leave Starfleet is what the trial is about. She had to rule on that, & did. She expounds further

PHILLIPA: Does Data have a soul? I don't know that he has. I don't know that I have. But I have got to give him the freedom to explore that question himself. It is the ruling of this court that Lieutenant Commander Data has the freedom to choose

The bold section is all part of one statement, not two mutually exclusive ponderings. So, what is the freedom to choose how he will explore himself, if not a freedom of a being to choose his own fate? She's indicating that as he is not property, he is considered a being in Starfleet, with the rights of all beings in Starfleet, including that he can leave when he wants. Data then addresses Maddox, by simply saying

DATA: I formally refuse to undergo your procedure.

What he didn't say was "I formally refuse to let you force me into the procedure, by transferring me, as I will leave Starfleet to prevent it. He didn't say that, because he didn't have to. She did... poorly, but she did say it

I think "ownership" of Lal is a bit trickier that Data. Lal was built on a Starfleet vessel most likely using Starfleet materials.

As I stated, that's a moot point, because Data himself likely has replacement parts from injury that were Starfleet owned. Picard's heart & Geordi's eyes are starfleet components. Does Starfleet own Geordi & Picard? Of course not. They are all beings not subject to ownership, & Data's trial defined that status for him & all like him

^Again: the question was not about whether Starfleet had the right to "own" Lal.

True. The issue was that Starfleet decided it had the right to usurp Data's guardianship over his own creation, (One made from himself even) & take possession of her, for the purpose of taking control over her existence. It is still wrongful detention. What place does Starfleet have to claim custody over a civilian, from someone else's claim of guardianship. To my knowledge, they aren't even an organization involved with civilian guardianship/custody in any case other than this one, because it holds scientific benefits for them

Hell, they couldn't have been happier to back away from the screaming teen who was raised by bumpy headed aliens in Suddenly Human. No, they just want Lal, plain & simple, & frankly, there is some ownership motives there, I think, which at least harkens back to the property issue, if not fully reclaiming it

 

[Timo]

Data then addresses Maddox, by simply saying "I formally refuse to undergo your procedure".

Indeed. Which completely nullifies your speculation about the meaning of Louvois' wording and establishes that a) Data felt he had gained the right to choose against the procedure and that b) everybody else present felt the same way, if not after Louvois' wording, then at least after Data's utilization of this interpretation.

Data gained the right to say no to Maddox. Data said no to Maddox. Data did not gain the status of a sentient or sapient being, or the right to resign, or a card saying "I have a soul", although he did gain the official status of being a machine and the official status of not being property.

Timo Saloniemi

 

[Mojochi]

Indeed. Which completely nullifies your speculation about the meaning of Louvois' wording and establishes that a) Data felt he had gained the right to choose against the procedure and that b) everybody else present felt the same way, if not after Louvois' wording, then at least after Data's utilization of this interpretation.

Data gained the right to say no to Maddox. Data said no to Maddox. Data did not gain the status of a sentient or sapient being, or the right to resign, or a card saying "I have a soul", although he did gain the official status of being a machine and the official status of not being property.

Timo Saloniemi

It doesn't nullify anything. It doesn't establish him thinking there is a specific right to refuse the procedure. Phillipa has made statements that remove that possibility prior to the trial

PHILLIPA: He can refuse to undergo the procedure, but we can't stop the transfer.
--------------------------------------------------------------
PHILLIPA: There is always an option. He can resign.

This predicates that ultimately he can only refuse by resigning, which they attempt to forbid him from doing. The trial was brought about because he was resigning, & they wouldn't let him do so. She had to resolve that issue as well as the issue of his status as property or not. What Data's statement does is illustrate that Data & everyone realize he now has the leverage to formally refuse the procedure. That leverage being the right to come & go as he pleases, like everyone else in Starfleet

That freedom being granted along with all the freedom she references when she attests to him deserving the right to make choices for himself, & seek to define his own existence himself. This is what she recognizes in her ruling

 

[Christopher]

Anyway, Maddox didn't accept Data's refusal at the end just because of a point of law. He accepted it because Picard's arguments during the trial, and perhaps the passion with which Data's friends came to his defense, convinced him that he'd been wrong to treat Data as an "it." Maddox came to recognize and respect Data's personhood, and that was as important to the outcome as the formal legal ruling. Indeed, arguably it was more important from a story standpoint, since stories are driven by character.

 

[Alpha Flyer]

Oh, Man. There are so many things wrong with that episode beyond the main premise ("Data's Right To Choose"), I barely know where to begin.

As a lawyer with a specialty in international law, including human rights, I'd start with the "trial" itself -- assuming, of course, that our dear, shiny Federation is based on such principles. Not that I assume the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is still in effect (after the Eugenics War it probably went into a vault) but basic principles should still be intact, including the right to counsel of one's choice.

I mean -- Picard and Riker??? Not only do they not have a clue (to paraphrase Tom Paris, "I'm a pilot, not a lawyer") but they are seriously conflicted -- in the legal sense -- and no court on THIS planet would ever pick them to conduct a hearing of this importance. And if they had any access to legal texts at all, first thing they should have done is file for a continuance and a change of venue to a real court. Seriously guys -- what's the rush here (research??? come on!!!) and if both sides agree, what can the judge do without setting herself up for an appeal, or removal from the case for bias?

Somebody in the thread mentioned the right to resign. Well, yes. I recall one of the actual directives of the Federation (I'm too lazy to look it up) is a prohibition of slavery. If you don't need to prove sentience, and Data is a member of Starfleet -- his pips and evident series of promotions would seem to confirm that he is -- he can get out. It ain't a cult, and the matter should not come before a court at all.

Unless of course the individual/thing/subject/toaster in question cannot be the holder of any rights -- the granting of which is linked to certain criteria, including sentience. (Animals are incapable of holding rights, no matter how much people would like to argue that they do.)

One of the issues with Roddenberry's universe (one that I address in my own stories) is its optimistic assumption that Bureaucracy Is Dead -- except when it suits a good story line, and someone feels free to haul out and quote a Starfleet Regulation that seems to emanate from a book the size of my desk. And then the fact that Star Trek really hasn't set up a coherent legal/political system comes back to haunt. (If you're interested, have a look at how I deal with Starfleet Bureaucracy, and the Maquis question, on Voyager's return; the story is called "Choices" and you can find it at http://www.fanfiction.net/s/6741063/1/Choices)

Bottom line -- to answer your question why it was necessary to prove Data's sentience (or whatever), is that it made for a damn fine script. (As did ST:VOY "Author, Author".) But like almost any ST episode, if you look behind the curtain too closely, the cracks show.

Cheers,

AF

 

[Use of Time]

Good post. One of the things we have discussed ad nauseum in this thread is the premise of the trial but not the reasons why it had to happen in such a ridiculous fashion. I refuse to believe a case as serious as that one would have been delegated to some half assed kangaroo court on some understaffed JAG office.