Or put more concisely - if simplistically - than I did:
If I had to choose, I'd rather be free than safe.
More accurately:
Would you rather have 1 in 5 people slightly inconvenienced or would you rather have a greater chance of being blown up?
OK, at least now you're discussing the crux of the issue. Although you've put it flippantly, that is indeed very much the question that needs to be answered. In order to do so, a person needs to know:
- the chances of being involved a terrorist incident
- how much is that risk has been reduced by pre-existing measures
- how much further is risk reduced by the new procedures
- how much harm (infringement/inconvenience/time delay/hassle/whatever we call it) is caused by the new procedures
I would strongly argue that since the risk of a terrorist incident is already astronomically low, and since the risk has been well contained by existing methods, that the further reduction of risk from the new procedures is likely to be very small. Not zero, I agree, but small. Especially on a per passenger basis.
If so, then the amount of harm required to be caused by the new procedures can be very small indeed before it outweighs the incremental reduction in risk of terrorist incident. In that setting even mere "inconvenience" may well be enough of a harm to outweigh risk of a terrorist incident.
So yes, on a personal level, I WOULD be willing to take my very marginally increased chances "of being blown up" in return for a faster and "less inconvenient" journey through security.
However, a more optimal outcome would be a proper streamlining of security, to reduce duplication, as that would both reduce the harm of delays and the risk of terrorism. The real problem with security procedures is that they are unintegrated instead of efficient.