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Challenger 30 Years on

MacLeod

Admiral
Admiral
Hard to think it was 30 years ago that the Space Shuttle Challanger exploded shortly after lift off. Sure I was in High School at the time but even on this side of the pond I was aware of the mission and the teacher n space. How many others remember where they were that day.

Sure looking back with hindsight we can say they should never have launched in temps that cold but as with many accidents we learn and strive to ensure they never happen again.
 
I was in high school. In Florida. I was going from English to Computer Math class when it launched. I was able to watch the whole thing unfold live, simply by looking up. I had watched nearly every shuttle launch at the time in person and knew immediately that something had gone horribly wrong. Most of my fellow students didn't believe it until we got to class and were able to turn on the tv there. Didn't get much school work done that day.
 
I was out at the barn after school doing something and was told the shuttle had just exploded. I ran to the house and turned on the T.V. What a day to remember two days after my birthday.
 
I was in a Navy dentist's chair at the moment and saw the news coverage when I came out.
A shame it was the result of corner cutting, lazy ineptitude. It's a risky enough business.
 
I was also a high schooler in FL at the time...while I lived 100 miles away from Canaveral, it was possible to see shuttle launches. I was in class at the time, but somebody came in from outside saying that they saw it explode.
 
Saw footage of the disaster on Newsround on Children's BBC. Apparently Newsround was the first news programme to break the story of the disaster in the UK.
 
Sure looking back with hindsight we can say they should never have launched in temps that cold but as with many accidents we learn and strive to ensure they never happen again.
Except that engineers who knew better had foresight of a disaster.

30 Years After Explosion, Challenger Engineer Still Blames Himself

Thirty years ago, as the nation mourned the loss of seven astronauts on the space shuttle Challenger, Bob Ebeling was steeped in his own deep grief.

The night before the launch, Ebeling and four other engineers at NASA contractor Morton Thiokol had tried to stop the launch. Their managers and NASA overruled them.

That night, he told his wife, Darlene, "It's going to blow up."

When Challenger exploded 73 seconds after liftoff, Ebeling and his colleagues sat stunned in a conference room at Thiokol's headquarters outside Brigham City, Utah. They watched the spacecraft explode on a giant television screen and they knew exactly what had happened.

Three weeks later, Ebeling and another engineer separately and anonymously detailed to NPR the first account of that contentious pre-launch meeting. Both were despondent and in tears as they described hours of data review and arguments. The data showed that the rubber seals on the shuttle's booster rockets wouldn't seal properly in cold temperatures and this would be the coldest launch ever.

Ebeling, now 89, decided to let NPR identify him this time, on the 30th anniversary of the Challenger explosion.

"I was one of the few that was really close to the situation," Ebeling recalls. "Had they listened to me and wait[ed] for a weather change, it might have been a completely different outcome."

We spoke in the same house, kitchen and living room that we spoke in 30 years ago, when Ebeling didn't want his name used or his voice recorded. He was afraid he would lose his job.

"I think the truth has to come out," he says about the decision to speak privately then.

"NASA ruled the launch," he explains. "They had their mind set on going up and proving to the world they were right and they knew what they were doing. But they didn't."

A presidential commission found flaws in the space agency's decision-making process. But it's still not clear why NASA was so anxious to launch without delay.

The space shuttle program had an ambitious launch schedule that year and NASA wanted to show it could launch regularly and reliably. President Ronald Reagan was also set to deliver the State of the Union address that evening and reportedly planned to tout the Challenger launch.

Whatever the reason, Ebeling says it didn't justify the risk.

"There was more than enough [NASA officials and Thiokol managers] there to say, 'Hey, let's give it another day or two,' " Ebeling recalls. "But no one did."

Ebeling retired soon after Challenger. He suffered deep depression and has never been able to lift the burden of guilt. In 1986, as he watched that haunting image again on a television screen, he said, "I could have done more. I should have done more."

[...]


http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-...ster-challenger-engineer-still-blames-himself
 
Except that engineers who knew better had foresight of a disaster.




http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-...ster-challenger-engineer-still-blames-himself

Don't think it's fair that Bob Ebeling blames himself - he warned them, they wouldn't listen - there's not much else he could have done (I guess he could have gone to the media but even that might not have changed things).

It's a pity that he's been burdened with the guilty. It would be only just if those who were admant that the shuttle launch also suffered because at the end of the day they are the ones ultimately responsible.

And you have to wonder if there was any political pressure either direct or implicit to have the shuttle in order for the SOTU address.
 
There was a persistent rumour that someone very senior in the administration put pressure on NASA to launch that day. Unconnected, but in apparent synchronicity, the O-rings on my bath trap failed that morning due to an extreme cold snap in the UK.
 
I remember that I was in bed and my grandmother woke me up. She'd been watching the morning news and promptly got out of bed and called me downstairs so I could see the coverage. I was glued to the TV that day, and I remember feeling really angry at the ones who insisted on launching when it was so obviously unsafe.
 
The Saturns--which could have been sustained (we were looking at even larger post Saturn LVs after all)
--esp the Saturn I-B were killed because they were Army rockets. The segmented solid tech was used first with the Titans, then as just de-facto RATO units for an orbiter with a drop tank.

I would have liked the Saturn Shuttle concepts. With Energiya Buran--you don't have either the Challenger Disaster or Columbis. Energiya needed no oxygen ramp for ice/foam to break off.

The wrong country made the right shuttle--and vice versa.
 
And you have to wonder if there was any political pressure either direct or implicit to have the shuttle in order for the SOTU address.

One might wonder. But if one reviews the evidence, one learns there wasn't. Diane Vaughan's The Challenger Launch Decision remains the best study of why this particular decision was made this particular way; it must be read by anyone who wants to have an informed position.

There's no summarizing Vaughan's thesis in the confines of a TrekBBS post. She needed hundreds of pages for it herself. But the essence is one familiar to any organization that's --- with the best of intent --- caused a disaster. The shuttle group had a need to launch shuttles; the evidence that there was a serious problem with the O-ring design was weak, and obscured by confounding data; people attempting to warn that the danger was bigger than it was perceived to be had no coherent answer to the question ``you thought this was safe before; what evidence has changed your mind?''; a long string of successes had left the organization more confident that it understood the system than it actually did.

The specifics vary, but most of the same kinds of pressures can be found in any technological disaster. (And many other kinds, come to it.)
 
people attempting to warn that the danger was bigger than it was perceived to be had no coherent answer to the question ``you thought this was safe before; what evidence has changed your mind?''
Say what? Their answer had been coherent and straightforward: they believed it was too cold, and it was significantly colder than it had ever been before.
 
Say what? Their answer had been coherent and straightforward: they believed it was too cold, and it was significantly colder than it had ever been before.

And the evidence that cold was a problem was ... ?

At the time, the worst O-ring erosion problem to date had happened during the coldest launch, yes. But the second-worst O-ring erosion had happened during one of the warmest launches. If cold causes O-ring erosion, then why does warmth also cause it? Since O-ring erosion --- based on the data available at the time --- seems to happen in random places on the booster, and in amounts not related to launch temperature, why conclude that launch temperature is relevant? What is the data?

In hindsight, yes, the data was there. It could have been organized and presented in a way that made a compelling case that temperature was a critical factor. (Most plausibly: every launch below a particular temperature --- I forget which; let's say 55 degrees --- had significant O-ring erosion. Only one above that temperature had significant erosion.) But it was not recognized and not understood. And as a result, the answer to the question ``you thought this was safe before; why have you changed your mind?'' went lacking a compelling answer.
 
Didn''t several Morton Thiokol engineers recommend against launch due to concerns about the cold, and were overruled pressured into changing their minds by managerment.
 
Didn''t several Morton Thiokol engineers recommend against launch due to concerns about the cold, and were overruled pressured into changing their minds by managerment.
Yes, that's what I remember from what I read and heard back then.

Some other things I heard was that a major reason for management pressuring them was because they didn't want negative PR from postponing the launch.

Well, they got negative PR anyway. And seven dead astronauts.
 
And the evidence that cold was a problem was ... ?

At the time, the worst O-ring erosion problem to date had happened during the coldest launch, yes. But the second-worst O-ring erosion had happened during one of the warmest launches. If cold causes O-ring erosion, then why does warmth also cause it? Since O-ring erosion --- based on the data available at the time --- seems to happen in random places on the booster, and in amounts not related to launch temperature, why conclude that launch temperature is relevant? What is the data?

In hindsight, yes, the data was there. It could have been organized and presented in a way that made a compelling case that temperature was a critical factor. (Most plausibly: every launch below a particular temperature --- I forget which; let's say 55 degrees --- had significant O-ring erosion. Only one above that temperature had significant erosion.) But it was not recognized and not understood. And as a result, the answer to the question ``you thought this was safe before; why have you changed your mind?'' went lacking a compelling answer.

Given that managers ignored the engineers' recommendation, I suppose you could twist that around and say that the data was not recognized and understood. If you ignore something, then you don't recognize it and you don't understand it, sure, from a certain point of view.

According to this, enough data to conclude that the launch was going to be irresponsibly dangerous was available and presented; it was simply ignored. From http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2007/01/remembering-the-mistakes-of-challenger/:

NASA decided on a 24 hour turnaround, but there was a new problem at the Weather Station, with exceptionally cold temperatures forecast for Florida.

‘We prepared forecast for the next day,’ said John Weems of the NASA Weather Station. ‘We knew the winds would be decreasing, but the real concern was the very cold temperatures that were due in the area. We put together a 12 hour forecast and presented it to the Mission Management people, presenting temperatures of 24F (minus 5 Celsius) at the pad for the next morning.’

NASA remembered that Morton-Thiokol had been concerned about low temperature launches and made a call to their Utah headquarters.

‘A manager came by my room and asked me if I was concerned about an 18 degree launch,’ recalled Ebeling. ‘I said ‘What?’ – because we’re only qualified to 40 degrees. I said ‘what business does anyone even have thinking about 18 degrees, we’re in no man’s land, we’re in a big grey area.’

Ebeling called his O-ring task force team to assemble in his office, given the O-rings had never been tested below freezing, but now the estimated temperatures the exposed SRBs would experience were some 18 degrees colder.

‘We discussed what might happen below our 40 degree qualification temperature and practically to a man we decided it would be catastrophic,’ added Ebeling.

A call was immediately made to the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Alabama to raise concerns.

Thiokol recommended that we could not launch until the weather warmed up in the afternoon,’ said NASA senior manager Jud Lovingood. ‘Well I told them they couldn’t make that recommendation. They had to give us a temperature that we could launch with.’

A formal presentation would have to be made, two hours after speaking with Lovingood and just 15 hours before launch, via a teleconference at which Thiokol would need to given their reasoning for a no launch decision – a power contractors held, but were scared to make given the effects on the Shuttle schedule.

Thiokol engineer Roger Boisjoly – one of two specialists (the other being Arnie Thompson) on the SRB joint seals – grabbed anything he could from his office to show how the temperature would lead to a failure of the SRB’s O-ring and the destruction of the Shuttle.

‘Unfortunately in our rush we didn’t have time for a dry run at what we’d present to NASA,’ noted Boisjoly. ‘I had no idea what my colleagues would present and I had no idea what I’d bring to the meeting.’

Thiokol engineers still managed to give what they believed to be compelling evidence that the low temperature would slow down the sealing of the O-ring primary and secondary seal, leading to hot gas leaking out of the joints and an explosion on the launch pad as soon as the SRBs ignited.

‘The entire Thiokol group recommended no launch,’ remembered Ebeling, as they recommended a minimum launch temperature of 53F (11C). The expected rubber stamping of that recommendation was expected from NASA on the other end of the teleconference. However, they would be proven wrong.

‘I thought it was a very poor briefing,’ said Lovingood. ‘To make such a huge statement on flight safety, it was an extremely poor briefing.’ NASA engineers at MSFC started to pull apart Thiokol’s data.

‘You don’t do data by emotion,’ added Lovingood. ‘You can’t go up there and say ‘hey, I’ve got a gut feeling this thing is going to blow up.’ They’d take you to the funny farm.’

‘We’re always probed on rational, but that night I was hammered (by NASA engineers) way more than I had experienced as an engineer in the aerospace industry,’ said Boisjoly.

‘We always do that with our contractors, ‘ countered Lovingood. ‘What we did that night was mild, compared to what we normally do.’

The problem escalated during the meeting. NASA could not go against a contractor’s ‘no launch’ recommendation. However, such a recommendation of a minimum launch temperature would destroy the ambitious launch schedule of the Shuttle.

‘I turned to my fellow managers and said if these guys persist in this decision not to launch, then we can’t launch, and they agreed with me, we were at their mercy,’ added Lovingood.

‘As soon as the button was pressed to mute NASA from our meeting, the managers said ‘we have to make a management decision,’ said Boisjoly. ‘It was obvious they were going to change their decision to launch decision to accommodate their major customer.

‘But surely the photographs I had showed that the more black that you see between the seals, the lower the temperature, the closer you are to a disaster. I was told I was literally screaming at the managers to look at the photos, but they wouldn’t look at them.

The general manager of Thiokol turned to his three senior managers and asked what they wanted to do. Two agreed to go to a launch decision, one refused.

‘So he (the general manager) turns to him and said ‘take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat’ – and that’s exactly what happened,’ said Boisjoly. ‘He changed his hat and changed his vote, just 30 minutes after he was the one to give the recommendation not to launch. I didn’t agree with one single statement made on the recommendations given by the managers.’

The teleconference resumed and NASA heard that Thiokol had changed their mind and gave a recommendation to launch. NASA did not ask why.

‘That was stupid on our part, that was dumb,’ said Lovingood. ‘We should have said ‘give us your rational for changing your mind’ but a guy sits in a meeting, that is a good for launch meeting and he doesn’t stand up in front of the train to stop it, he’s go. No one stood up, so everyone was go for launch.

‘But I remember going home and telling my wife that I sure hoped we made the right decision, as I had misgivings about it.’

‘I went home, opened the door and didn’t say a word to my wife, ‘ added Boisjoly. ‘She asked me what was wrong and I told her ‘oh nothing hunny, it was a great day, we just had a meeting to go launch tomorrow and kill the astronauts, but outside of that it was a great day.”

[...]
And, let's look at the overall context. There was no certification to launch in temperatures that cold. NASA knew that Morton-Thiokol was concerned about temperatures that low. The presentation that took place was under extreme time pressure to address that concern. If you're going to expect polish in a presentation on whether a program that had been operating for years could now safely operate under conditions that it had never been certified to operate under before, then you give the group making the presentation more than just the few hours they [the Morton-Thiokol group] had to throw something together. To then pick at the presentation made under such circumstances and fault it for a lack of coherence or a lack of organization, that's abominable.

Also, your post contains a logic error. You said, "If cold causes O-ring erosion, then why does warmth also cause it?", as if that's a question that would even need to be answered under the circumstances. The relevant information is granted right there in the hypothesis, "cold causes O-ring erosion." According to the source I quoted, there was convincing data presented to conclude that under the prevailing cold conditions, adequate seals wouldn't form. You don't need to go off on a red herring and also answer why adequate seals hadn't formed under other conditions, because that couldn't change the fact in front of you, that they wouldn't form under the prevailing conditions.
 
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There were other shuttles that almost didn't make it back. I forget which one it was, but it was sprayed with pellets of tank foam on the way up and the damage was really obvious. The crew was even informed in space that they had a good chance of not making it back. I remember reading the pilot having said that if it were clear that was the case, he was going to get on the radio and let NASA know just what he thought of how they run the space program. Anyway, it landed safely, with all of these black and dark streaks all over it, as if it passed through a meteor shower. This is only something I've read about ...
 
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