Watching the Clock question for Chris Bennett

[Ian Keldon]

You state in your story notes for WTC that:

Lucsly's argument about classical neurons is based on the Everett FAQ's entry on free will in the MWI: http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm#free-will This is the first of several points in the book where I counter the popular misconception that the Many-Worlds Interpretation means that there is an infinite number of alternate timelines or that every conceivable outcome is compelled to occur. I dislike this notion not only because it's a misunderstanding of the theory, but because it's dramatically unsatisfying: if every crisis point is resolved in all possible ways at once, there's no real risk of failure and no real triumph of success, and thus every story becomes meaningless. See Larry Niven's story "...All the Myriad Ways" for a fictional exploration of this idea; Peter David's TNG novel Q Squared also alludes to "the Niven effect."

Specifically referring to what you bolded (which you have the crazy agent early in the book pretty much give the readers as well), there is a logical counter to that contention.

Even if all possible outcomes happen, a given person only gets to perceive and experience one of those outcomes : that of the choice he makes or does not make.

So from the perspective of any one person, Many Worlds is irrelevant. In terms of temporal history and alternate timelines, you might argue that it's "meaningless", but for the inhabitants of any one world, it retains all of it's meaning, esp since the average person has no way to access time and/or alternate timelines.

And even if they could change history, they wouldn't change THEIR history or there would be no need to change history in the first place.

Marvel Comics explored that concept with their "Days of Future Past" storyline. The time traveling character returned to the future she had went back in time to prevent only to find things unchanged. That was so because it had to be in order for the time traveler to exist in the manner she did and to have cause to travel.

What she did do was create a new branch timeline wherein the events that led to her timeline were averted, and divert the flow of history in the "prime" timeline into that new branch.

So I think it's pretty clear that Many Worlds does not exclude the importance of decisions or the permanence of their effects.

 

[Christopher]

^Well, first off, it's not Many Worlds, it's the common fictional interpretation of Many Worlds that every decision is made in every possible way in a different universe. (In fact, the Everett interpretation has timelines diverging due to quantum events resolving in all possible ways, so given that human thought is most likely a classical-level process, decisions don't have any bearing on it at all.)

And maybe some people can choose to disregard the existence of those other timelines, but others can't. As seen in Niven's and David's stories, some people are simply unable to cope with the idea that the reality they perceive is just a randomly chosen one out of uncounted possibilities. After all, if every decision splits the universe (for the sake of argument), then what determines which outcome we perceive? Why favor one branch over the others? And if every event happens in every conceivable way, it reduces all events to pure chance, and things like skill and judgment and circumstances don't have any bearing. So it robs every decision of meaning in that sense.

And it's silly if you think about it. The usual sloppy interpretation of Many Worlds is "If you're at an intersection and turn right, another universe branches off where you turned left." But presumably you had a reason to turn right, because that was the way to get to your destination. Even if you were driving directionlessly and made a "random" choice to turn right instead of left, that choice would actually have been influenced by the pre-existing states of the neurons in your brain, or by the traffic patterns at that moment. That outcome was shaped by the circumstances leading up to the event, so there wasn't actually an equal probability of the two outcomes (or three if there's also the option to go straight). So even if some quantum event did split the universe at that point, you'd probably still turn right in every universe.

That's why it's illegitimate to do what Agent Faunt did and use Many Worlds as an excuse to avoid responsibility for your decisions, claim that it was all just the luck of the draw. And that's why it's dramatically unsatisfying to treat your characters' decisions the same way, as purely random outcomes with no meaning. In a well-written story, the outcome is meaningful. It happens because it's the natural consequence of what the characters do and think and believe, and because it's a plausible outgrowth of the circumstances of the story. And that means that the outcome would be pretty much the same in another timeline. There are some decisions where a person's choices could be evenly weighted and it comes down to luck which path they take, but it doesn't make sense to treat every decision in a story that way. Whether the outcome of those decisions is permanent to a given observer is beside the point. The problem is that it treats the causes of those events as random and thereby robs the choices and outcomes of meaning.

 

[Ian Keldon]

^Well, first off, it's not Many Worlds, it's the common fictional interpretation of Many Worlds that every decision is made in every possible way in a different universe. (In fact, the Everett interpretation has timelines diverging due to quantum events resolving in all possible ways, so given that human thought is most likely a classical-level process, decisions don't have any bearing on it at all.)

So Everett denies the possibility of free will?

And maybe some people can choose to disregard the existence of those other timelines, but others can't. As seen in Niven's and David's stories, some people are simply unable to cope with the idea that the reality they perceive is just a randomly chosen one out of uncounted possibilities.

Ah, and there's part of the flaw in your argument, IMO.

The reality any one person perceives is NOT "randomly chosen". Any given person is a natural part of the reality that shares his quantum state (or more accurately whose quantum state he shares). Barring intervention, either by altering the entirety of that quantum state, or removing the person from it, the only timeline he will ever perceive and interact with is his own "native" timeline. So what his quantum "twins" do is irrelevant. He will only interact with the results of what he himself decides to do.

After all, if every decision splits the universe (for the sake of argument), then what determines which outcome we perceive? Why favor one branch over the others? And if every event happens in every conceivable way, it reduces all events to pure chance, and things like skill and judgment and circumstances don't have any bearing. So it robs every decision of meaning in that sense.

See directly above.

And it's silly if you think about it. The usual sloppy interpretation of Many Worlds is "If you're at an intersection and turn right, another universe branches off where you turned left." But presumably you had a reason to turn right, because that was the way to get to your destination. Even if you were driving directionlessly and made a "random" choice to turn right instead of left, that choice would actually have been influenced by the pre-existing states of the neurons in your brain, or by the traffic patterns at that moment. That outcome was shaped by the circumstances leading up to the event, so there wasn't actually an equal probability of the two outcomes (or three if there's also the option to go straight). So even if some quantum event did split the universe at that point, you'd probably still turn right in every universe.

Possibly. I take your point, and I like the idea of a "robust" core timeline (as Lucsley put it, a "most probable" timeline"). Small, relatively random or otherwise insignificant changes either don't split or "come out in the wash" of the greater flow of history.

However, I have to posit a caveat, and that is the classic introduction of chaos via the "butterfly effect" both in terms of chaos theory AND in terms of the classic time travel story. While not necessarily inevitable, it is certanly possible for a small change to set off a chain reaction of changes that could radically reshape history.

Let us posit a food animal that we have killed while time traveling. That food animal was "destined" to be eaten by a predator. Because that food animal was missing, the predator went hunting again and kills a native man. That native man was "destined" to save the life of a downed pilot. Thanks to the absence of the native man that pilot now dies. That pilot was "destined" to save the world from a catastrophe. With that pilot gone, the world (or at least human civilization on it) is now destroyed.

It's a classic sci-fi time travel premise, and entirely plausible.

So while you may be correct in saying "don't sweat the small stuff", we must be careful to understand what truly is "small".

And there's probably no way for a time-traveler to know what is really and what is really not "small".

That's why it's illegitimate to do what Agent Faunt did and use Many Worlds as an excuse to avoid responsibility for your decisions, claim that it was all just the luck of the draw.

I agree. He's completely responsible for what he decides in the here and now.

And that's why it's dramatically unsatisfying to treat your characters' decisions the same way, as purely random outcomes with no meaning. In a well-written story, the outcome is meaningful. It happens because it's the natural consequence of what the characters do and think and believe, and because it's a plausible outgrowth of the circumstances of the story. And that means that the outcome would be pretty much the same in another timeline. There are some decisions where a person's choices could be evenly weighted and it comes down to luck which path they take, but it doesn't make sense to treat every decision in a story that way. Whether the outcome of those decisions is permanent to a given observer is beside the point. The problem is that it treats the causes of those events as random and thereby robs the choices and outcomes of meaning.

I think we agree on the outcome, but disagree as to the problem. You think that the "infinite splitting" many worlds interpretation is dramatically weak because of the factors you outline, and so you don't accept it.

I accept the IS version of many worlds but point out that, since any one perceiver is limited to a single world (the one he's in), that the dramatic tension is maintained.

 

[Christopher]

^Well, first off, it's not Many Worlds, it's the common fictional interpretation of Many Worlds that every decision is made in every possible way in a different universe. (In fact, the Everett interpretation has timelines diverging due to quantum events resolving in all possible ways, so given that human thought is most likely a classical-level process, decisions don't have any bearing on it at all.)

So Everett denies the possibility of free will?

No, Everett wasn't talking about free will in the first place. He was offering an explanation for the evident collapse of a quantum wavefunction upon measurement. He was a physicist, not a philosopher. All the stuff about decisions causing the universe to split is a plot device used by creators of fiction because stories are driven by characters making decisions rather than by quantum particles changing state. Everett was talking solely about a possible model for explaining the results of quantum measurements. Read here for more:

http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm

The reality any one person perceives is NOT "randomly chosen". Any given person is a natural part of the reality that shares his quantum state (or more accurately whose quantum state he shares). Barring intervention, either by altering the entirety of that quantum state, or removing the person from it, the only timeline he will ever perceive and interact with is his own "native" timeline. So what his quantum "twins" do is irrelevant. He will only interact with the results of what he himself decides to do.

Yes, obviously one can only perceive one's own timeline -- that's the whole meaning of distinct timelines in the first place. I don't need that explained to me. What you're not understanding is that I'm talking about something different. If the universe splits and you split with it, it's a given that you'll only perceive one of the outcomes -- but what determines which one you perceive? That's what I'm talking about. By analogy, if a storyteller is working in a universe built on the premise that every outcome happens in every possible way, then that makes it entirely arbitrary when the author chooses to depict a character dying instead of living, or the bomb being defused versus the bomb blowing everybody up. It undermines any victory (or tragedy) if the ground rules of the very story you're reading mean that there was an equally real failure (or triumph) emerging from the same events.

However, I have to posit a caveat, and that is the classic introduction of chaos via the "butterfly effect" both in terms of chaos theory AND in terms of the classic time travel story. While not necessarily inevitable, it is certanly possible for a small change to set off a chain reaction of changes that could radically reshape history.

Well, yes, in some cases. Hell, my Myriad Universes novel Places of Exile is built around that exact premise, that the entire course of events in Voyager and beyond turned out profoundly differently because Chakotay chose his words differently at a single key moment. I'm not objecting to the idea that alternate timelines exist at all (since obviously they do exist in Trek), just the facile notion that Many-Worlds means that every possible combination of events is required to occur. Physics doesn't require an unlimited number of alternates, and I find it more dramatically satisfying to keep the number finite, to say that most outcomes are not random and that only certain decision points have the potential to send history in two or more directions.

I think we agree on the outcome, but disagree as to the problem. You think that the "infinite splitting" many worlds interpretation is dramatically weak because of the factors you outline, and so you don't accept it.

I accept the IS version of many worlds but point out that, since any one perceiver is limited to a single world (the one he's in), that the dramatic tension is maintained.

But that's only true in a universe that follows strict quantum physics wherein the distinct measurement histories are completely causally isolated and non-interacting. Since the other timelines can't be perceived and have no measurable effect, they functionally do not exist. But we're talking about a fictional universe where alternate timelines can be observed and accessed and can have a measurable effect on one's own timeline. The observer is not limited to a single measurement history, and therefore the fact that outcomes happen differently in other timelines is relevant. If the story itself is premised on the ability to perceive or visit alternative outcomes to events, then it's self-contradictory to say that those alterntive outcomes are irrelevant to the story being told.

 

[Ian Keldon]

So Everett denies the possibility of free will?

No, Everett wasn't talking about free will in the first place. He was offering an explanation for the evident collapse of a quantum wavefunction upon measurement. He was a physicist, not a philosopher. All the stuff about decisions causing the universe to split is a plot device used by creators of fiction because stories are driven by characters making decisions rather than by quantum particles changing state. Everett was talking solely about a possible model for explaining the results of quantum measurements. Read here for more:

http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm[/quote]

I get what you are saying on one hand, but I don't think when it comes to alternate histories that you can say that timelines are spawned merely by the mechanics of quantum physics. That may tell you how, but not why.

If you posit that histories are altered merely by the transformation of quanta, then you are indeed denying free will. In fact you are denying the ability of a character to make any difference whatsoever in a timeline.

The timeline will split or not based on the mechanics. Kill Kennedy, save Kennedy. If it's all about the mechanics, it makes no difference you won't create a new timeline. You will, however, fundamentally transform your own.

We see that one happen in Trek multiple times (CotEoF, Yesterday's Enterprise, etc).

We also see (in JJ Trek) an example of your quantum splitting at work.

What you're not understanding is that I'm talking about something different. If the universe splits and you split with it, it's a given that you'll only perceive one of the outcomes -- but what determines which one you perceive? That's what I'm talking about.

Which one is the result of the choice you actually made would be my answer.

I choose job A over job B. My experienced reality is that where I chose Job A and all the consequences that extend from that choice.

By analogy, if a storyteller is working in a universe built on the premise that every outcome happens in every possible way, then that makes it entirely arbitrary when the author chooses to depict a character dying instead of living, or the bomb being defused versus the bomb blowing everybody up. It undermines any victory (or tragedy) if the ground rules of the very story you're reading mean that there was an equally real failure (or triumph) emerging from the same events.

I don't agree. The storyteller still choses a flow for the story, and the reality of that timeline is that of the reality where that choice is made.

The bomb cannot both blow up and be defused in the same reality...that would be an insurmountable contradiction. So the triumph or tragedy is entirely real for those within that timeline. As you note, the others are irrelevant.

I'm not objecting to the idea that alternate timelines exist at all (since obviously they do exist in Trek), just the facile notion that Many-Worlds means that every possible combination of events is required to occur. Physics doesn't require an unlimited number of alternates, and I find it more dramatically satisfying to keep the number finite, to say that most outcomes are not random and that only certain decision points have the potential to send history in two or more directions.

Fair enough...I can agree to that in principle.

I think we agree on the outcome, but disagree as to the problem. You think that the "infinite splitting" many worlds interpretation is dramatically weak because of the factors you outline, and so you don't accept it.

I accept the IS version of many worlds but point out that, since any one perceiver is limited to a single world (the one he's in), that the dramatic tension is maintained.

But that's only true in a universe that follows strict quantum physics wherein the distinct measurement histories are completely causally isolated and non-interacting. Since the other timelines can't be perceived and have no measurable effect, they functionally do not exist. But we're talking about a fictional universe where alternate timelines can be observed and accessed and can have a measurable effect on one's own timeline. The observer is not limited to a single measurement history,

He is at any one time. He doesn't and cannot inhabit more than one timeline simultaneously (unless perhaps he's some sort of transcendent being like Q)

Anyways, this I think has been a good discussion. I enjoyed it. You have obviously done your homework!

 

[Christopher]

I get what you are saying on one hand, but I don't think when it comes to alternate histories that you can say that timelines are spawned merely by the mechanics of quantum physics. That may tell you how, but not why.

No, when it comes to real-life physics, alternate timelines theoretically emerge from quantum events and have jack-all to do with human decisions. But in fiction, the concept of parallel timelines is interpreted in the context of decisions and macroscopic outcomes as a storytelling device.

If you posit that histories are altered merely by the transformation of quanta, then you are indeed denying free will. In fact you are denying the ability of a character to make any difference whatsoever in a timeline.

No, I'm not. I'm saying that what the Everett interpretation actually says in real life is distinct from the fictional conceit of decisions creating alternate timelines. You're conflating the two, blurring two entirely distinct subjects into one.

What I'm saying, in-universe, is that the question of timeline divergence is entirely separate from the question of personal choice. And that has the exact opposite outcome from what you're saying. It means that personal choices are meaningful because they're likely to go the same way in any quantum timeline, as a consequence of the life experience and circumstances that led up to them. Some decisions, occasionally, are so balanced on a knifepoint that they could go either way, and that's where we get something like the Places of Exile timeline versus the canonical Voyager timeline. But most decisions are not mere coinflips, so it doesn't make sense to assume that for every decision, there's an alternate universe containing the opposite decision. That is what renders personal choice meaningless, the assumption that there's no reason for favoring one option over the other.

The timeline will split or not based on the mechanics. Kill Kennedy, save Kennedy. If it's all about the mechanics, it makes no difference you won't create a new timeline. You will, however, fundamentally transform your own.

Well, yes, that's exactly what I'm saying, and it seems to contradict your own previous paragraph. I'm saying that personal decisions affect the way a given timeline unfolds, just as they would if it were the only timeline. And the mechanisms that split timelines from one another are a different subject altogether, despite how fiction tends to treat them.

What you're not understanding is that I'm talking about something different. If the universe splits and you split with it, it's a given that you'll only perceive one of the outcomes -- but what determines which one you perceive? That's what I'm talking about.

Which one is the result of the choice you actually made would be my answer.

I choose job A over job B. My experienced reality is that where I chose Job A and all the consequences that extend from that choice.

But that's a circular argument. If you live in a putative universe where every decision goes both ways and creates alternate timelines, then you make both choices. After the split, there are two copies of you that are identical except that one made choice A and the other made choice B. So why do you perceive yourself as one instead of the other? Saying "because I made choice A" doesn't resolve the philosophical conundrum, it just pushes it back one more step. Why are you the you that made choice A instead of the identical you that made choice B?

I don't agree. The storyteller still choses a flow for the story, and the reality of that timeline is that of the reality where that choice is made.

But it's not that simple in a story where alternate timelines are an integral part of the narrative. You're oversimplifying this, and I don't get why you're so determined to dismiss the whole concept out of hand rather than thinking about it. You really should read "All the Myriad Ways," or at least Q Squared.

But that's only true in a universe that follows strict quantum physics wherein the distinct measurement histories are completely causally isolated and non-interacting. Since the other timelines can't be perceived and have no measurable effect, they functionally do not exist. But we're talking about a fictional universe where alternate timelines can be observed and accessed and can have a measurable effect on one's own timeline. The observer is not limited to a single measurement history,

He is at any one time. He doesn't and cannot inhabit more than one timeline simultaneously (unless perhaps he's some sort of transcendent being like Q)

That doesn't make sense. Star Trek is full of stories where characters cross between timelines. They may not exist in more than one at a time, but that doesn't mean they can't be aware of both and affected by both. Saying "he's only in one timeline at a time so the other doesn't matter" is nonsense -- like saying that when Ben Sisko is with Jake, Kasidy ceases to matter to him, and vice-versa. Or that whenever Jim Kirk beamed down to a planet, he stopped caring what happened to the Enterprise. Everyone can only be in one place at a time, but someone who has the ability to move from place to place can obviously consider both places important and meaningful even after leaving them.

Look at the Mirror Universe episodes of DS9. By your argument, since Jennifer Sisko died in the Prime timeline, Ben Sisko should have been totally unaffected by the fact that Jennifer was alive in the Mirror Universe, and totally unaffected when she subsequently died in a different way and at a different time. But that's not what happened. The rationalizations you're making didn't matter to him, because he could see Jennifer, talk to her, touch her. She was real to him, and what happened to her in that other universe affected him. He cared about the difference of outcomes between the two universes. He couldn't just glibly disregard events outside his own timeline as irrelevant, because they weren't just an abstract bit of sophistry to him as it is to you. They were as real to him as events in his own timeline, because he experienced them firsthand.

 

[Ian Keldon]

No, when it comes to real-life physics, alternate timelines theoretically emerge from quantum events and have jack-all to do with human decisions. But in fiction, the concept of parallel timelines is interpreted in the context of decisions and macroscopic outcomes as a storytelling device.

And I submit in real life as well. Your quantum splitting, again, is a mechanism by which timelines are spawned. It is not in itself the cause of new timelines.

A quantum split is like an unfired round. Unless and until it is fired (a deliberate, conscious act by a person), it does not ignite and propel the bullet down the barrel of the gun.

You claim that timelines splitting as a result of character choice is a "conceit". Nothing could be farther from the truth.

History cannot "make itself". People make history, by making choices and acting on them.

Rome, for example, did not fall because of a quantum split. Rome fell because of the cumulative effects of the decisions made by itself, all it's citizens, and those made by every other person and group that affected it and whom it affected.

No, I'm not. I'm saying that what the Everett interpretation actually says in real life is distinct from the fictional conceit of decisions creating alternate timelines. You're conflating the two, blurring two entirely distinct subjects into one.

No, I'm pointing out that Everett is only looking at mechanisms, not causes. To suggest that history is changed by the act of spontaneously splitting quanta is to suggest an effect without a cause, which is not possible even in temporal physics. There MUST be a cause somewhere for any event within conventional reality (which would include the concepts of alternate timelines).

What I'm saying, in-universe, is that the question of timeline divergence is entirely separate from the question of personal choice.

And I'm saying that cannot be, for the reasons I outlined above.

And that has the exact opposite outcome from what you're saying. It means that personal choices are meaningful because they're likely to go the same way in any quantum timeline, as a consequence of the life experience and circumstances that led up to them. Some decisions, occasionally, are so balanced on a knifepoint that they could go either way, and that's where we get something like the Places of Exile timeline versus the canonical Voyager timeline. But most decisions are not mere coinflips, so it doesn't make sense to assume that for every decision, there's an alternate universe containing the opposite decision. That is what renders personal choice meaningless, the assumption that there's no reason for favoring one option over the other.

Who is positing there is no reason to favor one option over another? I'm certainly not. Whether or not I "favor" one decision over another at any given time is entirely under my control. That the "loose" interpretation of MW holds that it is inevitable that a timeline exist somewhere where I favor another choice doesn't change the circumstances and factors in my present experience that make me favor one option over another. I am in my time, place, and circumstance.

In another timeline, under different conditions, my "twin" might favor another option based on his time, place, and circumstance.

That has no effect on me, however, unless it is somehow arranged that I interact with that timeline. And even then I am only responsible for what I myself do, not for what my "twin" does.

But that's a circular argument. If you live in a putative universe where every decision goes both ways and creates alternate timelines, then you make both choices.

No, I make a single choice, and by so doing, make myself different from any quantum counterpart by that act.

After the split, there are two copies of you that are identical except that one made choice A and the other made choice B. So why do you perceive yourself as one instead of the other? Saying "because I made choice A" doesn't resolve the philosophical conundrum, it just pushes it back one more step. Why are you the you that made choice A instead of the identical you that made choice B?

1) I am not identical to the me that makes choice B. The very act of chosing a over b makes me different from him.

I 'perceive myself' as different because I AM different, and inhabit a different timeline.

But it's not that simple in a story where alternate timelines are an integral part of the narrative. You're oversimplifying this, and I don't get why you're so determined to dismiss the whole concept out of hand rather than thinking about it. You really should read "All the Myriad Ways," or at least Q Squared.

Read the later a long time ago...don't recall it as being a story I felt particularly one way or the other about.

I don't think I'm "oversimplifying" anything. I think you're overcomplicating it.

I am me, a finite corporeal being. I exist in one and only one time, place, and timeline at any given moment.

Unless I am a Prophet, or Q.

That doesn't make sense. Star Trek is full of stories where characters cross between timelines. They may not exist in more than one at a time, but that doesn't mean they can't be aware of both and affected by both.

Where did I say they weren't?

Saying "he's only in one timeline at a time so the other doesn't matter" is nonsense -- like saying that when Ben Sisko is with Jake, Kasidy ceases to matter to him, and vice-versa.

Never said that either. What I said was, that for purposes of consequences and to the issue of whether or not the existence of infinite alternate possibilities negated the value of choosing or mitigated the consequences of choosing, the alternate realities didn't matter, as I was not there. I was where I was, and barring intervention, I would remain there.

Put another way: I am an ordinary man with no extraordinary powers or technology. I kill a man. That man is dead by my hand and I am locked into a timeline where that even happened, and I must live with and suffer the consequences of that choice and act.

What does it matter, practically speaking, that there are myriad alterni-verses where I did not kill that man. I cannot access them. They are irrelevant to me and my life in the timeline I inhabit.

Everyone can only be in one place at a time, but someone who has the ability to move from place to place can obviously consider both places important and meaningful even after leaving them.

See above.

Look at the Mirror Universe episodes of DS9. By your argument, since Jennifer Sisko died in the Prime timeline, Ben Sisko should have been totally unaffected by the fact that Jennifer was alive in the Mirror Universe, and totally unaffected when she subsequently died in a different way and at a different time. But that's not what happened. The rationalizations you're making didn't matter to him, because he could see Jennifer, talk to her, touch her. She was real to him, and what happened to her in that other universe affected him. He cared about the difference of outcomes between the two universes. He couldn't just glibly disregard events outside his own timeline as irrelevant, because they weren't just an abstract bit of sophistry to him as it is to you. They were as real to him as events in his own timeline, because he experienced them firsthand.

Only AFTER he became embroiled in them and interacted with them, thus making them part of his own personal timeline.

You'll note that prior to Sisko going to the MU, he didn't spend a lot of time angsting about the status of Mirror Jennifer, or Mirror O'brian, or Mirror anybody else.

He never made any decision about running the station, or relating to his son based on what Mirror Jennifer might possibly say or think. They existed or not in their timeline, and he in his. For him, until he went to the MU himself they in fact were abstract, and had no bearing on him or his life in his own universe.

 

[Edit_XYZ]

I'm not objecting to the idea that alternate timelines exist at all (since obviously they do exist in Trek), just the facile notion that Many-Worlds means that every possible combination of events is required to occur. Physics doesn't require an unlimited number of alternates, and I find it more dramatically satisfying to keep the number finite, to say that most outcomes are not random and that only certain decision points have the potential to send history in two or more directions.

Fair enough...I can agree to that in principle.

The Many Worlds interpretation's strength is that it allows that, when a wave-function collapses, the largest part of the possible states (which are not measured) don't just disappear (this disappearing act - regardless of its scale - generating discontinuitites in the equations - Schrodinger wave-equation, for example).
What does Christopher do? He assumes the improbable states disappear during the wave-function collapse. At a stroke, he nullifies any advantage the Many-Worlds theory offers (as said, the scale of the disappearance of states doesn't really matter; ANY disappearance brings with it the discontinuities).

But the Many Worlds theory has huge disadvantages, as well: it blatantly breaks conservation of energy (all thermodynamical laws of conservation, actually), entropy, etc. And the only excuse found was that you - probably - can't use this excess energy/etc and so, who cares if all these laws are broken?
Needless to say, Christopher's variant of many worlds does nothing to remove these disadvantages.

No, when it comes to real-life physics, alternate timelines theoretically emerge from quantum events and have jack-all to do with human decisions. But in fiction, the concept of parallel timelines is interpreted in the context of decisions and macroscopic outcomes as a storytelling device.

And I submit in real life as well. Your quantum splitting, again, is a mechanism by which timelines are spawned. It is not in itself the cause of new timelines.

A quantum split is like an unfired round. Unless and until it is fired (a deliberate, conscious act by a person), it does not ignite and propel the bullet down the barrel of the gun.

You claim that timelines splitting as a result of character choice is a "conceit". Nothing could be farther from the truth.

History cannot "make itself". People make history, by making choices and acting on them.

Rome, for example, did not fall because of a quantum split. Rome fell because of the cumulative effects of the decisions made by itself, all it's citizens, and those made by every other person and group that affected it and whom it affected.

If you assume the human mind works by classical principles, then it's a newtonian, deterministic machine: you put in the input; for the same input, you will ALWAYS get the same output.
No free will whatsoever.
With an adequate computer, one could compute Mozart's symphonies. And not only those - one can compute what symphonies Mozart would have composed had he eaten beef or fish instead of eggs for breakfast, etc.
No creativity whatsoever.
Human beings become nothing more than meat puppets, the strings being the environment they found themselves in.
This is the solution Christopher adopted in 'Watching the clock', BTW.


If you assume the human mind works by quantum principles, then it's a dice throwing machine: you put in an input and you get a random output - as in your decision depends on hazard, not your values, determination or any other such factor.
No free will whatsoever.
Creativity becomes merely luck - not talent, not anything else. Just throw the dice.
Humans become just random number generators.


In your post, Ian, you say something similar to 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' - AKA the wave-function doesn't collapse (and the universe doesn't split as per the many-worlds interpretation) until a conscious observer 'sees' the measurement.

Even if this is correct, this idea does nothing to change the conclusion of the analysed situations - that humans remain only meat-puppets:
You may collapse the wave-function, but you can't control its outcome. Meaning, your decisions remain the throw of the dice.
And, in the classical universe, the timing/outcome of the wave-function collapse is irrelevant to your mechanistic thought processes (you will make the same decisions regardless of the state the wave function collapses to).


In conclusion, in either of the 2 situations analysed, people are passive cogs in a machine; or just dice being thrown. No shame, no glory - no real say in the way the future unfolds.
So - Rome did fall because of inevitable mechanics or because the dice happened to show a certain value; humans had no true say in it. Likewise with the achievements of humanity; no say, no true contribution, no merit.


Of course, there is a theoretical physical solution (which may or may not apply to the human brain) which allows humans to have true free will - beyond deterministic cogs or dice being thrown.
Would you like to know what this solution is?

 

[Ian Keldon]

If what you say is true, then I say there is something wrong about both classic and quantum models of the universe.

Human beings are decidedly NOT "meat puppets". Human beings have shown time and again that they can act beyond the bounds of their initial "programming". The most venal and selfish person can have a change of heart and demonstrate acts of charity. A coward can find his courage.

Related to that is the fact that people don't always do "what the dice tell them" they should do. The fact that not all people act in exactly the same way even under similar circumstances demonstrates that.

On another matter, I do not claim that a new timeline only comes into being when it is perceived. Existence is not a matter of perception.

By way of explanation: I do not know what President Obama is doing right this very second. I have no way of perceiving it. Does that mean he is doing nothing? Does that mean he doesn't even exist? Obviously not.

If by that you come to the conclusion I am not a fan of Schrodinger's Cat, you would be right. The entire concept is nonsense. The cat either is or is not in the box as a factual matter. My inability to see into said box affects that not one bit.

What I was saying about timelines outside the perceiver's frame of reference is that in terms of the perceiver making decisions about his own life and circumstance that they are functionally irrelevant.

Right now, I'm typing on the computer. I have no way of knowing what any "twin" of me might be doing in another timeline, nor do I care. I am here, he is there, and we have never met nor are we likely to do so.

Were I somehow to be transported into his timeline then and only then would that timeline matter to me as I am a part of it (and in a sense it becomes part of me), because my future is now tied up in the new timeline unless or until I can find a way to leave it.

 

[Christopher]

No, when it comes to real-life physics, alternate timelines theoretically emerge from quantum events and have jack-all to do with human decisions. But in fiction, the concept of parallel timelines is interpreted in the context of decisions and macroscopic outcomes as a storytelling device.

And I submit in real life as well. Your quantum splitting, again, is a mechanism by which timelines are spawned. It is not in itself the cause of new timelines.

Yes, it is. Read the FAQ I linked to above. Contrary to how it's used in fiction and misinterpreted by the public, the "Many Worlds Interpretation" (more formally, the relative state formulation) is intended simply as an explanation for the appearance of wavefunction collapse upon the measurement of a quantum particle. It's about why a particle that exists in a superposition of multiple states appears to resolve into a single state upon measurement or interaction. The idea is that the act of measurement causes the states of the particles in the measuring device, the scientist doing the measuring, and everything else in the interconnected system to correlate with the states of the particle being measured. So the measuring device and the system it belongs to aligns into two (or more) sets of states -- one correlated with one of the states of the quantum particle, the other correlated with the other state (and so on if there are more than two states). Each set of correlated states represents a distinct measurement history that is non-interactive with the other. Thus, an observer in each relative state measures only one of the particle's states, and so it appears to the observer that the particle's wavefunction has "collapsed" into only one state, producing the appearance of classical physics.

That's what the MWI really says. Everything else about parallel realities and human decisions and so forth is accreted onto it by philosophers and writers of fiction.

You claim that timelines splitting as a result of character choice is a "conceit". Nothing could be farther from the truth.

I'm sorry, you're profoundly wrong. You're mistaking a conceit of fiction -- that decisions cause timeline splits -- with actual physics. Hugh Everett was not speaking of philosophy or cosmology or human history. He was offering a mathematical, physical explanation for the paradox of wavefunction collapse. If you'd make the effort to read the source I linked to above, you'd see that. Here it is again:

http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm

It's a very good primer on the MWI and what it really means. I drew on it a lot in writing Watching the Clock; it really helped me understand quantum physics and the MWI better than I ever had before. You really should study it before continuing this discussion. Here are some other references I used:

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9709032/ (a bit technical)
http://www.ipod.org.uk/reality/reality_decoherence.asp

History cannot "make itself". People make history, by making choices and acting on them.

Of course they do. But my point is that that's an entirely separate question from the physics of timeline divergence. You're buying into the conceit of fiction that parallel timelines are a matter of history and choice, but that's not what Everett conceived them to be. So you're completely misunderstanding what it is I'm saying. You're treating the discussion of historical outcomes and the discussion of the MWI as if they were the same topic, but my whole point is that they aren't really, that fiction only pretends they are because writing stories about personal choice and the paths a society can take is more interesting than writing stories about whether a proton is measured as spin-up or spin-down.

Rome, for example, did not fall because of a quantum split.

Which is exactly my point -- that the topic of MWI and quantum splits is entirely separate from the topic of why historical processes occur. If quantum processes split the universe into 5000 parallels during the fall of Rome, then Rome would've fallen the same way in all 5000 of those parallel timelines, because the changes in the quantum states of particles would've had no bearing on the macroscopic, classical (no pun intended) processes that led to human decisions and cultural trends. So the quantum divergence would indeed have had no bearing on the historical choice.

But maybe, if there was someone whose mind was evenly split about a given decision at the moment the timeline happened to diverge, then there's a chance that one of the divergent copies might make a different decision than the others. And that could lead to one or more of those 5000 quantum timelines turning out measurably different from the others. The quantum divergence would not have caused the changed decision, no, but it would've created the opportunity for both decisions to be made.

No, I'm pointing out that Everett is only looking at mechanisms, not causes. To suggest that history is changed by the act of spontaneously splitting quanta is to suggest an effect without a cause, which is not possible even in temporal physics.

But again, that is NOT what I'm suggesting at all. You're the one who's mistakenly assuming that fiction is correct in treating the topic of quantum timeline divergence as equivalent to the topic of human-scale history. What I'm saying is that they're two separate conversations altogether.

There MUST be a cause somewhere for any event within conventional reality (which would include the concepts of alternate timelines).

But you're conflating the quantum with the classical there. "Events" on the human scale, decisions and historical processes, are macroscopic, classical phenomena. Their outcomes are not, as a rule, determined by events on the quantum level of single particles. MWI is talking about quantum-level processes and is not meant to apply to classical, macroscopic issues like human history and choice. Fiction merely subverts the concept, makes it about those things as a plot device.

Who is positing there is no reason to favor one option over another? I'm certainly not. Whether or not I "favor" one decision over another at any given time is entirely under my control. In another timeline, under different conditions, my "twin" might favor another option based on his time, place, and circumstance.

Sure, if the timelines diverged a significant length of time before the moment of decision, so that the circumstances would be different. But that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about the conceit of fiction that every moment of decision causes the universe to split at that moment. I'm objecting to the class of alternate-timeline stories that assumes that every decision generates as many different universes as there are possible outcomes of that decision -- that for every universe where the driver chooses to turn right, there must be a universe where she turns left, as though there were no reason for that decision and it was just random which universe the story happens to follow. The assumption there is that everything is exactly identical up until the moment of decision is reached, and that at the very moment the driver begins to turn, that's when the universe splits into two, one where the driver goes right and one where the driver goes left. Or into three if the driver can go straight. Or into as many different universes as there are possible outcomes. That's the model that ignores the influence of earlier causes and circumstances, that reduces all decisions to coin flips.

1) I am not identical to the me that makes choice B. The very act of chosing a over b makes me different from him.

But again, the whole premise of the fictional model I'm objecting to is that it's the moment of choice that creates the split in timelines, so that there is only one single you up until you make that choice, only one single set of circumstances, and yet the decision causes the universe to split into one where you make choice A and one where you make choice B. From what you're saying, I think you object to that idea as much as I do, but you're just misunderstanding what it is I'm talking about.

Never said that either. What I said was, that for purposes of consequences and to the issue of whether or not the existence of infinite alternate possibilities negated the value of choosing or mitigated the consequences of choosing, the alternate realities didn't matter, as I was not there. I was where I was, and barring intervention, I would remain there.

But this isn't about you. It isn't about anyone who lives in the real world. As I've already said, your analysis applies to discussing real life, but I'm not talking about real life. I'm talking about fictional universes in which alternate timelines are real and accessible. So logic that makes sense in the real world, where alternate histories are by definition inaccessible and effectively nonexistent, doesn't apply to the kind of fictional universe I'm talking about. The rules of the universe can be different in fiction, and so the same arguments don't necessarily work there.

Only AFTER he became embroiled in them and interacted with them, thus making them part of his own personal timeline.

Yes, and that is my whole point. I'm talking about stories in which crossovers between timelines are a directly experienced reality.

He never made any decision about running the station, or relating to his son based on what Mirror Jennifer might possibly say or think. They existed or not in their timeline, and he in his. For him, until he went to the MU himself they in fact were abstract, and had no bearing on him or his life in his own universe.

Not everyone could dismiss the question as casually as you claim you can. There are plenty of people of a more philosophical bent, people who would drive themselves crazy struggling to cope with the certain knowledge that they had parallel selves whose lives had different outcomes. Heck, I've spent time wrestling with that question myself, trying to ponder the philosophical and personal implications of having parallel selves, trying to understand why I would perceive myself in this branch rather than one of the others, etc., and it's rather daunting. And if I knew for a fact that there were a universe out there where my life was much better than it is here, it would be very depressing. You may be able to glibly dismiss it as irrelevant, but not everyone is you.

Human beings are decidedly NOT "meat puppets". Human beings have shown time and again that they can act beyond the bounds of their initial "programming". The most venal and selfish person can have a change of heart and demonstrate acts of charity. A coward can find his courage.

Related to that is the fact that people don't always do "what the dice tell them" they should do. The fact that not all people act in exactly the same way even under similar circumstances demonstrates that.

That's all entirely true, but the key is that it happens on a classical level, shaped by macroscopic processes in the brain and in the external world. So it's a separate phenomenon altogether from what the Everett interpretation is talking about, except in fiction where MWI is conflated with classical processes of history and choice.

On another matter, I do not claim that a new timeline only comes into being when it is perceived. Existence is not a matter of perception.

Well, that comes down to a misunderstanding of what a "timeline" really is. What we call a "timeline" in vernacular is really just a set of measurements of the state of the universe. When you measure a particle that's in two states at once, your measuring device, you yourself, and the system you occupy all end up in two states at once, one correlated with each of the particle's states. It's all still really one single set of particles, but it's in two separate sets of correlated states that behave as if they were distinct realities because they don't interact or affect each other.

So no, existence is not a matter of perception, but which existence you observe is, by definition, a matter of perception. Although it would be more accurate to say that perception is merely one case of interaction, which is what's really important here. It's the interaction between particles that correlates their quantum states with each other. Observation, measurement by a human being, is one type of interaction, and the one that gets focused on by scientists because science is about reporting the results of observation and experiment. This leads to the common misconception that "perception creates reality," but it's really all about interaction and correlation.

If by that you come to the conclusion I am not a fan of Schrodinger's Cat, you would be right. The entire concept is nonsense. The cat either is or is not in the box as a factual matter. My inability to see into said box affects that not one bit.

It's supposed to be nonsense. The biggest myth about Schroedinger's Cat is that Schroedinger was saying it would really happen. On the contrary, he was saying that it couldn't happen. His point was that quantum physics led to an irresolvable paradox and thus it was flawed, or at least incomplete. Schroedinger's Cat illustrated the clash between the multiple states of quantum-level particles and the observed reality that classical, macroscopic objects and events only happened one way. The question was, how do we resolve this? Where does the transition between quantum behavior and classical behavior occur, and why? Why doesn't the dual state of the radioisotope result in a dual alive/dead state for the cat?

And the Everett Interpretation/MWI is an explanation for that exact question. The answer, according to it, is that the switch that triggers the poison capsule -- essentially a measuring device for the radioactive atom -- itself enters into a dual state, each one correlated with one of the states of the atom. And thus so does the cat, the observer, and everything else interacting with them. So there are two distinct measurement histories, one in which the cat lives and the observers are happy, one in which the cat dies and the observers get in trouble with the Humane Society. Since these measurement histories do not interact, they effectively form separate "universes" or "timelines."

 

[Edit_XYZ]

If what you say is true, then I say there is something wrong about both classic and quantum models of the universe.

Human beings are decidedly NOT "meat puppets". Human beings have shown time and again that they can act beyond the bounds of their initial "programming". The most venal and selfish person can have a change of heart and demonstrate acts of charity. A coward can find his courage.

Ian, just because you - and I - wish for humans to be more than mere 'meat puppets' does not mean they are.

As for your 'proof', having a 'change of heart' or 'courage' are entirely compatible both with humans as (complex) deterministic automatons and with humans as (complex) rolling dice machines.
'Feel good' cliches are not enough to prove that humans actually have something resembling free will. Indeed, if not for the 'way out' I alluded to in the final part of my last post, the very laws of physics would dictate they don't have free will.

Personally, I think human psyche is incompatible with newtonian determinism (due to will, for example). But you'll find many (indeed, most) scientists arguing the contrary on biological basis.
As for humans as random number generators - who knows?

Related to that is the fact that people don't always do "what the dice tell them" they should do. The fact that not all people act in exactly the same way even under similar circumstances demonstrates that.

Of course not all people act the same way in the same circumstances, Ian.
Two dice being thrown at the same time (or successively), in the same circumstances, will give different results. As you see, your objection is entirely compatible with humans as ruled by quantum mechanical hazard, by the roll of the dice.

What I was saying about timelines outside the perceiver's frame of reference is that in terms of the perceiver making decisions about his own life and circumstance that they are functionally irrelevant.

For the subject at hand - human free will - this is irrelevant.

The many worlds theory:
It doesn't matter whether you perceive the other 'you' from other quantum universes.
You remain a dice being thrown, lucky - or unlucky - to be in a quantum universe where the dice fell a certain way and you made a certain decision. You had no say in it, no way to influence this decision; hazard rules all.

On another matter, I do not claim that a new timeline only comes into being when it is perceived. Existence is not a matter of perception.

By way of explanation: I do not know what President Obama is doing right this very second. I have no way of perceiving it. Does that mean he is doing nothing? Does that mean he doesn't even exist? Obviously not.

As per the 'consciousness causes collapse', if Obama is conscious, he collapses himself the surrounding wave-function.
No need for you to intervene.

If by that you come to the conclusion I am not a fan of Schrodinger's Cat, you would be right. The entire concept is nonsense. The cat either is or is not in the box as a factual matter. My inability to see into said box affects that not one bit.

Ian, Schrodinger's cat is a direct consequence of the FORMALISM of quantum mechanics - which was meticulously and repeatedly experimentally confirmed.

Is does not depend on whether you take - or not - consciousness as causing collapse.
It is entirely applicable when you assume the wave function collapse is due to objective interactions and has nothing to do with consciousness.


And, in quantum mechanics, particles DO occupy more then one position, etc. They objectively have more then one position, momentum, spin, etc simultaneously, at the same time.

Your assumption - that particles have only one position, momentum, etc, but you don't know it, cannot narrow it down beneath more than a few possibilities - was proven as incorrect by experimental fact - for example, the double-slit experiment with one photon at a time reaching the two slits.
It is counterintuitive, it is weirs, but that's just how the world behaves at the quantum mechanical level.

As for the dead/alive cat - what happens at the quantum particles level expands to the macroscopic levels - as per the formalism of QM. BTW, this is part of the measurement problem.


PS - about Schrodinger's cat - Christopher really needs to read J. von Neumann - 'Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics' with regards to the measurement problem (from which Schrodinger's cat derives).
The contradiction J. von Neumann pointed to is NOT the dead/alive cat (if you take this to be contradictory, ALL quantum mechanics is contradictory). It is the view from inside the system (the cat is ONLY dead or ONLY alive) vs the view from outside the system (the cat is BOTH dead/alive) that is contradictory - this comprises the measurement problem.

Also, it's cute how Christopher completely divorces quantum mechanics/newtonian physics from what they say, their conclusions about the human mind - just because he doesn't like what they say. Reminds me of the medieval church's modus operandi (among others who wanted their view imposed and didn't really care about the objective truth).

 

[Sci]

For the record:

You fellows are talking about some pretty complicated concepts that those of us laymen on the BBS may have trouble following at times. Because of that, I think it's fair to ask something:

We know that Christopher has a Bachelor of Science in Physics from the University of Cincinnati. What are your qualifications, Ian Keldon and Edit_XYZ?

 

[TiberiusMaximus]

PS - about Schrodinger's cat - Christopher really needs to read J. von Neumann - 'Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics' with regards to the measurement problem (from which Schrodinger's cat derives).
The contradiction J. von Neumann pointed to is NOT the dead/alive cat (if you take this to be contradictory, ALL quantum mechanics is contradictory). It is the view from inside the system (the cat is ONLY dead or ONLY alive) vs the view from outside the system (the cat is BOTH dead/alive) that is contradictory - this comprises the measurement problem.

Also, it's cute how Christopher completely divorces quantum mechanics/newtonian physics from what they say, their conclusions about the human mind - just because he doesn't like what they say. Reminds me of the medieval church's modus operandi (among others who wanted their view imposed and didn't really care about the objective truth).

So you're saying the contradiction is between the two states of 1) being dead OR alive and 2) being dead AND alive? Is that what you're saying? I don't agree. A cat is not the same as the quantum state of two subatomic particles. If you put that cat in the box, it's either alive or dead. The two states are mutually exclusive. But I know next to nothing about quantum physics, so go ahead and ignore me. I'm having fun just reading this discussion. Pass me the popcorn, please, this is fascinating.

Are you seriously comparing Christopher to the medieval church? Really? Wow.

Also, referring to someone like they're a non-entity in the discussion is rude and obnoxious.

 

[Christopher]

^You're right, Tiberius, because a cat is a macroscopic entity, an ensemble of a large number of particles. Thus it obeys what we call classical physics (at least insofar as a cat may deign to obey any physical laws), which are the physics of ensembles of particles rather than those of individual particles.

And I treat quantum physics separately from the mechanisms of the human mind because my best understanding of the physics and biology involved is that the functioning of the human mind is classical. I have no personal preference for that over the other; if there were evidence that consciousness had a quantum component, I think I would find that pretty cool, and certainly it could be useful to me as a writer of fiction. (I have, in fact, posited in my Trek fiction that telepathy is a form of quantum entanglement.) So I have nothing against the idea of quantum consciousness from a personal standpoint, but when I researched the issue, I found no credible evidence to support it. To all indications, the mind, like the cat, behaves as a classical ensemble, and the kind of quantum-level changes that split universes according to MWI happen below the level that would affect the neurological activity of the brain.

 

[Edit_XYZ]

So you're saying the contradiction is between the two states of 1) being dead OR alive and 2) being dead AND alive? Is that what you're saying? I don't agree. A cat is not the same as the quantum state of two subatomic particles. If you put that cat in the box, it's either alive or dead. The two states are mutually exclusive. But I know next to nothing about quantum physics, so go ahead and ignore me. I'm having fun just reading this discussion. Pass me the popcorn, please, this is fascinating.

The measurement problem - as per J von Neumann (if you don't agree, it's him - and QM formalism - you don't agree with, Tiberius):

When he applied the Schrodinger equation to a particle, he found that, when the particle was measured and the wave function collapsed, the particle had only 1 state (1 spin, for example).

When he applied the Schrodinger equation to the observed particle AND the measuring apparatus, he found that the wave function of this system was NOT collapsed (AKA the particle had two opposite spins).
In other words, from a perspective that encompasses both the measuring apparatus and the observed particle, the display of the apparatus is 'fuzzy', much like the particle.

This changes when one actually looks at the measuring apparatus: the display becomes 'precise' and shows only one spin.

But, if your perspective encompasses both the particle, the measuring apparatus and the observer that looked at it, this system is again 'fuzzy'. This changes when you, from your meta perspective, look at this system, measure it.

But above you there are other observers.

And so forth until one reaches what is called the universal wave-function, which - for lack of measurement being taken - is uncollapsed.

This contradiction between 'precise' from one POW and 'fuzzy' from another POW is the measurement problem.
The dead/alive cat is merely a consequence of the particle's 'fuzziness' being enlarged to macroscopic scale via measurement apparatus (the cat being the measurement apparatus, in this case); it means the particles that make the cat are 'fuzzy', exist simultaneously in more than one state (position, momentum, etc) for a meta observer. It's incredibly counterintuitive, weird, yes; but from QM's formalism's POV, it's not contradictory.

Are you seriously comparing Christopher to the medieval church? Really? Wow.

I'm comparing his reasoning from this thread (he analyzed classical physics/quantum mechanics and then said whatever he wanted about the human mind, with no connection to either classical or quantum physics, disregarding them both) with the reasoning of the medieval church. An important difference.

Also, referring to someone like they're a non-entity in the discussion is rude and obnoxious.

Christopher has been ignoring my posts for some time. Your comment is more appropriately addressed to him.

 

[Sci]

Also, referring to someone like they're a non-entity in the discussion is rude and obnoxious.

Christopher has been ignoring my posts for some time. Your comment is more appropriately addressed to him.

Bullshit. Ignoring someone's posts is not the same thing as speaking about them like they're not present.

Again, I ask: What are your physics qualifications?

 

[Edit_XYZ]

Also, referring to someone like they're a non-entity in the discussion is rude and obnoxious.

Christopher has been ignoring my posts for some time. Your comment is more appropriately addressed to him.

Bullshit. Ignoring someone's posts is not the same thing as speaking about them like they're not present.

Indeed.
Ignoring someone is actually ruder than speaking about someone with yet another person (or how insulted would any even little-known public figure be, daily..).

Again, I ask: What are your physics qualifications?

What if I told you I have a physics degree, Sci? You'll almost certainly say I'm lying, to prove it.
And, of course, there is the fact that I have no intention whatsoever of revealing my identity to you.

You know, Sci - you'll just have to believe whatever you want about me.
I'll let my arguments presented in these posts speak.

 

[Sci]

Christopher has been ignoring my posts for some time. Your comment is more appropriately addressed to him.

Bullshit. Ignoring someone's posts is not the same thing as speaking about them like they're not present.

Indeed.
Ignoring someone is actually ruder than speaking about someone with yet another person (or how insulted would any even little-known public figure be, daily..).

No, ignoring someone is significantly less rude than speaking about them as though they are not present when they are.

Again, I ask: What are your physics qualifications?

What if I told you I have a physics degree, Sci? You'll almost certainly say I'm lying, to prove it.

No. I just want you to cite your degree and university, the same way Christopher has. If I'm a layman, after all, it's not unreasonable for me to hear a disagreement over these concepts and ask for the qualifications of the debate's participants.

 

[TiberiusMaximus]

No, ignoring someone is significantly less rude than speaking about them as though they are not present when they are.

We're not talking about talking about someone who isn't present. We're talking about refusing to acknowledge someone's presence, childishly acting as if it's okay to insult them as long as you don't do it to their face. That is much ruder than not responding to your posts.

No. I just want you to cite your degree and university, the same way Christopher has. If I'm a layman, after all, it's not unreasonable for me to hear a disagreement over these concepts and ask for the qualifications of the debate's participants.

A perfectly valid and reasonable point.

What if I told you I have a physics degree, Sci? You'll almost certainly say I'm lying, to prove it.
And, of course, there is the fact that I have no intention whatsoever of revealing my identity to you.

You know, Sci - you'll just have to believe whatever you want about me.
I'll let my arguments presented in these posts speak.

Right, because Sci is clearly trying to discover your real-world identity for his nefarious purposes. Grow up. If you don't want to cite your qualifications, fine, but there's no reason to be confrontational about it. A simple, "I'd rather not" would suffice.

 

[Edit_XYZ]

Yes, I see your counter-arguments to my arguments.

Two deserved and supported observations about Christopher on my part (a small part of my post); bickering on yours (entire posts full of it).
And you actually imply I'm bickering.

BTW, I've already told you my position/opinion on these.

PS - Tiberius, you don't know Sci.