Transporters might be cloning machines not true transporters

[polyharmonic]

During the Second Chances episode, it was claimed that the stranded Thomas Riker is just as "real" as the William Riker on board the Enterprise and not a clone. However a better interpretation is that BOTH of them are clones as that makes a lot more sense. They can't BOTH be the real Riker because it doesn't make sense that you can split a consciousness into two and have both be a continuation of the original consciousness. And since there's really nothing to distinguish one as more real as the other, then perhaps it is the case that they are both clones and neither are real.

This leads me to thinking that perhaps transporters don't really transport. They actually create perfect clones of you with all your memories intact while killing the "old" you during the process. But if this is the case, how could you ever test to see if this was indeed what was happening? You couldn't prove it in any way I can think of. And I mean how do you prove that the person that just came through the transporters had a new consciousness (but with the memories of the old consciousness) rather than be a true continuation of the old consciousness?

You would think that people would have considered this possibility and refused to kill themselves in transporters even knowing their clones would continue on in their place uninterrupted.

 

[JB2005]

^McCoy

Your Witness.

 

[Kaziarl]

If I remember how they said it in the show, they pumped extra energy into the matter stream. And since as far as I know, the transporter turns matter to energy, and energy to matter, they gave it enough energy to create a perfect duplicate. Now, which is the duplicate, and which is the original, there's really no way to tell. But i do think that if the transporter made a clone, and killed the original as it's normal process, there would be a lot more people against using it.

 

[polyharmonic]

If I remember how they said it in the show, they pumped extra energy into the matter stream. And since as far as I know, the transporter turns matter to energy, and energy to matter, they gave it enough energy to create a perfect duplicate. Now, which is the duplicate, and which is the original, there's really no way to tell. But i do think that if the transporter made a clone, and killed the original as it's normal process, there would be a lot more people against using it.

If they knew FOR SURE that this was what was really happening almost no one would use it except in dire situations requiring self-sacrifice I would think. The problem I see though is that there is no way to ever really prove it one way or the other. The possibility that this might be happening though, even if unprovable, I would think would be a real problem to overcome.

 

[Timo]

They can't BOTH be the real Riker because it doesn't make sense that you can split a consciousness into two and have both be a continuation of the original consciousness.

Why wouldn't this make sense? Many processes in nature can be duplicated, and then run as perfect continuations of the original. Duplication doesn't make anything "less real", not unless it's imperfect duplication.

And I mean how do you prove that the person that just came through the transporters had a new consciousness (but with the memories of the old consciousness) rather than be a true continuation of the old consciousness?

Why, you stick fingers in their ear, eye and nose, and scan for their katra. Obviously, Vulcans are perfectly fine with transporters, and they have the means to check on souls - so it works on Vulcan souls, and by extension should work with those of any other species, too, there being no logical reason for Vulcans to be a special case. Bajorans can do that sort of checking, too. Not to mention all the truly telepathic species out there.

. The problem I see though is that there is no way to ever really prove it one way or the other.

Yet a difference that makes no difference is no difference. The transporter is just too damn convenient to be shunned on philosophical grounds; refusal to use the machine would no doubt be limited to small religious sects. Others would accept the proof of their own eyes: "Unca Bob came through all right, and didn't have to ride in that stinking shuttle for eight bloody hours - I'm taking the transporter next time, too!".

Timo Saloniemi

 

[polyharmonic]

They can't BOTH be the real Riker because it doesn't make sense that you can split a consciousness into two and have both be a continuation of the original consciousness.

Why wouldn't this make sense? Many processes in nature can be duplicated, and then run as perfect continuations of the original. Duplication doesn't make anything "less real", not unless it's imperfect duplication.

When I say "real", I meant "real" as in the continuation of the original consciousness. I agree that a clone that is an exact copy, right down to the memories, is a real living being in every sense of the word. And if it had all the memories of the original being, from the clone's POV, it would even believe it was the original being until told otherwise. But it would still be a clone not the original being, (i.e. not the "real" being).

Let say you assume the POV of either Thomas Riker or William Riker. Then clearly the other person has a distinct consciousness and isn't "you". That other person is completely as real as you of course but I don't see how BOTH could be continuation of the original consciousness. Therefore there are only two possibilities:
1. One of you is a perfect clone while the other is the continuation of the original consciousness.
2. Both of you are perfect clones and the original consciousness is killed.

I mean, how is it possible that the two independent consciousnessness of Will Riker and Tom Riker SIMULTANEOUSLY be the continuation of the consciousness of Will Riker pre-transporter accident?

 

[polyharmonic]

The problem I see though is that there is no way to ever really prove it one way or the other.

Yet a difference that makes no difference is no difference. The transporter is just too damn convenient to be shunned on philosophical grounds; refusal to use the machine would no doubt be limited to small religious sects. Others would accept the proof of their own eyes: "Unca Bob came through all right, and didn't have to ride in that stinking shuttle for eight bloody hours - I'm taking the transporter next time, too!".

The fact that you could DIE is hardly a minor philosophical quibble. The fact that your clone/duplicate would carry on in your stead doesn't change the fact that you yourself DIED.

 

[chardman]

You all might want to read James Blish's "Spock must die", published way back in 1970, which pretty much covers most all of the ethical concerns expressed in this thread.

 

[Kaziarl]

If I remember how they said it in the show, they pumped extra energy into the matter stream. And since as far as I know, the transporter turns matter to energy, and energy to matter, they gave it enough energy to create a perfect duplicate. Now, which is the duplicate, and which is the original, there's really no way to tell. But i do think that if the transporter made a clone, and killed the original as it's normal process, there would be a lot more people against using it.

If they knew FOR SURE that this was what was really happening almost no one would use it except in dire situations requiring self-sacrifice I would think. The problem I see though is that there is no way to ever really prove it one way or the other. The possibility that this might be happening though, even if unprovable, I would think would be a real problem to overcome.

I suppose early trials with the technology could show if it cloned or just moved the person, before they added the "Kill the original" line of code.

 

[FordSVT]

Transportation theory has always been a bit... wobbly in Trek, like their handling of time travel. A couple of episodes of TOS and the TNG episode with Thomas Riker clearly show individuals literally created out of "new" matter. Some technical jargon in other episodes suggest it's a person's own matter that is disassembled, sent through the beam, and then reconstructed at the other end. There is a critical difference.

In the first case it's as you described above: the transporter appears to be reassembling a copy based on a blueprint using standby matter. That means the original "you" is, in fact, gone. There's no practical difference to anyone, and if your parts are in the right place down to the electron and maybe there is some entanglement going on who's to say there is any "real" difference at all? But it raises a lot of questions. In the second case it's a molecular version of cutting a limb off and sewing it back on. Just because it was apart from me for a moment doesn't mean . Likewise, one can be clinically "dead" for a few minutes and be resuscitated and no one says they have no souls or they are not the same person.

McCoy's fear didn't seem to be based on the fear of being killed every time he stepped on the transporter, it was that he was going to be permanently erased in some malfunction and have his "atoms spread half way across the Galaxy".

 

[Timo]

Therefore there are only two possibilities:
1. One of you is a perfect clone while the other is the continuation of the original consciousness.
2. Both of you are perfect clones and the original consciousness is killed.

A third possibility rather obviously presents itself:

3. One of you is a perfect clone, and both of you are continuations of the original consciousness. Said consciousness just happens to have been duplicated (because what just happened was perfect duplication, doh!).

Or

4. Both of you are perfect clones and continuations of the original consciousness, while the original has been killed.

I mean, how is it possible that the two independent consciousnessness of Will Riker and Tom Riker SIMULTANEOUSLY be the continuation of the consciousness of Will Riker pre-transporter accident?

Why not? What possible argument could there exist AGAINST two processes both being continuations of an original process? That happens all the time in nature and engineering.

The fact that your clone/duplicate would carry on in your stead doesn't change the fact that you yourself DIED.

But why should you care? It worked all right for Unca Bob, and when you yourself tried it, you noticed no difference between before and after. It would be no different from going to sleep and waking up: an argument could be made that you died in between, but you'd dismiss that argument because it has no practical consequences. And if a bunch of engineers argued that you die in a transporter, this argument would probably be just as difficult for the layman to follow or believe as the argument that you die when you fall asleep.

Timo Saloniemi

 

[Cid Highwind]

What, if we define the perceived passage of time itself as the old consciousness "ending" (=dieing), and another one being created/cloned in its place. This clone isn't even totally perfect, because the atoms in his brain have a slightly altered composition compared to the original.

Is this different in any way to "being transported"?

 

[Mr. Laser Beam]

We've seen the process take place from the POV of the person being transported (Barclay) and they obviously didn't die...

 

[FordSVT]

^The whole "conscious while being transported" thing is something I wish I could forget.

 

[Crazy Eddie]

When I say "real", I meant "real" as in the continuation of the original consciousness.

They are BOTH the continuation of the original consciousness. Consciousness was duplicated too remember?

At the moment of duplication what you have is a "forking" of processes, both iterations of the same basic "source code" that is William T. Riker's memories. Since both processes fork off in perpendicular branches, they are both said to be originals.

Let say you assume the POV of either Thomas Riker or William Riker. Then clearly the other person has a distinct consciousness and isn't "you".

But by the same token "you" are not "him." You are therefore BOTH separate versions of the same person; in essence, you're both copies, and you're both originals.

Your confusion comes from an assumption of a "stream of consciousness" that is broken only in death. This is a flawed assumption; if temporary loss of consciousness is possible without waking up as a "totally new person" then copying of a person is possible without one of the two being a "totally new person." They only become distinct as their memories, behaviors and information continue to diverge now that their points of view have been separated.

I mean, how is it possible that the two independent consciousnessness of Will Riker and Tom Riker SIMULTANEOUSLY be the continuation of the consciousness of Will Riker pre-transporter accident?

How is it possible to have two independent copies of Star Trek on DVD?

 

[Tigger]

I'm not sure it is correct to say that Thomas Riker and William Riker had separate "consciousnesses" after the split, but that those consciousnesses after the split experienced different life experiences which molded them in different ways going forward from that split.

So to an outside observer - heck, even to the Riker's themselves - they each now have a "different" consciousness when they were re-united.

When the split happened, Riker and Troi were still in love. William Riker eventually fell out of love with Troi because of the future experiences he had (including those he had with her). Thomas Riker, on the other hand, never stopped being in love with Troi because he experienced a different set of future experiences which did not cause his feelings for her to fade/change. And Thomas Riker still hated his father, while William had come to an understanding with him because William had been able to see him again where Thomas didn't.

It might be like two identical twins raised exactly the same and exposed to exactly the same experiences and conditions. They could conceivably both develop very similar "consciousnesses" - possibly to the point that to an observer, they were "identical". You then start raising them differently with different experiences and conditions and they both would likely start to develop what an observer would consider "different" consciousnesses.

 

[polyharmonic]

Let me pose this thought experiment to better explain what I'm getting at.

You go into a booth which scans you. And then in another booth, you are replicated down to the sub-atomic level and beyond. Now in this situation it is very clear that you are the original person and are the continuation of the original consciousness. But it is also quite clear that the new being that is just created is a duplicate and not the "real" you. This other being is simply a "perfect clone", not just in DNA but in every atomic and sub-atomic arrangement of its being at the point of creation.

That other being clearly has its own newly created consciousness same as any other person. It's just that this person at the time of creation was identical to you in its atomic and sub-atomic arrangements. No one in the case would claim BOTH of you are the real original person and both are continuations of the original consciousness. Instead it is clear that you who went into the booth is the real original you and that the other one is clearly a copy, albeit a perfect copy because we all saw him created while the original you is still around.

Now let's change the scan a little. Let's say to do the scan, you would have to be "dematerialized" because that is the only way to scan you. So instead of being conscious and watching the scan happen (like if you had a full body scan IRL), you are actually torn apart. Then in another booth you are replicated.

Other than that this scan is "destructive", how is it fundamentally different? Why would the person who appears in the other booth be any less of a clone (albeit a super perfect clone) than in the first case? Its just that in the first case, the original is still there and it is explicitly clear that the second person is just created as a clone while in the second case it gives the appearance of transportation but is fundamentally no different than the first case.

 

[Da'an]

They say that every single cell in your body is replaced throughout an average of seven years.

Is the you from seven years ago the same you as now?

Is a transporter really very different, except instantaneous?

 

[Ronald Held]

Tigger has the coreect idea. Right after being split, they were identical, but both had different existences afterwards. Beyond that they were two different people,

 

[Ronald Held]

I had to search for this story which was in TNG special 03 Winter 95
"Pandora's Prodigy" The Enterprise arrives at a Federation
transporter research station near a star system where Picard
will help negotiate a trade agreement between two cultures.
LaForge meets an old friend, David Dirvy, who has developed a
method for recording transporter signatures. When Dirvy is
killed by an assassination attempt meant for one of the
negotiators, LaForge makes a copy of his friend. In disgust,
Dirvy gives all of his research data to Picard and tells him to
do what he will with it. Picard destroys the data and his actions
significantly affect the trade negotiations. Based on an unused
outline for the television series.
AFAIR they used an analogue method of recording data claiming the digital way would take too much storage.