or are we all just riding on a big train of causes and effects?
does free will exist?
- Thread starter splodenode
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Yes, free will exists.
Well, the idea is that you've already made your choice, the key is to understanding why you made that choice.
You build your own character and that sets up how you chose to resolve future conflicts, the goal is learn and understand why you made that choice.
You build your own character and that sets up how you chose to resolve future conflicts, the goal is learn and understand why you made that choice.
GodThingFormerly
A Different Kind of Asshole
Yes... until you get married.
Yes. But mind you, Im supposed to say that.
M
Meat Tenderizer
Guest
Yes. We always have had it. Anyone who says otherwise is most likely trying to abdicate their natural responsibilities.
I choose not to answer.
Ack! Another paradox!
The question if free will exists or not is probably impossible to be resolved on scientific grounds, at least any time soon.
That being said, psychology and biology have shown in 1000s of experiments that behaviour is lawful. The earliest example of this, in a truly empirical framework, is Pavlov’s work on classical conditioning. The laws he discovered make it possible to predict certain responses given prior association between stimuli, which occurs by presenting them together in time and space.
The fact that a lot of behaviour has become predictable like this, strongly speaks in favour of determinism. This is the philosophical concept that all our actions are the result of our environment and our genes and not of our personal free will. In fact, determinism argues that there is no free will at all. Of course that is a very extreme position and it is very difficult to prove entirely. Each experiment has a degree of unaccountable variance; even if it is not significant it is still there and leaves the possibility that, if not the key determinant, free will might at least play some role in how we make choices.
One shocking example of the lack of free will in a fairly random population is the Milgram Experiment. This study was carried out in the 60s, initially in the United States and later all across the world and 1000s of subjects participated.
For the experiment an advertisement was placed in a local newspaper aiming to recruit people for a learning study and a small incentive of a few dollars was offered for participation.
When the subjects arrived they were told that the experiment was assessing the effect of punishment on memory when learning words. They were then introduced to an actor who was alleged to be the learning subject. However, the real subject was unaware of him being an actor. They were then led into a room with a screen behind which the actor would sit. In front of the screen was a metal box posing as a shock generator. It had 30 switches each representing 15 volt increments, going up to 450 volts. They were labeled in groups with designations such as slight shock, moderate shock, danger, and XXX.
The actual subject was then given a list of word groups which he was to read to the actor behind the screen. The actor then had to repeat the group and for every mistake he made the subject had to shock him with increasing voltage. The real subject was watched by a person in a white lab coat who would insist for the subject to continue with the shocks regardless.
If you have never heard of this experiment I’m sure you can see where this is going and you are probably thinking to yourself, there is no way that I would shock an innocent person beyond what is mildly painful and I don’t care if there is a guy in lab coat or if I will be punished or what ever. And indeed this is exactly what Milgram, who designed the experiment and numerous psychiatrists whom he interviewed on this scenario, predicted. In fact the psychiatrists said that only the most sadistic and mentally sick psychopaths would go up to the maximum, which they estimated to be less than 0.1% of the population.
However, their prediction was entirely false. About two thirds of participants, regardless of where the experiment was carried out, went up to the full 450 volts and continued shocking at that level. The actor would scream out of pain, and plead for the subject’s mercy to stop with the experiment. This went up to the point where the actor was apperently dead or shocked into unconsciousness but none of that changed the behaviour.
Now you might think, gee, this was carried out in the 60s, maybe people had no morals in those days. However, most of the subjects suffered tremendously during the experiment and in turn pleaded with the lab coat guy to discontinue the experiment and most were reduced to nervous wrecks after the experiment had been carried out. Clearly, the shocking was against their will, against their moral beliefs. Nonetheless, free will had only little effect on what they ended up doing. The conditioned response of obedience to authority was too strong and ended up being the deciding factor.
There are people who dismiss this experiment, because they think it’s misguided or has no relevance beyond the experimental situation. I, however, would like to point out that scientifically it was a good experiment. Initially it did have weaknesses but Milgram revised the procedure several times until he had a randomly controlled method. This is no glitch.
In a situation where all of us, me included, insist that we would act according to what we believe is right, Milgram showed that only very few of us actually have the capacity to do this when we are challenged by an authority.
That being said, psychology and biology have shown in 1000s of experiments that behaviour is lawful. The earliest example of this, in a truly empirical framework, is Pavlov’s work on classical conditioning. The laws he discovered make it possible to predict certain responses given prior association between stimuli, which occurs by presenting them together in time and space.
The fact that a lot of behaviour has become predictable like this, strongly speaks in favour of determinism. This is the philosophical concept that all our actions are the result of our environment and our genes and not of our personal free will. In fact, determinism argues that there is no free will at all. Of course that is a very extreme position and it is very difficult to prove entirely. Each experiment has a degree of unaccountable variance; even if it is not significant it is still there and leaves the possibility that, if not the key determinant, free will might at least play some role in how we make choices.
One shocking example of the lack of free will in a fairly random population is the Milgram Experiment. This study was carried out in the 60s, initially in the United States and later all across the world and 1000s of subjects participated.
For the experiment an advertisement was placed in a local newspaper aiming to recruit people for a learning study and a small incentive of a few dollars was offered for participation.
When the subjects arrived they were told that the experiment was assessing the effect of punishment on memory when learning words. They were then introduced to an actor who was alleged to be the learning subject. However, the real subject was unaware of him being an actor. They were then led into a room with a screen behind which the actor would sit. In front of the screen was a metal box posing as a shock generator. It had 30 switches each representing 15 volt increments, going up to 450 volts. They were labeled in groups with designations such as slight shock, moderate shock, danger, and XXX.
The actual subject was then given a list of word groups which he was to read to the actor behind the screen. The actor then had to repeat the group and for every mistake he made the subject had to shock him with increasing voltage. The real subject was watched by a person in a white lab coat who would insist for the subject to continue with the shocks regardless.
If you have never heard of this experiment I’m sure you can see where this is going and you are probably thinking to yourself, there is no way that I would shock an innocent person beyond what is mildly painful and I don’t care if there is a guy in lab coat or if I will be punished or what ever. And indeed this is exactly what Milgram, who designed the experiment and numerous psychiatrists whom he interviewed on this scenario, predicted. In fact the psychiatrists said that only the most sadistic and mentally sick psychopaths would go up to the maximum, which they estimated to be less than 0.1% of the population.
However, their prediction was entirely false. About two thirds of participants, regardless of where the experiment was carried out, went up to the full 450 volts and continued shocking at that level. The actor would scream out of pain, and plead for the subject’s mercy to stop with the experiment. This went up to the point where the actor was apperently dead or shocked into unconsciousness but none of that changed the behaviour.
Now you might think, gee, this was carried out in the 60s, maybe people had no morals in those days. However, most of the subjects suffered tremendously during the experiment and in turn pleaded with the lab coat guy to discontinue the experiment and most were reduced to nervous wrecks after the experiment had been carried out. Clearly, the shocking was against their will, against their moral beliefs. Nonetheless, free will had only little effect on what they ended up doing. The conditioned response of obedience to authority was too strong and ended up being the deciding factor.
There are people who dismiss this experiment, because they think it’s misguided or has no relevance beyond the experimental situation. I, however, would like to point out that scientifically it was a good experiment. Initially it did have weaknesses but Milgram revised the procedure several times until he had a randomly controlled method. This is no glitch.
In a situation where all of us, me included, insist that we would act according to what we believe is right, Milgram showed that only very few of us actually have the capacity to do this when we are challenged by an authority.
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It all depends on how you define 'free will'.
Everything else that happens in the universe appears to be determined by cause and effect--the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics notwithstanding. (There are, in fact, other interpretations of quantum mechanics which are compatible with determinism, like the many-worlds intepretation) We live in a deterministic universe--at least, at the level at which we experience it, and at which we have evolved to cope with it.
So the question is: is free will compatible with determinism, or not?
If you say 'yes,' then you're a compatibilist. You believe that a person has free will so long as they are free to will what they would ordinarily will, given their particular combination of character and circumstance.
According to this interpretation, an ordinary person who is under duress, i.e. with a gun to their head, does not possess free will: it would take an extraordinary person to resist that kind of duress, and choose to take a bullet in the head; most people just do not possess that much strength of character.
So most people in our society are compatibilists, whether they know it or not. Our entire legal system is built on this philosophical position. A person with a gun to their head would not be held responsible for whatever crimes they were ordered to commit--at least, not fully responsible. We recognize that the fear of death has robbed such a person of their free will--that is to say, robbed them of their freedom to choose what they would ordinarily choose, and act as they would ordinarily act.
Certain people, however, reject this common-sense position, and try to argue that free will is not compatible with determinism. These people are, unsurprisingly, called 'incompatibilists.' They argue that free will is something more than just the freedom to do what we ordinarily do: this, they argue, is merely freedom of action, not freedom of will.
Most incompatibilists are so-called 'libertarians.' They argue that our choices are in no way determined: that our choices, unlike everything else in the universe, are somehow, magically, not subject to cause and effect.
To be fair, this position has a strong intuitive appeal: our choices do not seem determined, when we reflect upon them. And some very honest and respectable philosophers, like Thomas Reid, have held that our intuitions about our choices are true.
But people who believe in libertarian free will are faced with an impossible dilemma. Either our choices are determined, or they are not. If they are determined, then they are not 'free', by the incompatibilists' own definition. But if our choices are not determined, then they are also not 'free'. If our choices are not caused, then they're just random, unpredictable events.
This is important because most people who embrace libertarian free will do so because they fear that determinism undermines ethical responsibility: they believe that, if our choices are not completely free, and in no way determined, then we cannot be held responsible for them.
But what these people fail to realize is that, if our choices are completely free and undetermined, then we also cannot be held responsible for them. If our choices have no causes, then they're just random events--and no one can be praised or blamed for events that happen randomly.
Far from undermining moral responsibility, determinism is necessary to ensure moral responsibility. There is no point in punishing someone for their evil deeds, or rewarding them for their good deeds, unless those deeds are somehow determined by their moral character. Punishment and reward are justified because they change the characters and circumstances that determine people's choices.
What's more--and I think this is my own original contribution to the free will debate--it's impossible to prove that libertarian free will exists. To argue that libertarian free will exists is to argue that, if a person makes a choice, then that the exact same person, under those exact same circumstances, could have made a different choice. And there is just no way to test that hypothesis.
Given these problems, why do so many people still seem to believe that free will is incompatible with determinism?
I have come to believe that this fallacy has been promoted by Christian apologists as an alibi for their god, and a solution to the problem of evil.
If everything in the universe is determined, then God is responsible for everything that happens therein. That is to say: God is responsible for all the evil in the universe. He made it all happen, when he forged the first link in the chain of cause and effect.
This is unacceptable to Christian apologists, who want to believe that their God is all-good. So they promote the idea that human choices are undetermined as a way of blaming the victim, and getting their god off the hook.
Some people are so disgusted by this intellectually-dishonest, victim-blaming position that they embrace its reverse. Instead of identifying the source of the problem, and becoming compatibilists, they become ethical mechanists. They argue that, since the universe is deterministic, and free will is incompatible with determinism, then there simply is no free will, and nobody is responsible for anything.
I used to hold this opinion, in fact. But in time, I realized that it was just as wrong as its opposite, and that the heart of the problem lay in true and false definitions of free will.
Everything else that happens in the universe appears to be determined by cause and effect--the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics notwithstanding. (There are, in fact, other interpretations of quantum mechanics which are compatible with determinism, like the many-worlds intepretation) We live in a deterministic universe--at least, at the level at which we experience it, and at which we have evolved to cope with it.
So the question is: is free will compatible with determinism, or not?
If you say 'yes,' then you're a compatibilist. You believe that a person has free will so long as they are free to will what they would ordinarily will, given their particular combination of character and circumstance.
According to this interpretation, an ordinary person who is under duress, i.e. with a gun to their head, does not possess free will: it would take an extraordinary person to resist that kind of duress, and choose to take a bullet in the head; most people just do not possess that much strength of character.
So most people in our society are compatibilists, whether they know it or not. Our entire legal system is built on this philosophical position. A person with a gun to their head would not be held responsible for whatever crimes they were ordered to commit--at least, not fully responsible. We recognize that the fear of death has robbed such a person of their free will--that is to say, robbed them of their freedom to choose what they would ordinarily choose, and act as they would ordinarily act.
Certain people, however, reject this common-sense position, and try to argue that free will is not compatible with determinism. These people are, unsurprisingly, called 'incompatibilists.' They argue that free will is something more than just the freedom to do what we ordinarily do: this, they argue, is merely freedom of action, not freedom of will.
Most incompatibilists are so-called 'libertarians.' They argue that our choices are in no way determined: that our choices, unlike everything else in the universe, are somehow, magically, not subject to cause and effect.
To be fair, this position has a strong intuitive appeal: our choices do not seem determined, when we reflect upon them. And some very honest and respectable philosophers, like Thomas Reid, have held that our intuitions about our choices are true.
But people who believe in libertarian free will are faced with an impossible dilemma. Either our choices are determined, or they are not. If they are determined, then they are not 'free', by the incompatibilists' own definition. But if our choices are not determined, then they are also not 'free'. If our choices are not caused, then they're just random, unpredictable events.
This is important because most people who embrace libertarian free will do so because they fear that determinism undermines ethical responsibility: they believe that, if our choices are not completely free, and in no way determined, then we cannot be held responsible for them.
But what these people fail to realize is that, if our choices are completely free and undetermined, then we also cannot be held responsible for them. If our choices have no causes, then they're just random events--and no one can be praised or blamed for events that happen randomly.
Far from undermining moral responsibility, determinism is necessary to ensure moral responsibility. There is no point in punishing someone for their evil deeds, or rewarding them for their good deeds, unless those deeds are somehow determined by their moral character. Punishment and reward are justified because they change the characters and circumstances that determine people's choices.
What's more--and I think this is my own original contribution to the free will debate--it's impossible to prove that libertarian free will exists. To argue that libertarian free will exists is to argue that, if a person makes a choice, then that the exact same person, under those exact same circumstances, could have made a different choice. And there is just no way to test that hypothesis.
Given these problems, why do so many people still seem to believe that free will is incompatible with determinism?
I have come to believe that this fallacy has been promoted by Christian apologists as an alibi for their god, and a solution to the problem of evil.
If everything in the universe is determined, then God is responsible for everything that happens therein. That is to say: God is responsible for all the evil in the universe. He made it all happen, when he forged the first link in the chain of cause and effect.
This is unacceptable to Christian apologists, who want to believe that their God is all-good. So they promote the idea that human choices are undetermined as a way of blaming the victim, and getting their god off the hook.
Some people are so disgusted by this intellectually-dishonest, victim-blaming position that they embrace its reverse. Instead of identifying the source of the problem, and becoming compatibilists, they become ethical mechanists. They argue that, since the universe is deterministic, and free will is incompatible with determinism, then there simply is no free will, and nobody is responsible for anything.
I used to hold this opinion, in fact. But in time, I realized that it was just as wrong as its opposite, and that the heart of the problem lay in true and false definitions of free will.
Reality is deterministic. The only opportunity for freewill is on the quantum level.
And what does free will mean? It means that at some level we are manipulating the behaviour of matter directly, purely by choice.
So rather like telekinesis, somewhere in our brains, we are pushing particles around beyond the physical laws. So mind can manipulate one or more of the fundamental forces.
And it is through this essential mechanism that mind and body can be separated. The main argument against minds as non-corporeal forms is in the physics of their interaction with the material. Well in defense of the philosophy, this necessary construct within our brains (for free will) is how minds can and do interact with physical world.
And what does free will mean? It means that at some level we are manipulating the behaviour of matter directly, purely by choice.
So rather like telekinesis, somewhere in our brains, we are pushing particles around beyond the physical laws. So mind can manipulate one or more of the fundamental forces.
And it is through this essential mechanism that mind and body can be separated. The main argument against minds as non-corporeal forms is in the physics of their interaction with the material. Well in defense of the philosophy, this necessary construct within our brains (for free will) is how minds can and do interact with physical world.
I would say this depends on who you ask.
If you ask a neuropsychologist, you will probably be told that it doesn't. You may have the illusion of agentic behavior, but it is only that. For whatever reason, believing you had free will was an evolutionary advantage to our ancestors.
The worldview adopted by most of modern psychology is deterministic and reductionistic. Psychology has always wanted to legitimize itself by emulating physics--to be considered a science. So they adopt the assumptions of psychics and attempt to reduce behavior and emotions to predictable, controlable, and determined laws. They try to understand a phenomenon by breaking it down to its component parts.
So what you are left with is that what we think of as "love," is really just the presence of oxytocin in the limbic system. And that is it. It gives us an evolutionary advantage because it pushes our to spread our genetic material. But at the end of the day, your behavior is just chemicals in the brain.
There are other places in psychology where you can see alternative worldviews, such as existential psychology, but at the end of the day they aren't the dominant thread, and not representative of the direction in which psychology is moving.
Which is kind of sad because I think psychology should go back and look at what physics is doing now--maybe that would completely change things.
So to answer the question, I have no idea!
But in order to feel like my life has meaning, I will assume free will and act as such.
If you ask a neuropsychologist, you will probably be told that it doesn't. You may have the illusion of agentic behavior, but it is only that. For whatever reason, believing you had free will was an evolutionary advantage to our ancestors.
The worldview adopted by most of modern psychology is deterministic and reductionistic. Psychology has always wanted to legitimize itself by emulating physics--to be considered a science. So they adopt the assumptions of psychics and attempt to reduce behavior and emotions to predictable, controlable, and determined laws. They try to understand a phenomenon by breaking it down to its component parts.
So what you are left with is that what we think of as "love," is really just the presence of oxytocin in the limbic system. And that is it. It gives us an evolutionary advantage because it pushes our to spread our genetic material. But at the end of the day, your behavior is just chemicals in the brain.
There are other places in psychology where you can see alternative worldviews, such as existential psychology, but at the end of the day they aren't the dominant thread, and not representative of the direction in which psychology is moving.
Which is kind of sad because I think psychology should go back and look at what physics is doing now--maybe that would completely change things.
So to answer the question, I have no idea!
But in order to feel like my life has meaning, I will assume free will and act as such.
Reality is deterministic. The only opportunity for freewill is on the quantum level.
And what does free will mean? It means that at some level we are manipulating the behaviour of matter directly, purely by choice.
So rather like telekinesis, somewhere in our brains, we are pushing particles around beyond the physical laws. So mind can manipulate one or more of the fundamental forces.
And it is through this essential mechanism that mind and body can be separated. The main argument against minds as non-corporeal forms is in the physics of their interaction with the material. Well in defense of the philosophy, this necessary construct within our brains (for free will) is how minds can and do interact with physical world.
But, biological systems are too wet and warm to allow quantum states to reach the necessary synchrony. Molecular cell biology operates rather slowly when viewed from a quantum perspective. In fact, the difference is several orders of magnitude. The fastest biology operates in the range of milliseconds, whereas quantum states only remain stable for a maximum of nanoseconds. And this is only in environments that are 100% self-contained with regard to energy, which is quite the opposite of how biological cells work.
Mainstream psychology does not claim that determinism is 100% correct. Some extremist psychologists might but as a whole this is not what is being said. As you have pointed out psychology uses the scientific method to reach conclusions. Therefore, as determinism cannot be proven by this method, psychology will not claim that it has been. What psychology does claim is that most behaviour is lawful and this is based on 1000s of empirical experiments. The philosophy of free will thus is something each individual can then relate to these findings in what ever way they want to. There is no given dogma as you seem to be suggesting.
All Seeing Eye
Admiral
Free Will is an illusion created by those with power, for those without it.
I would say that's pessimistic Jeffries.
At one time, physicists swore there couldn't be any warm superconductors, but they found them.
Even cells are made of atoms.. and.. particles... there might be some "cool dry" substructures to the brain, created by some wonderful biological process.
It isn't really a question of maybes. IF free will exists, then these said brain structures must exist.
I wasn't specifically taking about traditional quantum models. For discerning free will, we're not immediately interested in what the quantum level is doing, but that whatever events happen there are being amplified to macroscopic levels which we colloquially identify as "willful action".
There may be other ways that quantum level things can affect the higher reality. Consider a molecule that is at some critical energy level where it can switch states as a consequence of quantum level activity. Perhaps the oscillation mode of one of its bonds? I'm not a quantum chemist, so I don't know specifically what stuff can happen. But it must be happening.
At one time, physicists swore there couldn't be any warm superconductors, but they found them.
Even cells are made of atoms.. and.. particles... there might be some "cool dry" substructures to the brain, created by some wonderful biological process.
It isn't really a question of maybes. IF free will exists, then these said brain structures must exist.
I wasn't specifically taking about traditional quantum models. For discerning free will, we're not immediately interested in what the quantum level is doing, but that whatever events happen there are being amplified to macroscopic levels which we colloquially identify as "willful action".
There may be other ways that quantum level things can affect the higher reality. Consider a molecule that is at some critical energy level where it can switch states as a consequence of quantum level activity. Perhaps the oscillation mode of one of its bonds? I'm not a quantum chemist, so I don't know specifically what stuff can happen. But it must be happening.
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