I would, be he wasn't talking to me. 
Historical what-if: the Yalta Conference
- Thread starter Nerys Ghemor
- Start date
Well, I'd like to hear about it, so I wish someone would ask.
All Italians love Operation Gladio, it saved them from Communism and made possible Silvio Berlusconi, the Northern League (forgot official name) and Vittoria Mussolini's party (total blank, unless it really is National Alliance, except I'm pretty sure that is one of our unquely American freedom-loving parties.)
However, the mention of Italy in this context should remind us that the US and English set the precedent for the powers of the conquerors of Axis territories over the new political and social regimes. Namely, that other nations are to have no say and the occupying powers can exercise what influence they see fit, in any form they see fit. The US and England excluded all Soviet influence, and fought determinedly against majority representation by anti-Fascists because the resistance was mostly Communist. The tactics of Operation Gladio were perfectly appropriate and entirely moral in the great struggle for democracy. Properly defined, of course.
As to the Yalta accords, unless the word democratic is defined, every Sovietized regime is defensible as democratic on the grounds that it excludes fascists and fascist sympathizers/collaborators while including economic democracy. Explicitly defining demoncracy to exclude the Soviet Union during a wartime conference would have been insane. It would have been exactly the same as switching sides, joining with Hitler.
All these Yalta scenarios are not new, though they are usually presented as conservative political counterfactual arguments rather than fiction or war games. Hitler was one of the greatest anti-Communists the world has ever seen. And, there are statistics that supposedly show that Stalin killed more people than Hitler. You do the math like you're supposed to. I think all such scenarios are secret wishes to have joined Hitler, because there was zero threat of Soviet expansionism after its devastating losses, even if there was a Soviet desire to do so. Anti-Communists falsify the historical record to claim there is some sort of expansionist drive inherent to socialism as there was one in the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and US.
On the other hand the western powers had enough trouble with the Germans on the western front against a minority of its forces. There was no way they were going to beat the armies that really beat Germany, not even with the wet dream nuking of Moscow.
However, the mention of Italy in this context should remind us that the US and English set the precedent for the powers of the conquerors of Axis territories over the new political and social regimes. Namely, that other nations are to have no say and the occupying powers can exercise what influence they see fit, in any form they see fit. The US and England excluded all Soviet influence, and fought determinedly against majority representation by anti-Fascists because the resistance was mostly Communist. The tactics of Operation Gladio were perfectly appropriate and entirely moral in the great struggle for democracy. Properly defined, of course.
As to the Yalta accords, unless the word democratic is defined, every Sovietized regime is defensible as democratic on the grounds that it excludes fascists and fascist sympathizers/collaborators while including economic democracy. Explicitly defining demoncracy to exclude the Soviet Union during a wartime conference would have been insane. It would have been exactly the same as switching sides, joining with Hitler.
All these Yalta scenarios are not new, though they are usually presented as conservative political counterfactual arguments rather than fiction or war games. Hitler was one of the greatest anti-Communists the world has ever seen. And, there are statistics that supposedly show that Stalin killed more people than Hitler. You do the math like you're supposed to. I think all such scenarios are secret wishes to have joined Hitler, because there was zero threat of Soviet expansionism after its devastating losses, even if there was a Soviet desire to do so. Anti-Communists falsify the historical record to claim there is some sort of expansionist drive inherent to socialism as there was one in the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and US.
On the other hand the western powers had enough trouble with the Germans on the western front against a minority of its forces. There was no way they were going to beat the armies that really beat Germany, not even with the wet dream nuking of Moscow.
The initial post-war governments were fairly democratic in the sense that they were left-center coalitions who did make up a Parliamentary majority. However, they were also not democratic in that they worked to consolidate their power and exclude even their coalition partners. I'm speaking of countries like Romania and Bulgaria, where the Communist Party was fairly popular. What I'm not referring to is Czechoslovakia, which had a democratic government where the left front could not gain a majority. There the Soviet Union did use their military to back a coup to take over the government. That one isn't defensible.
As for Operation Gladio, the wikipedia page actually does a good job outlining some of the abuses.
As for Operation Gladio, the wikipedia page actually does a good job outlining some of the abuses.
Going with the what-if, if I remember correctly, the Soviet Union received a significant amount of logistical resources from the United States during the war, specifically trucks and trains.
With sustained Allied strategic bombing, and the already depleted manpower reserves of the Soviet Union at the time, I don't see how the Soviet Union can sustain any attempt to conquer all of Europe, let alone any major offensives against the Allied forces in Western Germany for an extended period of time.
However, this would probably lead the Americans to just continually drop atomic bombs on Japan up until they surrender, considering the sheer nightmarish predictions about any Allied invasion of Japan.
With sustained Allied strategic bombing, and the already depleted manpower reserves of the Soviet Union at the time, I don't see how the Soviet Union can sustain any attempt to conquer all of Europe, let alone any major offensives against the Allied forces in Western Germany for an extended period of time.
However, this would probably lead the Americans to just continually drop atomic bombs on Japan up until they surrender, considering the sheer nightmarish predictions about any Allied invasion of Japan.
BTW, the actual atomic bombs didn't really cause more damage than the firebombing of Tokyo. This has led some to believe that it was the Soviet invasion that caused the end of the war. I actually tend to believe it was the bombs, but it was in a different way. It wasn't the damage, but it's systematic nature. The Potsdam declaration said surrender or be completely destroyed. Then the Japanese witnessed solitary American bombers literally going city by city (three days apart) and erasing it from the map. It's quite easy, in that context (and through all the clusterfuck language issues that were going on) to think that the American strategy literally was to destroy every single Japanese city so there was nothing left.
Of course, from the American perspective, if Nagasaki failed, we would have to invade anyway because we were out of bombs.
Of course, from the American perspective, if Nagasaki failed, we would have to invade anyway because we were out of bombs.
Here are approximate US bomber ranges, centered on Moscow:
As you can see, B-29s could just do the job from British bases, but unlike their Pacific missions, they would spend a long time over unfriendly territory. Their operating altitude made them hard to intercept, though, for pretty much any existing fighter. And this would assume a complex and lengthy redeployment of the 20th Air Force to Europe.
But the issue is pretty much academic. As Alidar said, Stalin was not really interested in aggressive expansion, and had a lot of internal goals that the war had sidetracked. The Red Army pushing west through Europe would be at the end of long communications lines, and the US and UK had vast and largely unrivaled tactical air resources to chew them up. And the political will in the US and UK was all on the side of winding up Germany and Japan and bringing the boys home. With the Depression added to the war, it had been a long, wearing decade and a half, and people were ready for it to end.
Justin
That's neat. But could you center it on either France or the UK? It looks like a B-29 would be able to take the trip there and back, but the others would struggle. I'm also guessing it would be a solo mission because our fighters did not have the range. So we could use nuclear weapons on their western cities (but not really hit the factories east of the Urals), but we could not do conventional bombing attacks.
These ranges are centered on Suffolk, where I believe RAF Mindenhall and Lakeheath were the first UK bases that could accomodate B-29s:
Yeah, P-51s with drop tanks had only about half the range of the Superfort; they had to fly out of Iwo Jima to escort the raids on Japan. The missions conjectured above would have to be largely conventional: According to this the US had 125 combat-ready Silverplate (a-bomb capable) B-29s by the end of 1946, but only eleven a-bombs. In 1947 it was 270 bombers and 32 bombs.
Justin
