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Historical what-if: the Yalta Conference

Then, of course, there's always the alternate history of the war presented in "Storm Front, Parts I and II (ENT)." But I don't think many of us really want to go there.

Space Nazis might Godwin the entire discussion. :)

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At Yalta, Stalin agreed to move troops east and end occupation of some places. In other places that they were given an occupation zone (Austria), they withdrew fairly quickly after. Yalta was not an agreement where the Soviet Union was given territory, it was an agreement where Stalin gave up things he didn't have to[...]

For the most part the line between East and West was a fait accompli where Soviet troops met Western troops, was it not?

Where did the Soviets give up any territory expect in eastern Austria?

eta: because I was curious, I looked for maps of the endgame of WWII in Europe, and if this is remotely accurate it clearly looks like Stalin only gained influence compared to what his armies achieved:

http://www.culls-page.de/WW II Karten/Kriegsverlauf 1945.gif
(only link because of size)
 
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At Yalta, Stalin agreed to move troops east and end occupation of some places. In other places that they were given an occupation zone (Austria), they withdrew fairly quickly after. Yalta was not an agreement where the Soviet Union was given territory, it was an agreement where Stalin gave up things he didn't have to and agreed to support the US against Japan (let's not forget that this was still a major issue and some historians still think that it was the Soviet invasion of Manchukuo that caused Japan to surrender).

So I'm not sure what "standing up to Stalin" would have accomplished.

Stalin was expected to allow the eastern European countries, specifically Poland as a non-Axis power, to chose their own form of government. How realistic this would have been I'll let you decide but it was, what was on the table at the time. Truman was stated to have been very frustrated upon finding out how accommodating FDR was to "Uncle Joe" as well.

A conflict between the Soviets and Western Allies could start with either side being the aggressor. Truman could very easily want to stop the communist threat. Stalin could feel threatened by the atomic bomb project, which he did have a reliable spy in and knew how close it was to completion, or an accident could just happen when you have millions of men closing on each other. A "friendly fire" accident was very possible and something the west was afraid of being the silhouette profiles of the German Panther and the Soviet T-34 were alarmingly similar for example.

The Soviets -did- have a major advantage in manpower and armor, there is no denying that, but that wasn't an insurmountable advantage. Zhukov was specifically warned by Stalin that he had to make this final campaign against Germany work because the Soviet Union -was- running out of manpower. So the traditional Soviet method of putting out a fire with Russian bodies wasn't sustainable forever. Air power would be a push between the two powers, with the training advantage going to the allies. When they start pulling in air power from the Pacific, it would rapidly lean the Allied way.

Military might -isn't- the only factor either. Economics is a huge one. The Soviets were dependent on the West for supplies, oil and even weapons through Lend-Lease. That would significantly hamper Soviet progress when that was cut off. Further complicating the Soviet oil situation would be the assumption the Allies put Strategic Bombers in Iraq and Iran to pound Baku and the rest of the Caucasus oil fields along with anything left standing in Romania too. They can have all the tanks in the world and it won't do them any good without fuel for them.

I want to say the number of German combatants at the time of the surrender was about half a million, most of them were concentrated around Flensburg at the Danish border with the Doenitz government, so they could easily be isolated and ignored by both sides. Given the rape of Berlin, they'd probably be eager to support the Allies in any case if given the chance. As for Japan? Their navy was destroyed, their air force crippled and their industry had been bombed into ruins. There's no reason in the short to medium term they couldn't start pulling air and even some land assets to fight in Europe.

As for the Soviets? Yes, they would advance and push the allies back. They may get over the Elbe. They may even get over the Weser. But I doubt they'd ever get over the Rhine before Allied air power and strategic bombings ground them and their supply situations to a halt. Then in fall 1945 the nukes start falling. Earlier than that, if Truman feels threatened enough to scrub the Trinity test and test the weapon against the Soviets.
 
Stalin was expected to allow the eastern European countries, specifically Poland as a non-Axis power, to chose their own form of government.

Actually, the agreement was to create a center-left coalition. It obviously was unrealistic because they literally did what the Bolsheviks did. They formed a coalition and then drove out the moderate parties too. If the agreement was to allow countries to decide for themselves their political direction, then the western powers failed too. They formed a center-right coalition. The only difference is they didn't drive out the center. But ask any Italian person familiar with Operation Gladio whether the US post-war actions were democratic.

As for the Soviets? Yes, they would advance and push the allies back. They may get over the Elbe. They may even get over the Weser. But I doubt they'd ever get over the Rhine before Allied air power and strategic bombings ground them and their supply situations to a halt. Then in fall 1945 the nukes start falling. Earlier than that, if Truman feels threatened enough to scrub the Trinity test and test the weapon against the Soviets.

How is this beneficial in the slightest? Could we fight the Soviet Union to a bloody stalemate costing thousands of lives, especially in the very countries we were supposedly fighting for with the end result being something somewhat more favorable? Yeah, probably. Why we would, I have no idea.

Roger Wilco, Austria may have been what I was thinking of.* They got an occupation zone and it ended fairly quickly. Still, Austria did not become a long-term divided country and it did not have a communist government imposed on them.

* I suppose they also withdrew from West Berlin, but I'm certainly not going to pretend that wasn't a clusterfuck.
 
So, destroy Eastern Europe in order to save it? Whatever.

Yeah, because Eastern Europe was in such great shape after Germany and the Soviets had fought over it for four years.

Nevermind my analysis was just of the result of such a conflict, not an arguement for or against such intervention. Whatever, indeed.

Stalin was expected to allow the eastern European countries, specifically Poland as a non-Axis power, to chose their own form of government.

Actually, the agreement was to create a center-left coalition. It obviously was unrealistic because they literally did what the Bolsheviks did. They formed a coalition and then drove out the moderate parties too. If the agreement was to allow countries to decide for themselves their political direction, then the western powers failed too. They formed a center-right coalition. The only difference is they didn't drive out the center. But ask any Italian person familiar with Operation Gladio whether the US post-war actions were democratic.

As for the Soviets? Yes, they would advance and push the allies back. They may get over the Elbe. They may even get over the Weser. But I doubt they'd ever get over the Rhine before Allied air power and strategic bombings ground them and their supply situations to a halt. Then in fall 1945 the nukes start falling. Earlier than that, if Truman feels threatened enough to scrub the Trinity test and test the weapon against the Soviets.

How is this beneficial in the slightest? Could we fight the Soviet Union to a bloody stalemate costing thousands of lives, especially in the very countries we were supposedly fighting for with the end result being something somewhat more favorable? Yeah, probably. Why we would, I have no idea.

Roger Wilco, Austria may have been what I was thinking of.* They got an occupation zone and it ended fairly quickly. Still, Austria did not become a long-term divided country and it did not have a communist government imposed on them.

* I suppose they also withdrew from West Berlin, but I'm certainly not going to pretend that wasn't a clusterfuck.

As I said, I wasn't arguing the "benefits" of this, only of a possible, maybe even likely result of such a conflict. Yes you're against the concept, I get that. You don't have to jump all over someone who dares to discuss it. I happen to think it probably wouldn't ever happened for the sole purpose of Stalin being too smart for it. He knew the Soviets were at the end of their strength and the west was ahead of them in the nuclear arms race. You can argue he was paranoid, insane and evil, but you can't really say he was stupid.

As for Austria? The Renner government really was an exception more than a rule in postwar Europe. Being the Soviets held Vienna in their occupation zone, I actually still find it surprising they didn't carve Austria into east/west like they did with Germany.

Then again, if you believe the Stalin letter, it's entirely possible he did want some neutral powers as a buffer between the Eastern Bloc and Wester Allies. Germany and Austria would have served as that, and Austria -could- have been a precident to a neutral Germany. The west didn't think Stalin was serious about his offer of a neutral Germany though, so we'll never know.
 
Strategically i agree with many that a land war might have gone to the Soviets even with allied air and sea supremacy. Strategic bombing of soviet industry would be quite difficult since theirs is far inland and the allied forces don't have any airbases in range to reach them.

As to the nuclear option.. back in 45 the Manhattan project provided only very minimal capabilities and it would have taken quite some time to get something like a regular production running. So the Soviets would have lost Moscow and maybe Leningrad or some other huge military target but that's about it and i believe it would only inflame the Soviets even more and drive their military fanaticism.

Question is where would the Soviets have stopped? They sure would have occupied Germany entirely as well as all of the Balkan but would they want all of Europe? Possibly.. their fanaticism and power of ideology rivalled Nazi Germany.
 
So, destroy Eastern Europe in order to save it? Whatever.

Yeah, because Eastern Europe was in such great shape after Germany and the Soviets had fought over it for four years.

Nevermind my analysis was just of the result of such a conflict, not an arguement for or against such intervention. Whatever, indeed.

So if your language, such as that the Soviet advantage in manpower and armor "wasn't an insurmountable advantage," was not intended to suggest that taking Eastern Europe back from the Soviets was militarily feasible, then just what were you trying to suggest?

In actual fact, Operation Unthinkable was determined by real-life military experts at the time not to be feasible. Your conclusion that anything like it might have been feasible is therefore highly suspect, in the first place, and calls into question your "analysis."

In the second place, further depopulation due to death is always a further form of destruction, no matter how bad things already are. Additionally, the level of civilian deaths could hardly have been inconsequential. Any statement to the effect that Eastern Europe was already destroyed, so therefore damaging it further would hardly have mattered, thus indicates a position formulated without due consideration given to the costs of actions, and so one unworthy of consideration.
 
So, destroy Eastern Europe in order to save it? Whatever.

Yeah, because Eastern Europe was in such great shape after Germany and the Soviets had fought over it for four years.

Nevermind my analysis was just of the result of such a conflict, not an argument for or against such intervention. Whatever, indeed.

So if your language, such as that the Soviet advantage in manpower and armor "wasn't an insurmountable advantage," was not intended to suggest that taking Eastern Europe back from the Soviets was militarily feasible, then just what were you trying to suggest?

In actual fact, Operation Unthinkable was determined by real-life military experts at the time not to be feasible. Your conclusion that anything like it might have been feasible is therefore highly suspect, in the first place, and calls into question your "analysis."

In the second place, further depopulation due to death is always a further form of destruction, no matter how bad things already are. Additionally, the level of civilian deaths could hardly have been inconsequential. Any statement to the effect that Eastern Europe was already destroyed, so therefore damaging it further would hardly have mattered, thus indicates a position formulated without due consideration given to the costs of actions, and so one unworthy of consideration.

Did you know it was possible to talk about something without suggesting to do it? I can talk about murder statistics for example without getting it in my head to kill someone. But if you can't figure out that and seem to be spouting out discussing an issue is the same as condoning it, then what's really unworthy of consideration?

As for Operation Unthinkable? As I said in my previous post. It didn't have to be the allies who initiated hostilities in the European theater. It could've been the Soviets, it could've been an accidental friendly fire incident that escalates. As for it not being feasible? You have as many experts saying that it is feasible as you didn't. You had experts saying Market Garden was feasible that didn't. Experts can be wrong. We'll never know in this case. Hence the concept of discussing possibilities.

Yes, war always has casualties. You're the one putting words in my that they don't matter. Perhaps I should just give you my password so you can speak directly on my behalf without crude implications? Given that position you seem to be taking on myself, it strikes me that your consideration and a quarter might buy me a newspaper and certainly nothing beyond that.
 
Strategically i agree with many that a land war might have gone to the Soviets even with allied air and sea supremacy. Strategic bombing of soviet industry would be quite difficult since theirs is far inland and the allied forces don't have any airbases in range to reach them.

As to the nuclear option.. back in 45 the Manhattan project provided only very minimal capabilities and it would have taken quite some time to get something like a regular production running. So the Soviets would have lost Moscow and maybe Leningrad or some other huge military target but that's about it and i believe it would only inflame the Soviets even more and drive their military fanaticism.

Question is where would the Soviets have stopped? They sure would have occupied Germany entirely as well as all of the Balkan but would they want all of Europe? Possibly.. their fanaticism and power of ideology rivaled Nazi Germany.

As I said previously, I don't think they could push much beyond Germany. The Elbe, Weser and Rhine all present formidable land obstacles, the Rhine especially that I don't think the Soviets could maintain the supply lines to breach. Austria and Italy's mountainous terrain would present a natural obstacle if they actually decided to make any serious effort to contest it. As for the Balkans? Well Greece and Turkey may be in trouble, but that really is a secondary front and Turkey may well try and bow out into neutrality again.

As for the strategic bombing, I was more indicating their supply lines, depots, and infrastructure in Eastern Europe. They have a huge army and will require lots of supplies and fuel to sustain. If this material starts to be interrupted because it cannot get from point a to point b, then Zhukov has a problem. Certainly nothing's going to stop Romania, Baku and the rest of the Caucasus oil fields from being bombed from British held Iraq and Iran, which is going to put a serious strain on Soviet fuel supplies. It's also further reasonable to assume a deal could be made with Finland since they weren't Fascists and only allied with the Axis out of self-interest against Russia.

As for the nuclear option, a single atomic bomb on Moscow would cripple the Soviet infrastructure. There's a sound reason that Stalin didn't evacuate his capital in the winter of 1941. Moving it would be practically impossible. Moscow was the hub of the vast majority of Soviet supply routes to say nothing of their centralized government being very rooted into the ground there. Heck, there's a good chance you get Stalin, Molotov, Beria, and anyone else who might take over if you drop an atomic bomb on the Kremlin.
 
Strategically i agree with many that a land war might have gone to the Soviets even with allied air and sea supremacy. Strategic bombing of soviet industry would be quite difficult since theirs is far inland and the allied forces don't have any airbases in range to reach them.

This needs more emphasis. What was the range of US bombers, where could they be based, and how far would they reach? One of Germany's biggest problems is that they could not reach any crucial area in the Soviet Union.

This not only includes conventional air superiority, but it would include any deliveries of nuclear weapons.

Question is where would the Soviets have stopped? They sure would have occupied Germany entirely as well as all of the Balkan but would they want all of Europe? Possibly.. their fanaticism and power of ideology rivalled Nazi Germany.

I think they would have stopped where they were (since they withdrew from Austria), with the possible exception of all of Germany depending on whether they wanted to deal with the difficulties of occupying the rest of the country. I could also see some desire to reach the Adriatic, but I'm not sure the Soviet Union at the time was entirely capable of taking Yugoslavia, which was very effective at guerrilla warfare at the time.

Stalin was many negative things. His main noteworthy trait was paranoia. But he is generally not described as a fanatical ideologue. Most people think of him as someone who used ideology for personal ends rather than ran the Soviet Union to serve the greater goals of Communism. I think that's overstated in the other way, but he was the main proponent of "Communism in one nation" and promoted United Fronts to include all left wing groups as a bulwark against Fascism. This isn't consistent with someone who was an ideologue.

His post-war actions do fit with his paranoid personality as someone who wanted a buffer from the west and wanted to prevent Germany from invading the USSR. He also was a Russian Chauvanist (odd for a Georgian, but I digress), which explains his desire to invade places formally owned by the Russian Empire.
 
If the agreement was to allow countries to decide for themselves their political direction, then the western powers failed too. They formed a center-right coalition. The only difference is they didn't drive out the center. But ask any Italian person familiar with Operation Gladio whether the US post-war actions were democratic.
Yes, please. Ask me.
 
If the agreement was to allow countries to decide for themselves their political direction, then the western powers failed too. They formed a center-right coalition. The only difference is they didn't drive out the center. But ask any Italian person familiar with Operation Gladio whether the US post-war actions were democratic.
Yes, please. Ask me.
I would, but...I'm scared. :(
 
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