Federation Foreign Policy

[Sci]

Sci: While I hesitate to bring real-world politics into the discussion, one of the results of the Clinton impeachment thing in 1998 is that more brilliant legal minds than anyone who's ever likely to come to this forum looked over the law and precedent re impeachment with fine-toothed combs that practically worked on the quantum level.

(I'm only being a mite hyperbolic.)

The end result is: If the UFP's relevant constitutional provisions are anything like the US's, "high crimes and misdemeanors" means whatever the legislature wants it to mean, no more and no less.

(You might agree with Clinton's impeachment, you might not, but I've not in 12 years heard anyone say that Congress didn't have the power to impeach. Whether they should have or not, sure. But whether they could or not?)

See, the problem with that argument is that Clinton was accused of a crime: Perjury. The relevant question with Clinton's impeachment was whether or not he had committed perjury, and whether or not perjury constituted a high crime or misdemeanor.

The issue with Jaresh-Inyo is simply this: Is appeasement -- a foreign policy trait that is difficult to define in the best of times -- considered a high crime or misdemeanor by statute? As I noted, it would be exceedingly difficult to make a law against that, because whether or not a given policy is actually appeasement can be very subjective. So the relevant questions here are, Is it a violation of Federation law for the President to engage in appeasement?, and, How can you prove that a Federation President has engaged in appeasement?

But either way, the Council can't just impeach someone for something that isn't a crime. A law has to be passed against something first. So the idea that they can just call anything they want a "high crime or misdemeanor" is just wrong.

Judicial review is also inapplicable if the UFP's justice system uses anything like the Common Law system used by (most of) the US, England, etc. I suspect they do.

The episode "Dr. Bashir, I Presume?" rather strongly established that the Federation uses judicial review. In that episode, Dr. Bashir's father, upon his son's secretly having been genetically enhanced as a child is exposed, vows to fight the law banning genetic enhancements and get it overturned, even if he has to fight all the way to the Federation Supreme Court.

 

[Penta]

Yes, but judicial review applies in that case because it's an ordinary criminal case. I agree that the Federation uses Common Law with judicial review of statutes.

Judicial review doesn't apply to impeachments, though. (If you must have a cite: Nixon v United States,506 U.S. 224 (1993))

Dealing more with Jaresh-Inyo: It's the beauty of impeachment not being a criminal proceeding.

If the Federation Council wanted to impeach and convict him for territorial concessions to the Cardassians or something, the beauty of the ambiguity of "High crimes and misdemeanors" is that it can mean whatever can get passed by the body doing the impeachment. Yes, Clinton's articles related with precision to criminal charges, but they could just have easily been on the grounds that sexual acts with an intern not much older than your daughter is icky.

The only way impeachment makes sense, after all, is when you view it as a political instrument, not a judicial proceeding like a criminal or civil case. You're correct that it'd be dubious were they to - but that still doesn't change the legal reality - you can be impeached for damn near anything. The question is whether the opposition can put it through (as the Republicans in the Clinton example did, though it didn't lead to conviction in the Senate) and whether they'll survive politically afterwards (Kinda debateable in the Clinton example).

 

[Sci]

Dealing more with Jaresh-Inyo: It's the beauty of impeachment not being a criminal proceeding.

If the Federation Council wanted to impeach and convict him for territorial concessions to the Cardassians or something, the beauty of the ambiguity of "High crimes and misdemeanors" is that it can mean whatever can get passed by the body doing the impeachment.

No, they can't. If something has never been criminalized, then it's not a "high crime." These are categories that a specific act has to be legally placed in by a statute. If there is no law against appeasement, they can't charge him with a crime for doing it, because it isn't a crime.

Impeachment may not be a criminal proceeding, but the impeached official still has to actually commit a crime in order for it to proceed.

 

[TerraUnam]

Who says that the Federation even practices impeachment? In current times other countries use a Vote of Non-Confidence to force out governments. The exact nature of the Federation government has never been defined, and just because the UFP uses the title "President" does not mean that their practices in any way resemble those of the US. Most other countries go for non-confidence votes, which are explicitly political and not judicial.

The closest look ever taken of the Federation government in Articles of the Federation showed many Parliamentary features instead of strict Presidential ones.

 

[Sci]

Who says that the Federation even practices impeachment? In current times other countries use a Vote of Non-Confidence to force out governments. The exact nature of the Federation government has never been defined, and just because the UFP uses the title "President" does not mean that their practices in any way resemble those of the US.

It may not resemble everything about how the U.S. does it, but that's how elected presidencies work -- they're not merely the heads of government, they're also the democratically-elected heads of state. That's why you can't just pass a no-confidence vote on a president -- any president in any country -- just because the legislature doesn't like them. Impeachment has to occur because of actual crimes because the people elected those presidents to serve out a specific term.

The closest look ever taken of the Federation government in Articles of the Federation showed many Parliamentary features instead of strict Presidential ones.

To be more specific, Articles established that the presidency itself rather closely resembled the American presidency, but that the working relationship between the President and Council was similar to that of the working relationship between a Prime Minister and Parliament. However, Articles did not established a no-confidence vote -- and it seems improbable that there is one, because a key subplot of that novel was that the relationship between President Bacco and the Council came grinding to a halt at one point. The Council would surely have used a no-confidence vote then if one existed.

 

[TerraUnam]

That remains to be seen, and all this talk of impeachment amounts to nothing more than a no-confidence motion with an extended hearing on the matter. Elected presidencies like the US are actually very rare nowadays, parliamentary republics are the norm except in US-influenced South America.

Ministerial Responsibility has done away with the need for impeachment in parliamentary democracies.

AOTF was interesting but if a no-confidence motion requires dissolution of both dismissal of the president and removal of the Federation Council, that provides a plausible in-universe explanation as to why we didn't see it. (Other than the real fact that KRAD didn't think of it.)

 

[Sci]

That remains to be seen, and all this talk of impeachment amounts to nothing more than a no-confidence motion with an extended hearing on the matter.

No, impeachment is a fundamentally different affair from no-confidence motions. In a no-confidence motion, the head of state remains head of state, and merely appoints someone else to serve as head of government. Yet even the ousted head of government gets to remain in their office as an MP.

With impeachment, you're talking about the removal of the head of state from office and the assumption of the office of head of state by another person. There's no continuing head of state who gets to appoint a new head of government; this is a fundamentally different affair.

And, yes, it's been well-established at this point that you don't just impeach a president for political reasons, because to do so would be to violate the democratically-expressed will of the people that that president serve out a specific term of office. That's the fundamental difference between U.S.-style Presidentialism and the Westminster system -- in presidentialism, the head of state is chosen to serve for a certain term of office, whereas in the Westminster system, the head of government serves at the Parliament's pleasure.

Elected presidencies like the US are actually very rare nowadays, parliamentary republics are the norm except in US-influenced South America.

Um, no, they're not rare. Presidentialism is practiced by 67 countries (depending on how exactly how you define the term), and Semi-Presidentialism is practiced by another 28 or so. Presidential republics cover all of South America, most of North America, and significant portions of Africa. It's certainly reasonable to say that parliamentary republics are more common, but a system practiced by 34% (presidentalism) or 49% (semi-presidentialism and presidentialism) of all United Nations Member States is not rare.

AOTF was interesting but if a no-confidence motion requires dissolution of both dismissal of the president and removal of the Federation Council, that provides a plausible in-universe explanation as to why we didn't see it. (Other than the real fact that KRAD didn't think of it.)

Why would the dismissal of the President require dissolving the Council? It should only require that the Council appoint one of their members as President Pro Tempore and then call a special election (which was established to be what they do when the President leaves office unexpectedly in the previous novel A Time for War, A Time for Peace).

Besides, it's not at all clear that the Council can be dissolved, because there's no uniform mechanism for determining how the Council is constituted. The Council isn't universally elected; every Federation Member State determines for itself how its Councillor will be chosen. Hence, Betazed's Councillor is popularly elected (Articles of the Federation), Andor's is appointed as part of the Cabinet depending on which party gains the majority of seats in the Parliament Andoria (Andor: Paradigm), and Bajor's is appointed by the First Minister with the advice and consent of the Chamber of Ministers (Bajor: Fragments and Omens).

Bottom line: There's no evidence, canonical or from Articles of the Federation, that the Federation has a no-confidence option. The Federation has some of the traits of the Westminster system, but it is very clearly not a parliamentary republic.

 

[TerraUnam]

A double-dissolution mechanism could serve as a responsibility check, to prevent frequent use the the device.

You've also confused the role of Head of State and Head of Government; the Head of Government is by far the more powerful and more important of the two. Impeachment and No-Confidence both remove the Head of Government from office and prevent them from exercising power. The role of a Head of State in a parliamentary system is ceremonial. The key question is if the new HoG can command the confidence of the legislature. Therefore the real judgment lies in the hand of the legislature.

To speak of impeachment in the Federation is as ill-founded as speaking of no-confidence motions. The device has never been mentioned, and the descriptions we have are sufficiently different from most modern day practices (good one KRAD) that extrapolations are not straightforward.

 

[T'Girl]

^ Without either impeachment or no-confidence I guess the only thing the council could do is call for elections, any one know if a parliment system can do that without the co-operation of the chief executive?

 

[Rush Limborg]

^Yeah. I think the one thing we can truly call "parlimentarian" about the UFP government is the fact that the President is also head of the Council. Aside from that, it's very similar to the US Government.

Now...on the subject of impeachment, I think it's best we clear up some confusion here, by going to the original source.

Here's how the conditions of impeachment are stated in the US Constitution:

Article II, Section 4:

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

The process is as follows:

Article I, Section 3, Paragraphs 6 and 7:

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person Shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members Present. [Today, that would mean a 67-member vote.]

Judgement in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishmnet, according to Law.

 

[Sci]

A double-dissolution mechanism could serve as a responsibility check, to prevent frequent use the the device.

It would prevent use of the device, period. No Councillor's going to risk losing their job just to oust the President over a political concern.

That's why impeachments require an actual crime be found to have been committed; that keeps the device from being over-used.

You've also confused the role of Head of State and Head of Government; the Head of Government is by far the more powerful and more important of the two.

I haven't confused a damn thing. Yes, the head of state is usual ceremonial, but the fact remains that they represent a legal continuity of authority that is lost in an impeachment.

Impeachment and No-Confidence both remove the Head of Government from office and prevent them from exercising power. The role of a Head of State in a parliamentary system is ceremonial.

No, the role is mostly ceremonial. Most of those systems give the head of state reserve powers, however -- that's why Australian Governor-General John Kerr was able to fire the sitting Prime Minister, for instance.

To speak of impeachment in the Federation is as ill-founded as speaking of no-confidence motions. The device has never been mentioned, and the descriptions we have are sufficiently different from most modern day practices (good one KRAD) that extrapolations are not straightforward.

Fair enough -- that's why I wasn't the one who suggested that the Federation has impeachments, Rush Limborg was. I just said that they'd need to be for actual crimes rather than political disagreements.

^ Without either impeachment or no-confidence I guess the only thing the council could do is call for elections, any one know if a parliment system can do that without the co-operation of the chief executive?

Parliaments cannot call for new elections, no; only the head of state can do that. However, most Westminster systems have laws that require the head of state to dissolve Parliament and call for new elections after a certain amount of time.

^Yeah. I think the one thing we can truly call "parlimentarian" about the UFP government is the fact that the President is also head of the Council. Aside from that, it's very similar to the US Government.

Hmm. I don't know that that's accurate, either.

The Federation President is not the head of the Council; there's no evidence that they hold any Council title ex officio. Rather, Articles established that the President serves as the presiding officer of sessions of the full Council if the President is not off-planet, but that's not the same thing as holding another office ex officio (the way the United States Vice President holds the office of President of the United States Senate ex officio).

Further, the Federation President in Articles is required to nominate specific Councillors to serve on the Federation Council's various committees, and to work closely with the relevant committees and Councillors when formulating policy. That's a much, much closer working relationship between the President and Council than exists between the U.S. President and Congress; it's more akin to the relationship between a Prime Minister and Parliament, where the PM basically controls the makeup of Parliament and which Members of Parliament hold important positions.

So, really, it's a U.S./Westminster mix.

Now...on the subject of impeachment, I think it's best we clear up some confusion here, by going to the original source.

Here's how the conditions of impeachment are stated in the US Constitution:

Article II, Section 4:

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

The process is as follows:

Article I, Section 3, Paragraphs 6 and 7:

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person Shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members Present. [Today, that would mean a 67-member vote.]

Judgement in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishmnet, according to Law.

In other words, it's not a criminal proceeding, but a crime must still have been found by the Senate to have been committed. A political disagreement, even a severe one, is not a valid reason to impeach someone.

 

[Rush Limborg]

Now, on the subject of "dissolving" the council:

Common sense would strongly demand that the President not have that kind of power--it is a direct path to tyranny. The entire point of a legislature is to ensure that no one person has complete power. Giving the exectutive office power to dissolve said legislature is a removal of that assurance.

 

[Sci]

Now, on the subject of "dissolving" the council:

Common sense would strongly demand that the President not have that kind of power--it is a direct path to tyranny. The entire point of a legislature is to ensure that no one person has complete power. Giving the exectutive office power to dissolve said legislature is a removal of that assurance.

Well, no, because dissolving the legislature doesn't mean abolishing the entire institution. It means dissolving that particular legislature (as in, the 127th Parliament or whatever) and calling for new elections.

Heads of government advise their heads of state to dissolve their parliaments and call for new elections in parliamentary states all the time without that leading to "tyranny."

 

[Rush Limborg]

I see.

Surely, though, a charismatic leader would dissolve the legislature for the purpose of encouraging the rise of new legislative members sympathetic to his cause, if he/she feels that the existing legislature is...hampering his/her agenda.

 

[Sci]

I see.

Surely, though, a charismatic leader would dissolve the legislature for the purpose of encouraging the rise of new legislative members sympathetic to his cause, if he/she feels that the existing legislature is...hampering his/her agenda.

Dramatic ellipsis, there.

Yes, the ability of a head of government to advise a head of state to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections carries the risk of unconstitutional behavior. So does the ability of the President of the United States to serve as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. More than a few advocates of the parliamentary system don't like the U.S. system because they feel that a charismatic President could use his position as head of state and government to make himself a dictator (which has, indeed, happened in numerous South American dictatorships).

No system is perfect. At a certain point, you've got to trust people, too.

In general, though, that's one of the reasons that most parliamentary systems give their heads of state reserve powers. The general idea is that the head of state can, in extraordinary circumstances, refuse the advise of the head of government if he feels that such advise is unconstitutional. Indeed, that's often posited as one of the justifications for not abolishing the Monarchy in Britain -- the Queen is argued to be a barrier against a Prime Minister from taking too much power (as, after all, the British Armed Forces swear personal loyalty to her, not the Prime Minister of the moment) who can act against the Prime Minister if he is abusing his authority.

Thus, if a head of state believes that the head of government is, for instance, repeatedly calling for elections in order to so pack the parliament full of his partisans that he can effectively shut down democracy, the head of state usually retains the authority to refuse such advise, or even to fire the head of government and appoint the leader of the opposition as the new head of government.

For the record, that was part of how Hitler got into power -- after becoming Chancellor, he repeatedly advised the German President to dissolve the Reichstag and call for new elections. New Nazi Members of the Reichstag kept winning until he had enough MPs to effectively control the government and pass the Reichstag Fire Act and the Enabling Act, turning Germany into a dictatorship. And, then, when the President died, Hitler appointed himself head of state and head of government simultaneously.

The question of when to go against the head of government's advise is tricky, though. Australian Governor-General John Kerr felt that Gough Whitlam's government ("Such-and-such's government," by the way, is parliament-ese for "administration") had lost the confidence of the Australian Parliament and so fired him and appointed the Leader of the Opposition as the new PM on the condition that he immediately advise Kerr to dissolve Parliament and call for new elections; it was legal, but he was vilified for it (as many felt he had undermined democracy, since Whitlam had the confidence of the House of Representatives but not the Senate).

Just recently, however, Canadian Governor-General Michaëlle Jean chose not to reject the PM's advise when Prime Minister Stephen Harper advised her to prorogue (that is, temporarily suspend) Parliament for six weeks in order to keep the opposition Liberals and New Democrats from forming a coalition and passing a vote of no confidence against him -- just long enough for the conflicts between the Libs and NDs to flare up and kill their coalition. As a result, Harper's been able to stay in office even though the majority of MPs don't support him anymore, just because that majority wasn't able to stay united enough to fight him when Jean prorogued Parliament.

As I understand it, there can also be statutory laws passed against calling elections too early, though I'm not aware of any specific examples.

 

[TerraUnam]

Partly. But you can also lose. Parliamentary systems will call elections to resolve a political impasse. That's the heart of the system.

Sci:

Parliamentary government means that the no-confidence motions usually result in an election. Parties put their standings and seats (along with their members) on the line for political questions all the time.

Parliamentary government requires that the Head of State act on the advice of the government at all times. Elections are in the hands of the Head of Government. The number of times a parliamentary Head of State has acted alone are very rare and remarkable. The Whitlam Affair was just that and was a constitutional crisis to boot.

Parliaments can and do force elections through no-confidence motions. If an alternative government cannot be formed or doesn't exist already, an election is called. Everybody in a parliamentary system knows this.

The "continuity" thing with impeachment is meaningless. A officer of state's term is terminated and replaced. In the US this happens through an extremely formal process. In parliamentary systems this happens on a case-by-case basis.

For a given incident Impeachment and No-Confidence produce the same result: replacement of the Head of Government. The only difference is No-Confidence motions may be used for any reason.

 

[Sci]

Parliamentary government means that the no-confidence motions usually result in an election.

That really depends on the situation and on the country, actually.

In Canada, for instance, had Harper not gotten Jean to prorogue Parliament and the no-confidence vote gone through, the leader of the Liberal Party at the time would simply have been appointed Prime Minister and have formed a coalition government with the New Democrats.

Meanwhile, countries like Spain or Israel require the opposition to submit the name of an MP they'd want appointed PM to the head of state if they do a no-confidence vote.

And, frankly, neither the Opposition nor the Government is unlikely to put forth a confidence motion and prompt the dissolution of Parliament unless they're ahead in the polls at the time.

Parliamentary government requires that the Head of State act on the advice of the government at all times.

No, they don't. They require that the Head of State be politically neutral and mostly ceremonial, but they also specify areas where the Head of State is allowed to act on their own initiative. Queen Elizabeth was twice forced to personally chose the Prime Minister in the 50s and 60s when the governing Tories lacked a formal process for choosing their own leader, for instance. And the constitutions of plenty of countries outline specific times when the head of state may chose to disregard the advise of the head of government -- the Federal President of Germany may choose to disregard advise to dissolve Parliament and call a new election if the Federal Chancellor loses a confidence motion that the government initiated rather than the opposition.

In any event, the bottom line is that you can't just have a motion of no confidence against an elected President who is both head of state and government. Why? Because such Presidents do not get their mandates from the legislatures, but from the people themselves. In the Westminster system, the head of government is chosen by the elected Parliament; in Presidentialism, the President is elected by the people, which means that throwing him out in a no-confidence motion for political concerns is a violation of the democratic will of the people. That's why impeachment is restricted to actual crimes.

Rush:

Wikipedia tells me that a number of countries have strict time limits on how often motions of confidence can be presented, presumably to avoid the scenario you were worried about.

Elections are in the hands of the Head of Government. The number of times a parliamentary Head of State has acted alone are very rare and remarkable. The Whitlam Affair was just that and was a constitutional crisis to boot.

Parliaments can and do force elections through no-confidence motions. If an alternative government cannot be formed or doesn't exist already, an election is called. Everybody in a parliamentary system knows this.

The "continuity" thing with impeachment is meaningless. A officer of state's term is terminated and replaced. In the US this happens through an extremely formal process. In parliamentary systems this happens on a case-by-case basis.

For a given incident Impeachment and No-Confidence produce the same result: replacement of the Head of Government. The only difference is No-Confidence motions may be used for any reason.[/QUOTE]