I was a sophmore in college and remember walking by a tv and watching it blow up.
The TV blew up?
(joking)
I was working at Toys By Roy in Southglenn Mall that day.
That’s just sick. Way too soon.I was working at Toys By Roy in Southglenn Mall that day. Within hours we had sold out all of our Estes Rocket Space shuttles to kids from the local high school many of whom asked how to get it to blow up.
That's sickening. How did you handle it?^ You think that's bad...I heard my first shuttle joke the day the disaster happened.![]()
^ You think that's bad...I heard my first shuttle joke the day the disaster happened.![]()
The Cast and Crew of Star Trek wish to dedicate this film to the men and women of the spaceship Challenger whose courageous spirit shall live through the 23rd century and Beyond...
I was a sophomore in HS. I'm on my way out of the cafeteria when my best friend Bob shows up and says "Hey, the shuttle blew up!"
the astronauts must have been aware of the risks, and must have thought the mission was important enough to accept those risks.
The origin and consequences of the erosion and blow-by were not understood. They did not occur equally on all flights and all joints; sometimes more, and sometimes less. Why not sometime, when whatever conditions determined it were right, still more leading to catastrophe?
In spite of these variations from case to case, officials behaved as if they understood it, giving apparently logical arguments to each other often depending on the "success" of previous flights. For example. in determining if flight 51-L was safe to fly in the face of ring erosion in flight 51-C, it was noted that the erosion depth was only one-third of the radius. It had been noted in an experiment cutting the ring that cutting it as deep as one radius was necessary before the ring failed. Instead of being very concerned that variations of poorly understood conditions might reasonably create a deeper erosion this time, it was asserted, there was "a safety factor of three." This is a strange use of the engineer's term ,"safety factor." If a bridge is built to withstand a certain load without the beams permanently deforming, cracking, or breaking, it may be designed for the materials used to actually stand up under three times the load. This "safety factor" is to allow for uncertain excesses of load, or unknown extra loads, or weaknesses in the material that might have unexpected flaws, etc. If now the expected load comes on to the new bridge and a crack appears in a beam, this is a failure of the design. There was no safety factor at all; even though the bridge did not actually collapse because the crack went only one-third of the way through the beam. The O-rings of the Solid Rocket Boosters were not designed to erode. Erosion was a clue that something was wrong. Erosion was not something from which safety can be inferred.
For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.
That's the one. I was the only person they moved over from the Southwest Plaza store when they closed that one down.I was working at Toys By Roy in Southglenn Mall that day.
Southglenn Mall in Littleton, Colorado? I worked at Prints Plus in Southglenn.
^ You think that's bad...I heard my first shuttle joke the day the disaster happened.![]()
I remember hearing one in the first couple of days, too. It was a play on the "Gimme a light. I meant a Bud Light!" commercials that were popular at the time.
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