Why was it necesarry to prove Data's sentience?

[Use of Time]

Data wasn't going to be tested to destruction, anymore than a patient is treated to death. Data just didn't trust Maddox to take him apart and put him back together again without "killing" him. There's no evidence that Maddox was incompetent, just inexperienced. Data might not have been in any danger from him at all.

And I doubt that Soong developed his androids entirely independently. He would've had all the androids that Kirk encountered as examples of the engineering and programming needed. Maddox just wanted a live sample, something Soong probably lacked but overcame. Maddox could probably overcome that problem, too! Eventually.

Also, don't forget that Data didn't just show up at the Academy. He was found by Starfleet officers. And we all know that the rule is finder's keeper's. Therefore, Data belongs to Starfleet!

How do we know that he wouldn't have been tested to destruction? Data was obviously very skeptical hence his whole "I'm unique" speech. Yes Maddox could probably get there on his own but he was impatient and had no regard for Data's life to the point where he was willing to risk his life to get him there faster. A scientist that takes shortcuts is scary. I know that Data was found by Starfleet but he decided to join Starfleet as something of a tribute to them not because they owned him.

 

[Use of Time]

That first paragraph is somewhat odd to me. Why would policy all of a sudden regress in a twenty year window?

Because the people making the policy changed. You see this in real life all around us. Over the past three decades, Republicans have systematically rolled back all the economic regulations that were instituted into US law after the Great Depression -- arguably leading to the situation that nearly caused another depression. In state legislatures, there are officeholders trying to roll back women's rights and gay rights to an earlier state of affairs. Just because one generation of lawmakers institutes a change, that doesn't mean the change is absolutely fixed for all time to come.

Is Data's commissioning paperwork somehow void simply because those who accepted it have moved on into retirement? Wouldn't it be kind of contractual? It's like saying "Data, you did great at the academy and your service record is exemplory (as was indicated in the "Measure Of A Man") but you know what, that commission you received is invalid and you are a toaster." Yeah, I would call that having privelages as an officer revoked at the drop of a hat, wouldn't you?

But that's not what happened (and I need to correct my own erroneous assumptions after reviewing the episode transcript). Data was given orders that transferred him to a new posting. Like any other officer, he was required to obey those orders -- but he also had the same right as any other officer to refuse by resigning his commission. Commander Maddox filed a motion that that should be changed, that he should be forbidden to resign on the grounds that he was Starfleet property. Louvois then found an obscure 21st-century legal precedent saying that Data was indeed property. Picard then challenged that ruling and Louvois held a hearing.

So I was wrong -- the policy didn't change. It's not that Data's rights and privileges were unceremoniously revoked. The default position was that he did have those rights, but Maddox found a loophole in the laws that let him attempt to get around that, a loophole that hadn't yet been closed because it was based on an antiquated, forgotten law that somehow was still on the books (though how a 21st-century Earth precedent is part of Federation law is beyond me).

Yes! There it is. That last paragraph makes perfect sense. Hey Chris, thanks for doing the legwork on this. That effectively makes the discussion more of an ethical issue than a legal one. You might have saved this episode for me. Thanks for the debate. I look forward to The Buried Age.

 

[Pavonis]

Wow, I've completely misremembered the episode. Thanks for the transcript link, Christopher. Seeing that, and checking MA, helps bring the trial into focus.

Still, I think Data was premature in concluding that Maddox couldn't do what he said he would do. Dismantling Data doesn't "kill" him, and dumping (copying) his memory to a computer (even non-positronic) doesn't mean his positronic brain wouldn't remain intact. Reassembling him should bring Data back to normal.

Frankly, I think Data was acting out of the fear he would've claimed he could not feel.

 

[Use of Time]

Wow, I've completely misremembered the episode. Thanks for the transcript link, Christopher. Seeing that, and checking MA, helps bring the trial into focus.

Still, I think Data was premature in concluding that Maddox couldn't do what he said he would do. Dismantling Data doesn't "kill" him, and dumping (copying) his memory to a computer (even non-positronic) doesn't mean his positronic brain wouldn't remain intact. Reassembling him should bring Data back to normal.

Frankly, I think Data was acting out of the fear he would've claimed he could not feel.

Premature? Yeah, he was just going to disable him and dump his memory into a computer putting his life in the hands of a guy who had shown that he didn't even consider him a lifeform. Yeah, no reason to worry about that whatsover.

 

[Timo]

The Enterprise crew sure didn't react as if this was a mundane situation.

I'm curious to hear more about this. In what way did they indicate that the situation had a component of "significance" or "universality" to it? Their pal was facing a threat, and they felt alarmed. But it took ages for Riker to put together a silly straw man about "android armies"; until that point, all the arguing had been extremely personal and specific to this single case and these individuals involved. And it was at that point that Louvois put an end to the silliness and stopped things from getting ugly.

Beyond that desperate defense tactic, neither Riker nor Picard indicated that they would have felt that important basic rights were in danger here. It was only the application of those rights in the case of a relevant individual that got them hot and bothered.

Timo Saloniemi

 

[Use of Time]

The Enterprise crew sure didn't react as if this was a mundane situation.

I'm curious to hear more about this. In what way did they indicate that the situation had a component of "significance" or "universality" to it? Their pal was facing a threat, and they felt alarmed. But it took ages for Riker to put together a silly straw man about "android armies"; until that point, all the arguing had been extremely personal and specific to this single case and these individuals involved. And it was at that point that Louvois put an end to the silliness and stopped things from getting ugly.

Beyond that desperate defense tactic, neither Riker nor Picard indicated that they would have felt that important basic rights were in danger here. It was only the application of those rights in the case of a relevant individual that got them hot and bothered.

Timo Saloniemi

What about that heavy scene in Ten-Forward with Guinan where they discuss the implication of how they will be judged by outsiders on the way they treat other races or forms of life? That wasn't exclusive to their concern for Data.

 

[Christopher]

Still, I think Data was premature in concluding that Maddox couldn't do what he said he would do. Dismantling Data doesn't "kill" him, and dumping (copying) his memory to a computer (even non-positronic) doesn't mean his positronic brain wouldn't remain intact. Reassembling him should bring Data back to normal.

But Maddox wasn't just going to disassemble Data's body. He wasn't studying Data's body, he was studying the positronic brain. I refer you again to the transcript. His proposal called for invasive examination of the brain, so no, the brain definitely would not remain intact. That was the entire point. He wanted to take the brain apart and see how it worked.

And the very fact that he intended to download Data's memory into another computer tells us that Maddox could not guarantee that he'd be able to put the brain back together again after taking it apart -- since after all, by his own admission, Maddox didn't know how to build a working positronic brain. It's always easier to take something apart than to put it together again, especially if the latter is something no living person has ever done.

So yes, there was a palpable risk that this would kill Data. The very reason Maddox wanted to do this research was that he didn't know how the positronic brain worked, so of course he couldn't guarantee that it was perfectly safe to take it apart and put it back together again. Nobody could guarantee that before it had ever been done.

And a neural network isn't like an ordinary computer. It's not just static memory, but active, ongoing processes interacting in nesting layers and producing intricate, emergent behaviors that can't be predicted from the substrate alone. So as Data said, there was no guarantee that simply copying his memory files would be the same as preserving his consciousness. Remember, we've seen two instances of memory dumps from one positronic brain to another: Lal to Data and Data to B-4. In neither case did the recipient take on any of the donor's personality or identity. Only information was transferred.

 

[Use of Time]

I think we have pretty good clarification on the nature and meaning of the hearing itself and established that Data's life was in danger of submitting to the procedure.

OK, now let's try to move on to another issue here. The transcript also said that Louvois initially ruled Data to be considered property. At what point would he be considered property? Was it at the point of his comissioning? Woud this be a natural contractual compoent for any other comissioning officer?

 

[Timo]

Supposedly, his being property made him ineligible for resigning - and since other officers have resigned, this is not a property extending to all of them.

Without knowing the details of these "Acts of Cumberland", we can't tell whether the ruling could be retroactive or only apply from the timepoint it was written down in the appropriate records. But Louvois says her research has made her conclude that Data is "the property of Starfleet" specifically, not simply "property". Since Data clearly wasn't involved with Starfleet for the entirety of his existence, Louvois doesn't appear to be saying that he has always been property by nature - but that he became property of Starfleet at some point when getting involved with this organization.

Whether being the property of Starfleet means that Data cannot be considered a person is unclear. Perhaps the former just overrides the latter in these circumstances?

Timo Saloniemi

 

[Christopher]

OK, now let's try to move on to another issue here. The transcript also said that Louvois initially ruled Data to be considered property. At what point would he be considered property? Was it at the point of his comissioning? Woud this be a natural contractual compoent for any other comissioning officer?

I doubt the law in question applied to organic beings; probably it was specifically a law pertaining to computers or artificial intelligences. Otherwise it would've been a precedent that stretched well beyond Data and the episode would've been about that, rather than specifically about his rights.

 

[Mojochi]

What the court ultimately ruled was that Data has the right to choose whether to undergo Maddox' procedure. Nothing was established about sentience one way or another. Judge Louvois in her closing speech did say she felt Data was a machine, and was not property of Starfleet, but I doubt those things were actually included in the judgement as such. Although if the courts had to decide upon whether Data was a machine, or property, this would be precedent if not a verdict.

Not exactly. The court ruled that "Data has the right to choose", in reference to his resignation, not the experiment. Apparently, it's questionable whether he has a right to refuse the experiment while serving in Starfleet, under Maddox, which is odd to say the least. I'd think officers would have the right to refuse being experimented on, but Picard seemed worried that once Data was under Maddox's command it would be less controllable

His right to choose his fate & resign is what was recognized by the court, which was the only reason the trial was brought. By ruling so, it accordingly recognizes him as not being Starfleet's property. Consequently, Maddox withdrew his transfer order, & chose to leave Data alone, rather than see him leave Starfleet

The court declaring that "Data has the right to choose" whether or not he will remain in Starfleet is an important ruling, because it certifies his right to choose his fate, just as any other being in Starfleet & thereby the Federation, as it was apparently left unaddressed upon his enrollment. It grants him, & all like him, freedom of action in their society, which is why Picard could tell Admiral Haftel (The Offspring) that they have rights which he helped to define.

As to why it became necessary to prove this many many years after he'd been a member of Starfleet, we can only speculate that no one considered his status sufficiently to foresee this eventuality, at the time of his enrollment, & much like real law, someone came along & used it against Data & the unresolved question of his sentience was used as support for making the claim

When I say unresolved question of his sentience, I refer to the fact that his acceptance was granted despite there being objections on the grounds of unprovable sentience, and yes, the matter of his sentience is still unresolved, but as the judge noted, so is the matter of our own. However, the matter of his status as a free being is settled.

 

[BillJ]

Remember, we've seen two instances of memory dumps from one positronic brain to another: Lal to Data and Data to B-4. In neither case did the recipient take on any of the donor's personality or identity. Only information was transferred.

We really don't know what happened with B-4, as there is no canon work post-Nemsis that deal with him. But the comic Countdown, as I'm sure you know, has Data as Captain of the Enterprise.

 

[JoeZhang]

Sure the joining papers for Starfleet must note that the candidate is joining of their own free will or similar wording? If data is indeed, simply a machine, he doesn't have free will and therefore his enlistment into Starfleet was invalid as a machine can't legally sign the papers and therefore was never in Starfleet.

As for him for being property? Can they provide a valid receipt or even his warranty?

No they cannot and I ask the honour to adjourn this case so we can retire to my quarters and get tucked in with this case of saurian brandy I have.




<ROLL END CREDITS>

 

[Mutai Sho-Rin]

Discussions like this, conducted with inquisitiveness and civility, make me very happy to be the TNG moderator. Well done, folks.

 

[Trekker4747]

Why was it necesarry to prove Data's sentience in Measure of A Man? I mean why did they choose that time of all time's to challenge that concept.

He was obviously sentient enough to go to Starfleet Acadamy and to serve in Starfleet.

He was the second officer on the Federation flagship and now all of a sudden they wanted to prove to the Federation he is sentient? Wasn't it a little bit late to be debating that? He had already been serving for years as an officer and in charge of actual humans.

All due respect to CDR Maddox, but Starfleet should've said "You can ask him to help you but I doubt he's going to go for it."

This was a great episode but the baseline premise was flawed to me.

I agree, it's flawed because it seems to me all Picard had to argue was that if Data got to choose to be in Starfleet and had to do it like anyone else (by going through the Academy) and he had to work his way up the ranks and supposedly even got to choose his assignments then certainly he could choose not to undergo Maddox's plans/reassignment. But it was probably a case of having to cement his "rights" other than him simply only having them while they were convenient to Starfleet.

One of my problems with this episode was Riker's arguments seemed to basically be "Data is a machine" which really wasn't at dispute and already a fact in evidence. Riker did little to "prove' Data didn't have the right to choose and was property.

 

[Pavonis]

But Maddox wasn't just going to disassemble Data's body. He wasn't studying Data's body, he was studying the positronic brain. I refer you again to the transcript. His proposal called for invasive examination of the brain, so no, the brain definitely would not remain intact. That was the entire point. He wanted to take the brain apart and see how it worked.

After reading the whole transcript, I now remember the focus on the positronic brain. I had thought the focus was in general on his whole body. Which wouldn't really be necessary, as there were already plenty of androids from previous civilizations to use as examples of android engineering. I wonder what those alien android's were using instead of positronic brains, though. Something sophisticated, but totally different, apparently. Why wouldn't or couldn't Maddox vivisect one of those Old Ones from Exo III, or Mudd's Planet? I wonder....

I also recall that Bashir installed a positronic brain, or at least part of one, in Vedek Bareil. So someone managed to build a positronic brain in the meantime.

Perhaps Maddox succeeded in his quest to build a functioning one, and somehow managed to get it cleared for medical use, too? Artificial hearts (Picard), artificial limbs (Nog)... and artificial brains?

 

[Trekker4747]

I also recall that Bashir installed a positronic brain, or at least part of one, in Vedek Bareil. So

IIRC he implanted part of a brain into him and then later another part, at the end effectively giving him a full poistronic brain.

 

[BillJ]

I also recall that Bashir installed a positronic brain, or at least part of one, in Vedek Bareil. So

IIRC he implanted part of a brain into him and then later another part, at the end effectively giving him a full poistronic brain.

Things like this is where Star Trek went too far. Silly stuff like artificial brains.

 

[Christopher]

I wonder what those alien android's were using instead of positronic brains, though. Something sophisticated, but totally different, apparently. Why wouldn't or couldn't Maddox vivisect one of those Old Ones from Exo III, or Mudd's Planet? I wonder....

The Mudd's Planet androids were actually pretty dumb. They seemed to be nothing more than drones all controlled by a single central computer that was too rigidly programmed to be anything I'd consider sentient. Heck, the NPCs in a modern computer game are nearly as sophisticated in their behavior as Mudd androids.

The Exo III androids were also pretty limited, except for those that contained copies of living beings' minds, and even those apparently lost something basic. And the androids Sargon, Thalassa, and Henoch built would've just been receptacles for their minds.

I'd say the only really sentient android we saw in TOS -- sentient in her own right rather than containing a duplicate of a living person's consciousness -- was Rayna Kapec. And given that what happened to her upon facing an emotional dilemma was almost identical to what happened to Lal in a similar context, I've long believed that she had a positronic brain, and that Soong's work was based on Flint's (a premise also employed in the novel Immortal Coil by Jeffrey Lang).

 

[Use of Time]

I wonder what those alien android's were using instead of positronic brains, though. Something sophisticated, but totally different, apparently. Why wouldn't or couldn't Maddox vivisect one of those Old Ones from Exo III, or Mudd's Planet? I wonder....

The Mudd's Planet androids were actually pretty dumb. They seemed to be nothing more than drones all controlled by a single central computer that was too rigidly programmed to be anything I'd consider sentient. Heck, the NPCs in a modern computer game are nearly as sophisticated in their behavior as Mudd androids.

The Exo III androids were also pretty limited, except for those that contained copies of living beings' minds, and even those apparently lost something basic. And the androids Sargon, Thalassa, and Henoch built would've just been receptacles for their minds.

I'd say the only really sentient android we saw in TOS -- sentient in her own right rather than containing a duplicate of a living person's consciousness -- was Rayna Kapec. And given that what happened to her upon facing an emotional dilemma was almost identical to what happened to Lal in a similar context, I've long believed that she had a positronic brain, and that Soong's work was based on Flint's (a premise also employed in the novel Immortal Coil by Jeffrey Lang).

Perfect. I'm glad you brought that up because I think that is the next logical step in this discussion. I don't know if if I should make a new thread for this or not but lets talk about Lal. I find it hard to believe that after the incident in "Measure Of A Man" that Lal could be considered property of Starfleet. Is it fair for Starfleet to assume Lal is property. Does Admiral Haftel have that kind of unilateral authority or is that another decision made by many in Starfleet Command. Maybe she could be considered Starfleet property because Data used Starfleet resources (The Enterprise) to create her? Thoughts?