Exactly! And the personality traits that add up to religiosity make one more likely to be religious! That is the brain-basis. That is the psychological phenomenon.
There are two problems you have omitted. First, a minor but statistically significant distinction between two groups is only as important as the reliability of the classification into two groups and the reliability of the indicators for the traits measured. These are significant enough problems that, given the small size of the effect measured, that it may simply be an experimental artifact that disappears with better classifications into conservative and liberal. I mean, just two groups? Second, there isn't even the slightest hint of a mechanism for how greater flexibility (which is probably to be read as a proxy for "intelligence" anyhow) creates liberal politics. Attitudes are not policies, and politics are about policies. The whole schema is reminiscent of the failed attempts to cobble up some notion of an authoritarian personality as an explanatory factor. That is forgotten for good reason, and I fully expect these experiments are merely retracing a dead end.
You acknowledge the science yet dismiss the implications. It simply does not follow.
I've always known far more about the neuroscience than you think. The disagreement lies in the perceived implications. You would have it that a heterogeneous set of emotions that are sometimes (but sometimes not) deemed religious, somehow are involved in creating the heterogeneous set of cultural institutions arbitrarily called "religion" although they are also present in other social institutions as well. Talking about complexity of causation doesn't work. There is not even a hypothesized chain of causality! There certainly is no possibility of predicting the nature of religious institutions from human nature.
Again, how can you know there are no specifically religious emotions? You state this as fact but again provide no evidence with which to support it, whereas I have provided plenty of evidence that contradicts it.
A sensation of a presence can be interpreted as God? Religious, right? A ghost? Well, religious too, in a broad sense; right? A telepathic contact via ESP? Well, no, not religious, just bad science, right? It's up to you to explain how this isn't just a common enough psychological phenomena sometimes interpreted as a religious experience and others not, depending upon the learned cultural behaviors. And I'm sorry, I think you have gravely misinterpreted neuroscience experiments if you think they have demonstrated the existence of any state or experience that is specifically religious.
For most people it's just learned behavior. That's why there are so relatively few conversions. And when there are mass conversions there is usually an element of compulsion, or a crassly material motive, or, in a few cases, a massive breakdown of all social institutions which necessarily incluedes the religious ones. That's why each religious institution will find the full range of psychological types, traits and experiences instead of a selection. Indeed, the conflict between the psychological needs of some believers and the social institution is a major cause of tension in these institutions, leading sometimes to splits or reformations. By your hypothesis, the religious insitutions express the psychological needs! Absurd.
So, what about religion as medicine do you want to discuss?
Why, what psychological states and experiences that are "religious" in the "religion" that is primitive medicine? There are some cultures in which religion as medicine is the vast bulk of "religious" observance. The claim that every culture has religion demands surreptitiously counting such debatable religion without examination. What religous impulse causes shamans to fake trances or surgery?
You're creating a false dichotomy; religion is both a psychological phenomenon and a socio-political institution, the two are not mutually exclusive, but rather inform and encourage one another.
There is about as much connection between religion as a social institution and its members' psychology as there is between a school and the students' psychologies. If anything, it's oppositional. The psychological phenomena you want to call religious are just human, sometimes called religious, other times not. They exist, are of interest, but are not causal to religious institutions. "Religion" is notorious for not being what it's founders' inspirations demanded. If the founders' religious experiences are of doubtful importance, how so the mere follower?
What? Isn't the philosophical question of the nature of the brain one of the central foundations of religion? Isn't it one of the defining factors of the vast majority of religions and spiritual philosophies, that there is a soul? A "ghost in the machine"? As opposed to the scientific materialist view that the mind is caused by the brain? How on earth can the nature of the human mind be irrelevant to a discussion of the nature of religion?
No, no, no, no(most religions preceded scientific materialism,) and because social institutions are not human nature writ large. There are various religious ideas, but they are incredibly varied, so varied that calling religious tells us nothing significant.
I am not claiming that the religion is the cause of the abnormal states, but that the normal states that the abnormal states teach us about (by magnifying or minimizing the effects) are the cause of the religion.
Psychological states, neither normal nor abnormal, do not cause religion. In this society some religious institutions appear to exist to fulfil some psychological needs but in very many other cultures, do not. There seems to be an unconscious agenda to somehow ratify "religion" as human nature. \No ideas in themselves are causal for any institutions, separable even in principle from social functions they fulfill.
Actually, you're wrong about that. There is no specific part of the brain to which trauma will cause a specific language deficit either.
How specific do you think it has to be? Damage to Broca's are is different from damage to Wernicke's area, despite the overlap. There's nothing even that specific for religion. The specificity alleged for ibogaine is fantastic, but you had no difficulty in accepting that. The complicating factors you refer to argue against claims for ibogaine.
There are different kinds of irrationality. All of these are natural psychological phenomena, and some of them contribute to religiosity.
And some kinds of rationality contribute to "relgiosity" too. And some kinds of irrationality that contribute to "religiosity" also contribute to non-religious behavior. All this screams correlation, not causation!
This is what really gets me: you are citing the Standard Social Science model as more solid evidence than neurological science....Neuroscience is solid. It is testable.
The standard social science model is solid because it is based on a mountain of observations of religion, society, history, economics, on and on. The experiments in neuroscience with their shaky definitions equating heterogenous phenomena, unexamined assumptions, lacunae in chains of causation, may be set up as lab experiments, with chatter about controls etc. But is this Popperian emphasis on testability really good science?
As to your other post, Steven Pinker in his latest book The Better Angels of Our Nature flatly declares that g, the general factor of intelligence, has been scientifically established. And that it is fifty percent heritable. It's not a problem for me because I think Pinker's a crank with a Ph.D.
But his kind of science is the kind you're using.