So, what, those other worlds don't have God in them? Or do they have less perfect Gods? Or did Leibniz just think God liked us best? What if he was wrong and somebody else was God's favorite?
Christopher, "The Spindle of Necessity" notwithstanding, I am not some sort of philosophical savant. Philosophy and metaphysics intrigue me, but I think that stems from my natural nihilism.
As for Leibniz, his "best of all possible worlds" attempted to answer the Problem of Evil. From
The Columbia History of Western Philosophy, edited by Richard Popkin:
As he later came to define it, the problem of "theodicy" is the problem of vindicating God's supreme justice, which he exercises in choosing the best world for creation from among an infinity of possible worlds. Defending this position required Leibniz to take firm stands on the contingency of the world's existence, its embodiment of characteristics of perfection, order, and harmony definitive of the wisdom that has guided God's choice in creation, and the compatibility of worldly evil with the supreme goodness of God's will.
The passage goes on to city Leibniz's 1710 pamphlet,
Essays on Theodicy.
My understanding of Leibniz's infinite worlds philosophy was that
this world is the one possibility which has the
least capacity for evil. There are other worlds, and they would be more evil, and because they are more evil they are thus more and increasingly imperfect. God, himself perfect, cannot suffer them to exist or his creation to exist in them, and thus they do not
actually exist, except as possibilities.
That's how I understand it, anyway.
And as for Voltaire, what Steve said.
