^ The problem is that our definition of consciousness, as it stands, is only provisional. Under our provisional definition, sure, we have no reason to believe that it extends after bodily death.
If we had a harder definition of consciousness, with both broad explanatory and predictive power, then yeah, in that case, I would have to agree that, without any evidence to the contrary, that
in itself could provide good and concrete reason to conclude the improbability of the extension of consciousness after bodily death, and would
if the definition were successful enough.
I should have amended this important qualification, perhaps something like this:
However, I do not think that science is in a position yet to comment reliably on whether there are any other aspects of the human experience that surpass bodily existence, as we currently understand bodily existence to be. Although there is presently no scientific reason to suppose that any such aspects exist under our current and still often provisional conceptions of what constitutes the human experience, where they are only provisionally defined in science this limits the reliability of the conclusions that can be drawn from them. In addition, there is what I consider to be the real possibility that current physical theories may be inadequate to account for what is perhaps the preeminent aspect of the human experience: consciousness. Revising physical theories to fit all the facts would also have implications that cannot currently be foreseen.